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Like global governance more generally, global health governance and the global health architecture 
are changing and, in the process, creating new kinds of openings for non-state actors (NSAs) such as 
non-governmental organizations (NGOs), the private sector, and philanthropic organizations. This 
growing role for NSAs in global health governance has occurred at the same time as the World 
Health Organization (WHO) has turned to the private sector and philanthropic organizations for 
multistakeholder partnerships and voluntary contributions to bridge its budgetary gap due to some 
states capping their annual contributions. But without adequate safeguards, there is a risk that the 
increased influence of the private sector on global health policy-making, norm-setting and 
governance at the WHO can result in substantive policy shaped to prioritize profits over public 
interest and health outcomes. There are also risks for the WHO, as the global lead body on health, 
including the potential for conflicts of interest, damage to institutional reputation, and deeper 
reliance on private funding in ways that undermine the WHO’s mandate. 
This dissertation seeks to answer the following questions: 1) In what ways have profit-
oriented NSAs engaged with the WHO as a site of global health governance on substantive policies 
and paradigms that shape policy-making? 2) What are the implications for the WHO of the agency’s 
enhanced engagement with the private sector? This dissertation examines these questions broadly as 
well as through in-depth analyses of the specific cases of the baby food and soda industries. 
The analysis in this dissertation finds that, despite their self-representation as trustworthy 
partners in addressing health issues, private sector actors have worked to influence substantive 
initiatives by the WHO related to the sale and consumption of their products. Private sector actors 
have also engaged in a long-game to shape paradigms that determine which policies are pursued and 
what role private actors are able to play in developing them. These paradigms create an environment 
conducive to companies and their associations, for example, arguing against regulation and in favour 
of voluntary measures and representing themselves as legitimate partners in developing health-
related policy. Like other industries, the baby food and soda industries have pursued their 
substantive and long-term interests by drawing on a so-called “corporate playbook” of strategies and 
tactics to access and impact upon global health policy-making at the WHO. These strategies and 
tactics are iterative and mutually reinforcing. 
Furthermore, in its efforts to bridge its budgetary gap, the WHO has potentially set itself up 
for even more in-depth influence by opening itself to fuller engagement through multistakeholder 
arrangements and PPPs. This fuller engagement has been formalized by the WHO’s Framework of 
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engagement with non-state actors (FENSA). Analysis of the contested development of FENSA 
serves to highlight the types of issues against which the WHO must guard itself  if  it is not to 
undermine the agency’s independence, integrity, credibility and mandate. Although FENSA is 
ostensibly intended to safeguard against potential conflicts of interest, conflating “conflict of 
interest” with the different but related notion of “conflicting interests” leaves the WHO vulnerable 
to those very conflicts of interest and can lead the agency to greater, not less, influence from profit-
based actor. As it continues to adopt a multistakeholder approach and widen its engagement with 
NSAs in order to address its financial challenges, the WHO is potentially setting itself up for greater 
dependence on for-profit entities, which can lead to further conflicts of interest and erosion of the 
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Chapter 1 – Introduction 
 
“The new distribution of power raises an absolutely critical question for health in the sustainable development era. 
Who really governs the policies that shape our health? Is it democratically elected officials acting in the public interest? 
Is it multinational corporations acting in their own interest? Or is it both?  
That is, governments making policies that are heavily influenced by corporate lobbies.” 
Dr. Margaret Chan, Former Director-General of the World Health Organization1 
1.0  Introduction 
Like global governance more generally, global health governance and the global health architecture 
are changing and in the process creating new kinds of openings for non-state actors (NSAs) such as 
non-governmental organizations (NGOs), the private sector, and philanthropic organizations 
(Fidler, 2009; K. Lee & Smith, 2020; McInnes, 2020; O. D. Williams & Rushton, 2011; Youde, 
2020). The state remains an important actor in global health governance, and in governance more 
broadly: States have a duty to protect and fulfil the rights of their populations and they are 
responsible for representing the public interest in decision-making, including as part of 
intergovernmental organizations such as the World Health Organization (the WHO). Yet, as this 
dissertation suggests, states are relinquishing – or delegating (Moloney & Stone, 2019) – some of this 
role to NSAs, such as corporations, and to multistakeholder initiatives2.  
This growing role for NSAs in global health governance has occurred at the same time as the 
WHO, the United Nations specialized agency for health created in 1948, has become resource-
constrained and found its role as lead global health body undermined as some states capped their 
annual contributions to the agency and other international organizations. To bridge its budgetary 
	
1 Address at the Regional Committee of Europe on 15 September 2015. 
(http://www.who.int/dg/speeches/2015/europe-regional-committee/en/) 
2 Interactions between the public and the private sectors are described in UN, academic and corporate 
literature by a number of terms, including PPPs; “collaboration or alliances with the business sector; public-
private joint initiatives; voluntary initiatives; multistakeholder initiatives or dialogues; corporate social 
responsibility- or corporate citizenship initiatives; cause-related marketing; corporate sponsorship; venture 
philanthropy; and reputation- and issues-management” (Richter, 2004b, p. 5). “Multistakeholder” is spelled in 
this dissertation (except in direct quotations) as one word (without a hyphen) to emphasize the extent to 
which the model has been regularized and normalized, and the term “multistakeholderism” to describe the 
dominant approach “in which everyone enters the room on the same footing, ignoring differences in 
interests, roles, and responsibilities among the parties, and negating power imbalances” in contrast to 
“participatory multi-actor deliberation” (McKeon, 2017, p. 380). 
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gap, the WHO has turned to the private sector and philanthropic organizations for multistakeholder 
partnerships and voluntary budgetary contributions.3 
However, greater corporate influence over the WHO governance and policy-making carries 
risks. There is a growing literature about the ways in which corporate activities and influences shape 
health outcomes (Freudenberg & Galea, 2008; Kickbusch et al., 2016). Freudenberg (2014, p. viii) 
argues that “a few hundred corporations have changed the world to suit their needs, and as a result 
set the stage for the twenty-first century disease epidemics”. Without adequate safeguards, the 
increased influence of the private sector on global health policy-making,4 norm-setting and 
governance at the WHO, including through the agency’s reliance on and partnership with 
corporations and their associations, can result in substantive policy shaped to prioritize profits over 
public interest and health outcomes. There are also risks for the WHO as the global lead body on 
health in an evolving global health architecture, and for global health more broadly, including the 
potential for conflicts of interest, damage to institutional reputation, and deeper reliance on private 
funding in ways that undermine the WHO’s mandate and normative functions. 
Against this backdrop of the growing involvement of NSAs in global health governance, as 
part of a global shift toward multistakeholder approaches and public-private partnerships (PPPs)5 to 
address financing challenges, this dissertation seeks to answer the following questions: 1) In what 
ways have profit-oriented NSAs engaged with the WHO as a site of global health governance on 
substantive policies and paradigms6 that shape policy-making? 2) What are the implications for the 
	
3 This dissertation does not seek to prove causation between the WHO’s budgetary gap and the agency’s turn 
to the private sector for financing. Rather, it explores the ways in which the need to bridge this gap has 
potentially set up the WHO for even more in-depth influence on both substantive policy areas as well as 
health policy governance, and thereby both exposed the agency to potential conflicts of interest and 
conflicting interests (this distinction is discussed below) and also undermined its role as global health leader. 
This risk has significant implications for the agency and for global health. 
4 Drawing on Rushton and O. D. Williams (2012, p. 150), “global health policy” in this dissertation refers to 
“those policies, both formal and informal, adopted on either an international or domestic level that respond 
to or affect health.” It includes “both formal instruments (such as laws, rules, standards, regulatory 
frameworks) and more informal outputs (such as principles, norms and guidance)” (Rushton & Williams, 
2012, p. 150). It may refer to both single global policies addressing a particular issue, as well as “a range of 
overlapping and sometimes competing policies from various sources” (Rushton & Williams, 2012, p. 150).  
5 Interactions between the public and the private sectors are described in UN, academic and corporate 
literature by a number of terms, including PPPs; “collaboration or alliances with the business sector; public-
private joint initiatives; voluntary initiatives; multi-stakeholder initiatives or dialogues; corporate social 
responsibility- or corporate citizenship initiatives; cause-related marketing; corporate sponsorship; venture 
philanthropy; and reputation- and issues-management” (Richter, 2004b, p. 5). 
6 Paradigms are, according to Campbell (1998, pp. 385 & 389), “underlying theoretical and ontological 
assumptions about how the world works” and operate in the “cognitive background” to “constrain action by 
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WHO of the agency’s enhanced engagement with the private sector? This dissertation examines 
these questions broadly as well as through in-depth analyses of the specific cases of the baby food 
and soda industries. 
 
1.1 Summary of findings and contributions 
This dissertation finds that, despite their self-representation as trustworthy partners – “part of the 
solution” (Nixon et al., 2015), as they refer to themselves – in addressing health issues, private sector 
actors have worked to influence substantive initiatives by the WHO related to the sale and 
consumption of their products. Private sector actors have also engaged in a long-game to shape 
paradigms that determine which policies are pursued and what role private actors are able to play in 
developing them. These paradigms create an environment conducive to companies and their 
associations, for example, arguing against regulation and in favour of voluntary measures and 
representing corporate actors as legitimate partners in developing health-related policy. Like other 
industries, the baby food and soda industries have pursued their substantive and long-term interests 
by drawing on a so-called “corporate playbook” (Brownell & Warner, 2009; Madureira Lima & 
Galea, 2018; Wiist, 2010) of strategies and tactics to access and impact upon global health policy-
making at the WHO. The “playbook” refers to a variety of similar strategies and tactics witnessed 
across many industries, which include using and shaping the political environment, political and 
public preferences, the knowledge environment, the legal environment and the extra-legal 
environment (Madureira Lima & Galea, 2018). These strategies and tactics are iterative and mutually 
reinforcing, which is to say an actor may use one strategy or tactic to increase its ability to utilize, 
and the effectiveness of, others. 
Beyond substantive policy and the paradigms that shape it and the private sector’s role in 
policy making, there are other implications for the WHO and for global health governance of the 
agency’s enhanced engagement with the private sector. In its efforts to bridge its budgetary gap, the 
WHO has potentially set itself up for even more in-depth influence by opening itself to fuller 
engagement through multistakeholder arrangements and PPPs. This fuller engagement has been 
	
limiting the range of alternatives that policy-making elites are likely to perceive as useful and worth 
considering”. My understanding of paradigms also draws on Hall’s (1993, p. 279) description of them as “a 
framework of ideas and standards that specifies not only the goals of policy and the kind of instruments that 
can be used to attain them, but also the very nature of the problems they are meant to be addressing. Like a 
Gestalt, this framework is embedded in the very terminology through which policymakers communicate about 
their work, and it is influential precisely because so much of it is taken for granted and unamenable to 
scrutiny as a whole”.  
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formalized by the WHO’s Framework of engagement with non-state actors (FENSA). Analysis of 
the contested development of FENSA serves to highlight the types of issues against which the 
WHO must guard itself  if  it is not to undermine the agency’s independence, integrity, credibility and 
mandate. Although FENSA is ostensibly intended to safeguard against potential conflicts of interest, 
conflating “conflict of interest” with the different but related notion of “conflicting interests” leaves 
the WHO vulnerable to those very conflicts of interest and can lead the agency to greater, not less, 
influence from profit-based actor. Furthermore, as it continues to adopt a multistakeholder 
approach and widen its engagement with NSAs in order to address its financial challenges, the 
WHO is potentially setting itself up for greater dependence on for-profit entities, which can lead to 
further conflicts of interest and erosion of the WHO’s role as lead global health body.  
This dissertation makes both empirical and theoretical contributions. Empirically, this thesis 
contributes to the literature in the following ways: first, an analysis of the private sector’s influence 
on, and participation in, global health policy-making in two issue areas and, second, an analysis of 
the evolution of the WHO’s policies concerning its engagement with non-State actors (NSAs). As 
the first empirical contribution to analyze the potential for corporate influence on substantive policy 
and paradigms that shape policy-making, this dissertation uses qualitative case studies of the private 
sector’s influence on, and participation in, global health policy-making in two issue areas.  
The first case study involves the baby food industry7 and its marketing of baby milks and 
foods in the context of infant health outcomes. Concern over the aggressive promotion of formula 
milks and related products and declining breastfeeding rates increased over the 1960s as doctors 
established the negative impact of marketing and advertising on breastfeeding practices. The baby 
food issue landed on the global agenda in the 1970s, when public outcry resulted in a boycott of 
market leader Nestlé. In response, the WHO and UNICEF were compelled to pursue an 
international code to regulate the marketing of baby milk and related products. The result was the 
WHO’s adoption in 1981 of the International Code of Marketing of Breastmilk Substitutes (WHO, 
1981b), which hereafter I will refer to as “the Code”. Almost forty years later, the baby food 
industry has modified its marketing practices but continues to promote its products in ways that 
violate or stretch the Code and to lobby for policies that put profits before infant health (Mehdi & 
	
7 In this dissertation, the baby food industry refers to for-profit companies that manufacture, market or 
distribute BMS, foods for infants and young children, feeding equipment such as teats, bottles (including 
those used with breast pumps), and other products and ingredients used for feeding infants, young children, 




Wagner-Rizvi, 1998; Save the Children, 2007; Save the Children Pakistan, 2013; Anna Taylor, 1997; 
The Network, 1999; Yeong et al., 2010; Yeong & Allain, 2014, 2017).  
The baby food issue is significant because it has a long history on the global health agenda. 
This case study also offers insight into the changing nature of global (health) governance. For 
example, in response to the problem, a WHO-UNICEF joint meeting in October 1979 brought 
together representatives of the UN, national-level governments, industry, experts from a range of 
disciplines, and NGOs including six organizations8 that would create the International Baby Food 
Action Network (IBFAN) at the meeting (Allain, 2005). IBFAN is the first and longest-running 
single-issue transnational advocacy network (Allain, 1989) and works to keep the baby food 
industry’s influence in check. This meeting marked the first time that industry and NGO actors sat 
as equal participants with government delegates in a UN summit (Allain, 1989, 2005; Chetley, 1986, 
pp. 63–65).  
The analysis demonstrates that the baby food industry continues to engage with the WHO in 
connection with policy-making related to infant feeding half a century after the marketing of their 
products became recognized as a health issue. Given the fact that the WHO does not have 
regulatory authority, this engagement indicates that the agency nevertheless represents a significant 
site of policy-making for this industry. The analysis shows that the baby food industry’s engagement 
with the WHO – using strategies and tactics from the corporate playbook to influence substantive 
policy and shape paradigms conducive to their interests – has been intended to protect the 
marketing of its products, including by creating doubt about the scope of the Code and undermining 
efforts for formal regulation at the national level by representing themselves as responsible, 
trustworthy and capable of self-regulation.  
The second case study relates to soda (sugar-sweetened beverages), in the context of non-
communicable diseases (NCDs). The WHO, scholars, NGOs and the media refer to the increased 
incidence of NCDs such as diabetes and obesity as an “epidemic” (for example, Herrera, 2015; 
NCD Alliance, 2017; Nesheim & Nestle, 2015; WHO, 2015b)9), although this framing is also 
	
8 International Organization of Consumers Unions (IOCU) – now called Consumers International, Interfaith 
Center on Corporate Responsibility (ICCR), Infant Formula Action Coalition (INFACT), OXFAM, War on 
Want, Déclaration de Berne. 
9 (Chopra et al., 2002; Daynard et al., 2004; De Vogli et al., 2014; Johnston & Finegood, 2015; Jönsson, 2014; 
Malik et al., 2006; Mann et al., 2015; Myers et al., 2015; Nulu, 2016; Pietrobelli & Agosti, 2017; Sacks et al., 
2013; Schram et al., 2015; Schrecker & Bambra, 2015; Sridhar et al., 2013; Stuckler et al., 2012; A. Taylor et 
al., 2012; UNGA, 2011; Yancey et al., 2006).  
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contested, disputed and highly politicized, as are the terms “obesity” and “obese” 10. Compared with 
the baby food issue, concerns about soda and the health effects from consuming it emerged more 
recently on the global agenda. The soda case also differs from the baby food case in that the causal 
relationship between the marketing and consumption of soda and health outcomes is more difficult 
to isolate and attribute than in the case of the marketing of infant formula, decreased breastfeeding 
and increased infant morbidity and mortality. Soda is not the exclusive cause of diabetes, obesity, 
and other NCDs, but extensive research points to its consumption as a contributing factor to, or 
even a key driver of, the global rise in their rates. Soda manufacturers play a significant role in 
driving up the consumption of soda through the tactics that will be examined below.  
As with the baby food case, the analysis indicates that the soda industry’s engagement with 
the WHO has aimed to protect its sales and profitability and to undermine calls for regulation by 
promoting its self-regulation and voluntary initiatives. Unlike the baby food case and the Code, there 
is no the WHO policy dealing specifically and exclusively with soda. The only global policy 
addressing soda specifically is with respect to its marketing (along with foods and other non-
alcoholic beverages) to children. Instead the soda industry engages with the WHO on matters 
relating to its constituent ingredient (sugar) and to lifestyle (diet, physical activity and health) and 
NCDs, and to specific initiatives that could impact sales (for example, taxation). It also advocates a 
role for the private sector in policy-making and governance, especially in relation global efforts to 
prevent and control NCDs. The 2011 and 2018 Political Declarations for the Prevention and 
Control of NCDs, adopted by Special Sessions of the United Nations General Assembly, for 
example, specifically emphasize a role for, and partnerships with, the private sector. Having 
multistakeholder approaches and the private sector’s role recognized and enshrined in such 
significant documents represents a major win for the soda industry as a global health governance 
actor.  
The analysis of track-records of these two industries contributes to understandings of how 
private sector actors influence policy and policy-making at the WHO, which impacts upon the 
health and well-being of the world’s population.11 It outlines how private sector actors put their 
	
10 The framing of obesity as an “epidemic” is contested, disputed and highly politicized, however, as are the 
terms “obesity” and “obese” (see, for example, Firth, 2012; Medvedyuk, Ali, & Raphael, 2017; Millstone, 
2010; Monaghan, Bombak, & Rich, 2017; Shelley, 2012). However, this discussion lies outside the scope of 
this dissertation. 
11 What this dissertation does not do in relation to the case studies, is independently evaluate the technical 
soundness or effectiveness of various policy options or make substantive policy recommendations. At most, 
it distinguishes which policies are preferred by health professionals and which by industry actors. This is to 
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profits ahead of health in the public interest, even while representing themselves as responsible 
corporate citizens. The analysis highlights the risks for the WHO, including to its independence, 
credibility and mandate, of its enhanced engagement with non-state actors, especially those that are 
profit-oriented, as will be discussed below with respect to the development and adoption of 
FENSA.  
The dissertation’s second empirical contribution is an analysis of the evolution of the 
WHO’s policies concerning its engagement with non-State actors (NSAs), and specifically the for-
profit sector, culminating in the agency’s development and adoption of the “Framework of 
engagement with non-state actors” (FENSA). These policies, especially FENSA, provide a site for 
understanding the implications for the WHO and for global health governance of increasing 
industry influence on substantive policy and paradigms relating to their products and industries’ 
roles as governance actors and the global shift toward multistakeholderism. 
FENSA was adopted on May 28, 2016 (WHO, 2016f), after four contentious years of 
development. It was developed in the context of the agency’s increasing reliance on public-private 
partnerships (PPPs) and multistakeholder collaborative initiatives for funding and carrying out its 
programs (Lhotska & Gupta, 2016). The purpose of the new policy was said to be to provide clear 
guidance to the WHO staff, its Member States and to civil society organizations (CSOs) on how to 
encourage and secure meaningful participation and collaboration of CSOs with the WHO (WHO, 
2012f). However, the Secretariat’s Report to the Executive Board in January 2014 on the November 
2013 Financing Dialogue made it clear that financing was the purpose of FENSA. The Secretariat’s 
report said the overall objective of the WHO’s engagement with NSAs was to work towards 
fulfilling the agency’s mandate “by making better use of [NSAs] resources (including knowledge, expertise, 
commodities, personnel and finances)” (emphasis added) (WHO, 2013j). It further stressed “the 
imperative need to conclude the framework for engaging with [NSAs], in order to facilitate expansion of 
the contributor base beyond Member States…, particularly in light of the growing demands for 
international health-related financing” (emphasis added) (WHO, 2013j).   
The analysis of the development and adoption of FENSA considers the implications for the 
WHO of potentially opening itself to increased profit-driven influence and conflicts of interest, and 
	
say, for example, this dissertation does not make recommendations about the optimal duration of exclusive 
breastfeeding, for example, but it does provide reference to the duration recommended by health 
professionals as well as industry efforts to minimize this duration. Similarly, it does not make 
recommendations about the maximum sugar or soda consumption levels, but states the guidelines determined 
by the WHO through a scientific review and consultative process and notes the soda and sugar industries’ 
efforts to challenge such guidelines. 
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for its integrity and independence, given the private sector’s well-documented efforts to influence 
policy at the WHO. The dissertation considers the implications for global health governance of 
legitimizing actors with for-profit interests participating in global health standard-setting, norm-
setting and policy-making. It also contributes an analysis of the extent to which the WHO is 
potentially setting itself up for greater dependence on for-profit entities, which can lead to additional 
conflicts of interest and further undermine the WHO’s role as lead global health body.  
Although the focus of this dissertation is the global health sector, the findings contribute to 
the understanding of similar developments in other fields where the corporate sector is promoting – 
and gaining – influence and legitimacy as governance actors through the entrenchment of 
multistakeholder approaches and PPPs. Locating the strategies and tactics deployed by the baby 
food and soda industries as part of a “corporate playbook” that is common across many industries, 
as mentioned above, allows for the analysis in the chapters to follow in relation to the baby food and 
soda companies and their business associations to be generalized to other sectors and fields.  
Theoretically, this dissertation contributes to the literatures at the intersection of public 
health, global health, and international political economy in the following ways. The public health 
and global health literatures have identified the “corporate entity as a social structural determinant of 
disease” (Wiist, 2006a, p. 1370) and developed several useful conceptualizations for understanding 
corporate influence on health outcomes and disease burden. The first is the notion of “industrial 
epidemic” (Gilmore et al., 2011; Jahiel, 2008; Jahiel & Babor, 2007; Moodie, 2014; Moodie et al., 
2013), adapting the traditional public health model of epidemics (host, agent vector) and applying it 
to the increase of diseases attributed to the consumption of industrial products such as tobacco, 
alcohol, food, cars, and guns. The second notion is “corporate (or commercial) determinants of 
health” (Hastings, 2012; Kickbusch, 2012; Kickbusch et al., 2016; Millar, 2013), which recognizes 
that the activities of companies and their associations shape the environments in which people live 
and make decisions and which have an impact on their health. 
These literatures have classified the corporate sector’s political activities as a playbook of 
strategies and tactics common across industries (Madureira Lima & Galea, 2018; Mialon et al., 2015). 
While recognizing the utility of the playbook concept for capturing corporate strategies and tactics, 
these literatures are lacking analysis of what types of power underpin the playbook, how the 
corporate sector goes about having this influence and what types of power it is able to access in 
order to do so, and the ways in which these strategies and different types of power are iterative and 
mutually reinforcing. To bring this depth and nuance to my analysis, I draw on the political science, 
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international relations, and international political economy literatures, wherein typologies and 
theories of power are central concepts (M. Barnett & Duvall, 2005; Fuchs, 2005; Lukes, 1974).  
In summary, my analysis brings the following theoretical insights to the existing literature on 
global health governance: 
a) An understanding of how corporations increase their legitimacy and influence as governance 
actors by participating in multistakeholder initiatives, PPPs, and self-regulatory platforms. 
This analysis shows the multistakeholder approach and self-regulation to be an extension of 
corporate actors’ efforts to influence policy and shape paradigms and in the process, 
representing themselves as legitimate partners in global health policy-making and 
governance. For example, baby food company Nestlé has portrayed its membership in the 
UN Global Compact and the FTSE4Good index as indication of its responsibility through 
self-regulation in meeting international agreed baby food marketing standards although 
monitoring of its practices around the world has found that it does not. Companies’ 
inclusion in such platforms and the acceptance of their voluntary codes and other self-
regulation efforts as sufficient both draw on and reinforce their discursive, instrumental and 
structural power. It bolsters their ability draw on this power to represent themselves as 
responsible and trustworthy in order to influence substantive policy and reinforce a 
regulatory environment in which collaboration and partnership appears necessary and 
sufficient, and formal regulation unreasonable and unwarranted. Similarly, soda companies 
undertake self-regulation and other voluntary measures such as product reformulation, 
participating in collaborative initiatives and issuing “global public commitments” to send the 
message that the industry recognizes its role in addressing health concerns and it can be 
trusted to take responsible measures without government imposing legislation. 
b) An application of the concept of the corporate playbook to the strategies and tactics 
undertaken by corporations and their associations at the international level, specifically at the 
WHO as the global lead body on health. Although the WHO lacks regulatory authority as it 
has no enforcement mechanisms, it remains a significant site for political activity by 
corporations and their business associations, such as those of the baby food and soda 
industries, seeking to influence both substantive policy recommendations and paradigms 
relating to health, their products, and their roles as governance actors. The baby food and 
soda industries both use strategies and tactics from the corporate playbook to exercise and 
	 10	
	
reinforce the types of power available to them, which leads to the third theoretical 
contribution. 
c) A more nuanced understanding of the strategies in the “corporate playbook” as they are 
deployed to influence global health policy-making and governance at the WHO and how the 
strategies are accessible to the corporate sector. The analysis demonstrates how the 
corporate sector is able to access and draw upon different types of power – notably 
instrumental, structural and discursive power – in order to exercise various playbook 
strategies. For example, corporations can draw structural power from their market position 
and economic significance in national and global economies in order to shape the legal 
environment when governments understand that investments and jobs may move out of  the 
country in response to unfavourable policies. The analysis also demonstrates that the 
exercise of one type of power often increases or reinforces access to another type of power. 
In other words, their strategies and tactics, as well as the different dimensions of power 
underpinning them, are iterative and reinforcing. For example, by using discursive power to 
represent itself  as a “partner” and legitimate governance actor, the private sector increases its 
instrumental and structural power by shaping paradigms that determine which policies are 
pursued and what role private actors are able to play in developing them. 
My analysis presents a critical evaluation of policy-making processes and mechanisms that 
are meant to safeguard the public interest but in fact increase private sector influence on global 
health policy with important implications for public health. Such a critical analysis is 
particularly necessary at a time when the agency increasingly seeks partnerships with the private 
sector and philanthropies to bridge its budgetary shortfalls due to Member States’ non-payment of 
dues and caps on funding. This shift is taking place against a backdrop of an evolving global health 
architecture that increasingly involves multistakeholder initiatives and PPPs and an entrenchment of 
the role of private sector across the UN system (see, for example the Sustainable Development 
Goals (UNGA, 2015)). The UN’s “rapprochement with business” was “motivated by both external 
changes in the UN’s environment and internal bureaucratic dynamics” and the Secretariat’s material 
interests (Pingeot, 2015, p. 8). It has led to private forms of authority such as multistakeholder 
initiatives and PPPs in global health governance being “widely, but not universally, seen as legitimate 
and desirable” (O. D. Williams & Rushton, 2011, p. 11) and the WHO’s turn to the private sector 






My interest in the corporate influence on health and policy began 30 years ago, when – as an 
idealistic and environmentalist teenager – I became aware of the international boycott of baby food 
giant Nestlé. The company was marketing its products in ways that drew mothers away from 
breastfeeding, a more natural, healthier source for babies and better for the environment. Several 
years later, I worked with a health-related NGO in Pakistan on its advocacy campaign for a law 
prohibiting the marketing of baby milks and foods, in line with an international code on this issue. 
This work began nearly 25 years of involvement with the baby food issue, witnessing firsthand 
industry tactics to market their products and undermine government efforts to regulate these 
practices in Pakistan and elsewhere in the world. The more I got involved in this field the more 
aware I became of similar marketing and lobbying practices across industries and at different levels 
of governance. This experience informed my case selection and methodology for conducting the 
qualitative case studies for this research project.  
 
1.2.2 Data sources 
A challenge of conducting research about the corporate sector is accessing firsthand information 
about companies and industry associations (Kickbusch et al., 2016).12 Companies are either 
unwilling to provide interviews or put forward a public relations person, which does not serve the 
purpose of this research. This was a particular concern for me because of my visibility in connection 
with the baby food issue in Pakistan and internationally13 and I decided not to do interviews for this 
reason. Nevertheless, I was able to secure sufficient data from other sources in the public domain 
	
12 As will be discussed with respect to direction for future research, a new resource has become available for 
exploring food and beverage industry activities to influence both substantive policy and global health 
governance, although too late for inclusion in the analysis for this dissertation. The Food Industry 
Documents Archive was launched by the University of California, San Francisco Industry Documents Library 
on November 15, 2018 (UCSF, 2018). The Industry Documents Library is already home to archives about 
the tobacco, drug, and chemical industries that have made it possible to investigate corporate tactics for 
influencing public health policy. 
13 During my work in Pakistan, I published a Nestlé whistleblower’s account of how the company markets 
baby milk in violation of the international marketing code and the company’s own weaker policy. Milking 
Profits resulted in international media attention, an “internal audit” commissioned by Nestlé headquarters into 
the Pakistani subsidiary’s operations, a hearing by a European Commission Special Committee, and a 2014 
film (Tigers) by an Academy Award-winning director. The film had been in production for several years (as 
Nestlé was well aware (Nestlé, 2014)) and its release was pending as I embarked on my fieldwork for this 
project. The film remained on the film festival circuit for several years and remains available online. 
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and archives to make my case. Although most of what companies and their industry associations 
make publicly available is carefully crafted public relations material, such documents are a 
fundamental part of corporate efforts to “dominate the information environment, so they can 
significantly affect decision making” (Miller & Harkins, 2010, p. 566) and, as such, can provide 
insights into corporate motivations and strategies. These insights can then be corroborated with 
other sources from the grey literature – “that which is produced on all levels of government, 
academics, business and industry in print and electronic formats, but which is not controlled by 
commercial publishers” (New York Academy of Medicine, 2016) – and media reports.  
Much of my information for the baby food case came from records acquired through my 
work with an NGO called The Network for Consumer Protection in Pakistan (formerly the 
Association for the Rational Use of Medication in Pakistan). The Network was a member of 
IBFAN, with which I remained involved to varying degrees and in different capacities over the 
years. These records were supplemented and updated by recourse to peer-reviewed academic articles 
and books (especially from the public and global health literatures), as well as the information 
collected from the websites, publications, and archives of the WHO, NGOs and networks (such as 
IBFAN and its member organizations), and baby food companies and their associations, as well as 
from the news media, business reports and other publicly available information (Mialon et al., 2015). 
In order to understand the baby food industry’s formal engagement with the WHO, I collected 
submissions and interventions made by business associations during consultations and governing 
body meetings. These documents, which were available from the WHO and business association 
websites, pertained both to policies related to their products and infant nutrition and to the 
development of FENSA. 
Because it was important to use the same method for both cases, data collection for the soda 
case relied similarly on peer-reviewed academic articles and books (again, especially from the public 
and global health literatures) and the relevant grey literature. I collected submissions and 
interventions made by business associations during consultations and governing body meetings. 
These documents, readily available from the WHO and business association websites, pertained 
both to policies related to their products and NCDs, as well as to the development of FENSA. 
I also attended the 67th World Health Assembly (WHA) in May 2014 as a participant-
observer in IBFAN’s delegation. That WHA was expected to adopt the proposed FENSA but 
deferred it for further development. This participant-observation was particularly useful for the 
development of my analysis of the WHO’s adoption of FENSA. It helped me to identify key issues 
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and critiques of early drafts of the proposed policy and the process through which it was being 
developed, and for answering my question about the implications for the WHO of the agency’s 
enhanced engagement with the private sector. 
 
1.2.3 Modes of analysis 
To analyze the data, I developed timelines and documented the political activity of these two 
industries with respect to their engagement with the WHO. My analysis combined historical trends 
with insights from contemporary information, as well as with insights from other issue areas and 
industries, such as the tobacco, pharmaceutical and alcohol industries, with which it was possible to 
draw parallels. This analysis also benefited from my experience as an insider observer, having been 
involved with the baby food issue for many years. 
To understand the strategies that corporations deploy to advance their political agendas, I 
undertook a document analysis (MacKenzie & Hawkins, 2016) of peer-reviewed articles, systematic 
reviews, and grey literature, including market analyses and reports published by government and 
intergovernmental agencies and NGOs. Documents of various types “can help the researcher 
uncover meaning, develop understanding and discover insights relevant to the research problem” 
(Merriam & Tisdale, 2015, p. 106). However, document analysis must take into consideration the 
provenance of the documents, including their source, intended audience, and intended purpose 
(MacKenzie & Hawkins, 2016). 
My document analysis entailed an iterative process of “skimming (superficial examination), 
reading (thorough examination), and interpretation” that combined elements of content analysis and 
thematic analysis (Bowen, 2009, p. 32). In this sense, content analysis refers to “a first-pass 
document review” to identify meaningful and relevant text or data and to separate pertinent 
information from that which is not pertinent (Bowen, 2009; Corbin & Strauss, 2008). This was 
followed by a thematic analysis to recognize patterns in the data and themes for subsequent analysis 
(Fereday & Muir-Cochrane, 2006) to identify and track strategies for influencing both substantive 
policies and the paradigms that determine which policies are pursued and what role private actors 
are able to play in developing them. I corroborated these themes with insights from the submissions 
and interventions by NGOs and networks about their critiques with respect to industry influence 
and with respect to the development of FENSA. 
My document examination also included a frame analysis of industry documents, including 
business reports, press releases and submissions to consultations, as well as corporate quotes and 
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representation in the media. Frames are “underlying structures of belief, perception and 
appreciation” (Schön & Rein, 1994, p. 23). Frames “emphasiz[e] a particular definition of a problem 
or solution and help shape policy discourses and the public policy agenda” (Scott & Nixon, 2017, p. 
1). The framing of issues and actors make possible or encourage certain kinds of policy responses 
and preclude others (Hawkins & Holden, 2013; MacKenzie & Holden, 2016). 
I also used document analysis to analyse the WHO’s adoption of FENSA and its 
implications for the agency’s integrity and independence. Document analysis here provided “the 
historical roots of specific issues and … indicate[s] the conditions that impinge upon the 
phenomena currently under investigation” and served “as a means of tracking change and 
development” (Bowen, 2009, pp. 29–30). 
 
1.3 Overview of chapters 
The chapters of this dissertation are as follows. To set the stage for the analysis of profit-oriented 
NSAs’ engagement with the WHO as a site of global governance, Chapter 2 sets changes in global 
health governance in relation to the changing nature of global governance in general. These changes 
include the creation of openings for NSAs such as the private sector to influence upon and 
participate in governance and policy-making and the global shift toward a multistakeholder approach 
and PPPs. This shift exposes the WHO to potential risks, including undue corporate influence and 
conflicts of interest. For conceptualizing the impacts of  corporate influence on health, including by 
influencing substantive policy and paradigms that shape policy-making, the chapter goes on to 
introduce the public and global health notions of “industrial epidemics” and “corporate (or 
commercial) determinants of health.” In addition, while recognizing the utility of the concept of a 
corporate playbook (Madureira Lima & Galea, 2018) for capturing the strategies and tactics for-
profit enterprises and their associations use to do this, the chapter goes on to develop a more 
nuanced conception that identifies as well the instrumental, structural and discursive dimensions of 
power that underpin them (Clapp & Fuchs, 2009b; Clapp & Scrinis, 2017; Fuchs, 2005, 2007; Levy 
& Egan, 2000).  
As a way of situating this dissertation’s analysis of corporate influence on substantive 
policies and paradigms that shape policy-making at the WHO and the implications for the agency of 
its enhanced engagement with the private sector, Chapter 3 provides context for understanding the 
WHO as a site of global governance and its financial challenges that have encouraged greater 
engagement with the private sector. The chapter opens with an overview of the antecedents, 
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creation and mandate of the WHO, followed by a description of its structure, governance, and 
financing. It then focuses on the emergence of the financing crisis – against the backdrop of the rise 
of neoliberalism14 – that contributed to the agency’s increasing engagement with the private sector 
in ways that make it vulnerable to conflicts of interests and corporate influence on substantive 
policy. The chapter assesses a number of reforms introduced by various Directors-General of the 
WHO with particular emphasis on the WHO’s embrace of a multistakeholder approach in the late 
1990s under then Director-General Gro Harlem Brundtland and lays out the resulting challenges to 
the WHO’s role as global health leader in a changing global health landscape. 
Chapter 4 provides background to the two case studies studied in depth to answer the 
question about private sector engagement with WHO as a site of global health governance on 
substantive policies and paradigms that shape policy-making. The chapter first presents the 
significance of breastfeeding to infant health. Following an overview of the baby food marketing 
issue, it introduces baby food market leaders Nestlé and Danone and the largest industry 
associations and outlines global policies and guidelines relating to baby milks and foods. With regard 
to the soda industry, the chapter discusses the effects of sugar consumption on health and NCDs, 
including diabetes and obesity and then identifies soda market leaders Coca-Cola and PepsiCo and 
the main soda industry business associations and outlines global policies and guidelines relevant to 
soda.  
In order to answer in what ways profit-oriented NSAs have engaged with the WHO as a site 
of global health governance on substantive policies and paradigms that shape policy-making, the 
next two chapters, Chapters 5 and 6, turn to the in-depth analysis of the two case studies to show 
how corporations and their business associations in the baby food and soda industries draw on the 
“playbook” to influence substantive policy and shape public discourse (Brownell & Warner, 2009; 
Madureira Lima & Galea, 2018; Wiist, 2010). Chapter 5 analyzes corporate engagement on baby 
food, discussing how corporations have utilized the playbook at key moments in global health 
governance at the WHO regarding baby food marketing and infant and young child nutrition more 
	
14 Neoliberalism is a nebulous term applied to many different phenomena. Ward and England (2007) 
describe neoliberalism as having four faces, which Schrecker (2016, p. 1) summarizes as “simultaneously an 
ideology, a set of policies and programmes, a set of distinctive institutional forms, and a complex of 
normative conceptions of agency and responsibility that are rooted in the ideology and embodied in the 
policies, programmes and institutional forms”. In terms of global health governance, neoliberalization has 
been characterized by the “deployment and privileging of market-based policy responses, … 
commodification, privatisation, liberalisation of health and healthcare, and … the individualisation of risk and 
responsibility for health” (Rushton & Williams, 2012, p. 163). 
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broadly. Chapter 6 analyzes corporate engagement in global policy-making at the WHO relating to 
soda consumption utilizing the strategies from the playbook. These two chapters demonstrate how 
the corporate sector is able to utilize these strategies and tactics by drawing on different types of 
power, including instrumental, structural and discursive power and that both these strategies and the 
power they rely on are iterative and reinforce one another (Fuchs, 2005).  
Chapter 7 turns to the implications for WHO of the agency’s enhanced engagement with 
NSAs, especially the for-profit sector, with an emphasis on the development and adoption in May 
2016 of the contentious FENSA (WHO, 2016f). The chapter begins with an overview of the global 
shift toward multistakeholder approach and PPPs across the UN system in general and by the WHO 
in particular, and its entrenchment as a legitimate and preferred mode of  operation. Such 
collaborations increase the risk of  conflicts of  interest, which the chapter distinguishes from 
conflicting interests. These constitute two distinct but related concepts that the WHO has repeatedly 
conflated, including throughout the development of  FENSA, with the result that the agency has 
potentially opened itself  to greater private sector influence, not less. It then reviews the WHO 
policies and proposals relating to engagement with NSAs, leading up to the adoption of FENSA, 
highlighting the main concerns raised by the private sector and critical NGOs. The chapter analyzes 
the final FENSA text, developments since its adoption, including the alignment of subsequent 
policies with its faulty conceptualization of conflicts of interest, and implications for the WHO and 




Chapter 2 – Global Health Governance and the Private Sector: The “corporate 
playbook” and the exercise of power 
 
2.0 Introduction  
The concept of global governance, which gained traction in the 1990s, opens the way to recognizing 
a greater role for non-state actors (NSAs), including non-governmental organizations (NGOs), 
philanthropic organizations, and the private sector, including corporations and business associations 
in global political activity (Avant et al., 2010; Koppell, 2010; Lake, 2010; Moloney & Stone, 2019; 
Scholte, 2005). Although intergovernmental organizations like the World Health Organization 
(WHO) have long been sites for state cooperation and coordination on global issues, NSAs are 
increasingly able to impact upon and participate in global governance processes. Moloney & Stone 
(2019) capture this effect in the linked notions of global policy and transnational administration. As 
a result of  growing space, private sector actors are having ever-increasing influence and are thus able 
to shape policies, regulations and institutions concerning global policy, including global health 
policy. 
This chapter locates the changing nature of global health governance in relation to these 
broader developments in global governance in general. As we shall see, this shift toward a 
multistakeholder approach and public-private partnerships (PPPs) exposes the WHO to potential 
risks, including undue corporate influence and conflicts of  interest. For conceptualizing the impacts 
of  corporate influence on health outcomes and disease burden, the public health and global health 
literatures provide the useful notions of  the “industrial epidemic” (Gilmore et al., 2011; Jahiel, 2008; 
Jahiel & Babor, 2007; Moodie et al., 2013) and “corporate (or commercial) determinants of  health” 
(Buse et al., 2017; Hastings, 2012; Kickbusch, 2012; Kickbusch et al., 2016; Millar, 2013), which will 
be expanded upon below.  
One way these corporate impacts are manifested is through the variety of strategies and 
tactics the private sector deploys to influence global health policy and policy-making, as will be 
analyzed in Chapters 5-7. Similar strategies are witnessed across many industries and have been 
dubbed the corporate “playbook” (Brownell & Warner, 2009; Madureira Lima & Galea, 2018; Wiist, 
2010), as will be outlined below. A more nuanced understanding of the playbook requires an analysis 
of the different types of power – for example, instrumental, structural and discursive power – that 
underpin the strategies available to the corporate sector. These types of power are discussed below, 




2.1 The WHO in the changing landscape of global health governance  
The global governance perspective abandons methodological nationalism that takes the state as the 
primary unit of analysis and instead examines a wide range of governance actors (Hettne, 2005). Some 
of the types of actors engaged in global governance include: international organizations (Avant et al., 
2010; M. Barnett & Duvall, 2005; M. Barnett & Finnemore, 2004; M. N. Barnett & Finnemore, 1999; 
Lake, 2010; Strange, 1996), regimes (Krasner, 1983), corporations and other for-profit organizations 
(Avant et al., 2010; Lake, 2010; Ruggie, 2004; Strange, 1996), non-governmental organizations and 
international non-governmental organizations (Cooley & Ron, 2002; Keck et al., 1998; Lake, 2010; K. 
Lee, 2010; McKeon, 2016; Price, 2003), private governance authorities (Büthe & Mattli, 2011; Lake, 
2010; Ruggie, 2004; Scholte, 2005, 2011), and regional formations. Networks are another type of global 
governance actor (Kahler, 2009), and one that includes a variety of sub-categories, such as 
transnational advocacy/activist networks (Gilson, 2011, 2011; Hudson, 2001; Keck et al., 1998; Price, 
2003), epistemic communities (Haas, 1992), transgovernmental networks (Slaughter, 2004) and 
transnational municipal networks (Betsill & Bulkeley, 2006). 
Corporate actors in particular are increasingly playing political roles and acquiring rule-
setting powers (Fuchs, 2005; Pearson & Seyfang, 2001; Ruggie, 2004). In more and more issue areas, 
“firms are basically functioning like governments” (Cutler, 2002, p. 32), while the state has retreated 
from being a standard-setter and regulator (Pearson & Seyfang, 2001, pp. 54–55). Instead of  state 
regulation, which in the era of  neo-liberalism was rejected as it would raise public expenditure and 
become a disincentive for foreign investment, “greater governance responsibility is placed on 
companies themselves” (Detomasi, 2007, p. 323). Voluntary self-regulation is replacing state 
regulation in many industries and sectors (Pearson & Seyfang, 2001), although its effectiveness in 
improving corporations’ behaviour and practices has been limited (Ollila, 2003). For Lister, 
however, governments are not so much retreating as transforming their role. Alongside traditional 
regulation, governments are also enabling private regulation within co-regulatory systems (Lister, 
2011, p. 15). 
Thus, the state has not completely lost its power and remains a significant, though not the 
only, actor in global health governance and global governance more broadly (Cerny, 2010; Sassen, 
2007; Scholte, 2005; Slaughter, 2004). States have political mandate, legitimacy and accountability at 
both the national and global levels, including through intergovernmental organizations such as the 
WHO. States remain responsible for giving effect to global policies and commitments, including 
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through programing, legislation, and enforcement, at the national level. International agreements 
recognize the continuing significance of states and the intergovernmental organizations that they 
form. For example, the Political Declaration on the Prevention and Control of NCDs, adopted at 
the High-level meeting of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), September 19-20, 2011, 
recognizes the “primary role and responsibility of governments”, as well as “the leading role of the 
[the WHO] as the primary specialized agency for health,” and reaffirms the WHO’s “leadership and 
coordination role” with respect to action against NCDs (UNGA, 2011). 
From a rights perspective, states are duty-bearers: they have the duty to protect and fulfil the 
rights of their populations, and they are responsible for representing the public interest in decision-
making. The right to health has been recognized in numerous international and regional human 
rights treaties as well as national constitutions all over the world. For example, the right to health is 
enshrined in the UN Declaration of Human Rights (UNGA, 1948); the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (UNGA, 1966), and the subsequent General Comment on the 
Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health (Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights, 2000); the WHO Constitution (WHO, 2006b), the Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) (UNGA, 1979); and the Convention on the 
Rights of the Child (UNGA, 1989). Additionally, the Alma-Ata Declaration, adopted by the 
International Conference on Primary Health Care held in that city (present-day Almaty, Kazakhstan) 
in September 1978, emphasized the importance of  primary health care and the role of  the state in 
providing adequate health and social services and infrastructure. It was a major milestone in the field 
of  public health, reaffirming health as a human right and setting a target of  achieving Health for All 
by 2000 (ICPHC, 1978). 
As duty-bearers with respect to the right to health, “governments must generate conditions 
in which everyone can be as healthy as possible”; this includes ensuring the availability of health 
services, healthy and safe working conditions, adequate housing and nutritious food 
(WHO/OHCHR, 2007). According to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (UNGA, 1966), and the subsequent General Comment No. 14 on the Right to the Highest 
Attainable Standard of Health (Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 2000), State 
Parties have three types of obligations with respect to the right to health. They must respect (not 
interfere with its enjoyment), protect (ensure that third parties (NSAs, including corporations such as 
those discussed in this dissertation) do not infringe upon its enjoyment), and fulfil (take positive steps 
to realize it) the right to health (WHO/OHCHR, 2007).  
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Intergovernmental organizations like the WHO are sites for state cooperation and 
coordination on global issues. Comprised of Member States represented by government delegates, 
they represent an extension of states’ political mandate, legitimacy and accountability to their 
citizenry, even if this accountability is flawed and even if there are other influences, such as from 
civil society (which also often claims to represent the public interest) and the private sector, which 
will be discussed in the following section. Yet, as this dissertation indicates, states and 
intergovernmental organizations such as the WHO are relinquishing some of their role and 
responsibility in terms of respecting, protecting and fulfilling the right to health to NSAs, including 
corporations, and to multistakeholder initiatives such as PPPs, which lack democratic political 
mandate, legitimacy and accountability.  
 
2.2 The turn to multistakeholderism 
One way that the ever-growing influence of  private sector actors is manifested is through the shift 
toward multistakeholder initiatives and governance15 – or multistakeholderism – across the UN 
system, including by the WHO. Not only are private actors asserting a greater governance role, but 
they are also increasingly recognized as governance partners as part of  multistakeholder initiatives 
and PPPs. In response to pressures from the rise of  neoliberalism, the 1990s saw the UN system 
looking to the private sector for financing and collaboration in solving development, poverty and 
human rights issues. In 1997, the then new UN Secretary General Kofi Annan announced reforms 
that stated that the relationship of  the UN and the organizations of  the UN system with the 
business community was of  “particular importance” (Annan, 1997, 1998).  
Seeking to strategically adapt the WHO to the dominant neoliberal logic (Chorev, 2013), 
then the WHO Director-General Gro Harlem Brundtland (1998-2003) spearheaded reform of the 
WHO, calling for “open and constructive relations with the private sector” (WHO, 1998, cited in 
Buse & Walt, 2000 and Lee, 2009). Her reforms led to a dramatic increase in PPPs in the form of  
vertical initiatives focused on specific diseases such as HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria. These 
reforms and the WHO’s growing reliance on voluntary funding contributions are discussed in more 
detail in Chapter 3.  
	
15 Multistakeholder initiatives (or governance) bring together two or more classes of  actors (i.e. state, 
intergovernmental, business and civil society actors to formulate, implement and/or monitor rules governing 
different policy fields (Raymond & DeNardis, 2015; Schneiker & Joachim, 2018). 
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Multistakeholder engagement, including with the private sector, is enshrined in the UNGA’s 
2011 and 2018 Political Declarations on NCDs. In addition to the primary role and responsibility of 
governments and the leadership and coordinating role of the WHO with respect to actions against 
NCDs, the 2011 Political Declaration also recognizes “the essential need for the efforts and 
engagement of all sectors of society” and acknowledges “the contribution of and important role 
played by all relevant stakeholders,” including, “where and as appropriate, the private sector and 
industry” in efforts to prevent and control NCDs (UNGA, 2011, paras. 3 & 37). The Declaration 
makes repeated references to a multi-sector approach, multi-sector initiatives, including the private 
sector, as well as one reference specifically to multistakeholder engagement (UNGA, 2011). The 
2018 Political Declaration calls for multistakeholder engagement, dialogue and partnerships (UNGA, 
2018). 
Multistakeholder partnerships are also highlighted in the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable 
Development, which outlined the Sustainable Development Goals, adopted at the UNGA’s high-
level plenary meeting on the topic in September 2015 (UNGA, 2015). Under the heading “Multi-
stakeholder partnerships”, Indicator 17.17, attached to Goal 17 – Strengthen the means of 
implementation and revitalize the Global Partnership for Sustainable Development – reads 
“Encourage and promote effective public, public-private and civil society partnerships, building on 
the experience and resourcing strategies of partnerships” (UNGA, 2015). The private business 
sector is called upon “to apply their creativity and innovation to solving sustainable development 
challenges” (UNGA, 2015 para 67). Indeed, as Horton (2019) describes, financing for the SDGS 
relies on various sources and formats of private funding, such as philanthropy from individuals and 
foundations and “impact investments” that take into consideration environmental, social and 
governance factors. The SDGs format encourages a “pay to play” approach where donors select 
activities to fund toward the attainment of specific goals while core funding to support integrated 
global goods is lacking (McKeon, 2016). 
Advocates of the multistakeholder approach and PPP model maintain that global health 
issues are more complex than can be handled by states and other actors alone and that business can 
contribute expertise and resources (Sturchio & Goel, 2012), enable the sharing of risks and help 
overcome systemic challenges toward their solution (UN Global Compact, 2014). Proponents of 
PPPs argue that public health has become ‘big business’, involving large and influential companies 
and significant commercial activity. At the same time, following the 2008 financial crisis, public 
health receives less public revenue, necessitating private sector involvement (Majestic, 2009). Private 
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sector involvement in health initiatives also makes good business sense, maintain Sturchio and Goel 
(2012), because improving public health contributes to economic development and political stability. 
Essential to the success of such partnerships, writes Quelch (2016), are mutual understanding and 
respect.  
However, not everyone welcomes the corporate sector’s growing political influence on social 
policy and the trend toward multistakeholderism and PPPs (Farnsworth & Holden, 2006; Gilmore et 
al., 2011; Hastings, 2012; McKeon, 2017; Rundall & Brady, 2011; Savell et al., 2014). Critics view 
PPPs as “basically public relations and market expansion gambits for the private sector” (Ng & 
Ruger, 2011, p. 6). They also raise concerns that partnerships may blur the distinctions between the 
aims, roles and obligations of different types of actors (Buse & Walt, 2000; McKeon, 2017; Richter, 
2004c), negate power imbalances (McKeon, 2017), and jeopardize the “independence, integrity and 
reputation” of  the WHO and other agencies (Richter, 2004c) or co-opt government actors and 
public-interest NGOs (Fuchs, 2005). McKeon (2017, p. 380), for example, argues that the 
multistakeholder approach poses challenges for the “the legitimacy of governance, the protection of 
common goods, and the defence of human rights.” Furthermore, ideational pre-alignments 
determine which actors participate in multistakeholder forums, the forums’ governance processes 
and their results, among other things (Schneiker & Joachim, 2018), meaning that critical perspectives 
are left out. 
Perspectives on the role and responsibilities of corporations are now more nuanced than 
Friedman’s classic perspective that the only responsibility of business is to increase shareholder 
profits (M. Friedman, 1978). Nevertheless, the reason for corporations’ existence is to generate 
profits and increase value for shareholders, and they have a fiduciary responsibility to pursue their 
best interests regardless on the effects on society (including its health) or the environment (Wiist, 
2006b). A corporate official who takes action that results in poor financial performance can be held 
accountable for failing to maximize profits for investors (Wiist, 2006b). 
In their pursuit of fulfilling this fiduciary responsibility, corporations seek to influence policy 
and regulations that would impact their activities. Corporations often call for strong regulations that 
would protect their interests (for example, contract law and intellectual property rights) while 
opposing or undermining regulations that could constrain their operations and ability to make a 
profit (such as restrictions on advertising and limits on unhealthy ingredients) (Rundall & Brady, 
2011). One way that private sector actors seek to avoid more rigorous regulation by governments 
that might constrain their profitability and trustworthiness is by promoting voluntary self-regulation 
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and voluntary codes and initiatives (see, for example, Albareda, 2008; Bohme, Zorabedian, & 
Egilman, 2005; Nixon et al., 2015; Savell et al., 2014; Sharma, Teret, & Brownell, 2010). However, 
voluntary codes of conduct have had limited effect on improving corporations’ behaviour and 
conduct (Ollila, 2003). Ultimately, the private sector’s fiduciary motivation raises questions about its 
role in multistakeholder initiatives, especially when it comes to matters of governance and the setting 
of norms and standards. 
 
2.3 Corporate impacts on health: industrial epidemics and corporate determinants of 
health 
The public health and global health literatures provide useful ways of conceptualizing the 
implications of corporate impacts on health and disease burden – both directly through their 
promotion of products that can be harmful to health and indirectly by influencing substantive policy 
and paradigms relating to their products and industry role in governance and policy-making. The 
first concept is the notion of the “industrial epidemic” (Gilmore et al., 2011; Jahiel, 2008; Jahiel & 
Babor, 2007; Moodie et al., 2013). The concept was first developed in 1995 by Beatrice Majnoni 
d’Intignano to refer to the increase of diseases attributed to the consumption of industrial products 
such as tobacco, alcohol, food, cars, and guns. While acknowledging the role of the consumer, the 
concept drew attention to the responsibilities of industrial corporations (d’Intignano, 1995, 1998; 
d’Intignano & Philippe, 2001; Jahiel, 2008; Jahiel & Babor, 2007). 
Traditional public health constructs of epidemics identify the role of the host, agent, 
environment and vector of disease spread. The agent is the cause of disease, the host is the 
individual exposed to the agent, the environment is the place where the host is exposed to the agent, 
and the vector is an organism where the agent may evolve and replicate, be carried through different 
environments and eventually exposed to the host (Jahiel, 2008). For example, an individual (host) 
may become infected with malaria after exposure to malaria plasmodia (agent) carried by a mosquito 
(vector) in the woods (environment). This model has been suggested as a way to address non-
biological epidemics as well, such as obesity (Egger et al., 2003). 
The “industrial epidemics” concept adapts this model to identify “the role of the host (the 
consumer), agent (the product, e.g. cigarettes, alcohol), environment and, crucially, the disease vector 
(the corporation)” (Gilmore et al., 2011). While in infectious disease epidemics the vectors are 
biological, in industrial epidemics the vectors are TNCs and their activities that undermine public 
health interventions (Gilmore et al., 2011; Jahiel & Babor, 2007). This approach shifts the focus 
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from the agent (for example, alcohol) or the host (the problem drinker) to the disease vector (the 
alcohol industry and its associates) and their responsibility for the exposure of vulnerable 
populations to the risks of alcohol (Jahiel & Babor, 2007).16 The “corporate disease vectors” (Jahiel 
& Babor, 2007) have “have considerable power, resources and experience in shaping environments 
in ways that maximize their profits, while not seriously and comprehensively considering its public 
health impacts” (O’Flaherty & Guzman, 2016).  
Infant mortality and morbidity as a result of decreased breastfeeding linked with the 
marketing of baby foods, and increased rates of diabetes and obesity linked with soda consumption 
are examples of industrial epidemics attributable in part to corporate (or industrial) disease vectors. 
The conceptualization has also been applied to the harmful effects on health of a wide variety of 
products, including tobacco (Reubi, 2012; Slade, 1989; Stuckler et al., 2012), alcohol (Babor et al., 
2010; Jernigan, 2009; Moodie, 2014; Moodie et al., 2013), chemicals and lead (Markowitz & Rosner, 
2013), asbestos (Lilienfeld, 1991), cars (MacLennan, 1988), and the food and drink industries (Jahiel 
& Babor, 2007; O’Flaherty & Guzman, 2016).  
Another useful conceptualization calls corporate practices to promote the consumption of 
harmful products the “corporate (or commercial) determinants of health” (Buse et al., 2017; 
Hastings, 2012; Millar, 2013).17 Kickbusch, Allen, & Franz (2016) define commercial determinants 
of health as: “strategies and approaches used by the private sector to promote products and choices 
that are detrimental to health”. They argue that these corporate activities influence “the social 
environment in which people live and work: namely the availability, cultural desirability, and prices 
of unhealthy products. The environment shapes the so-called lifeworlds, lifestyles, and choices of 
individual consumers—ultimately determining health outcomes” (Kickbusch et al., 2016). While the 
social determinants of health have received considerable attention (Marmot, 2005; WHO 
Commission on Social Determinants of Health & WHO, 2008), the commercial (or corporate) 
determinants deserve as much concern (Hastings, 2012), along with political, environmental, 
	
16Jahiel and Babor (2007) modified d’Intignano’s conceptualization to include “diseases of consumers, 
workers and community residents caused by industrial promotion of consumable products, job conditions 
and environmental pollution, respectively, and to endemic as well as epidemic conditions.” This modification 
is not the focus of this dissertation. 
17This idea builds on the concept of social determinants of health, which refers to the conditions in which 
people are born, grow, live, work, and age, and the structural drivers that determine those conditions, and the 




behavioural and legal determinants (Gostin et al., 2019; Kickbusch, 2012; Ottersen et al., 2014; 
Whitmee et al., 2015). 
The conceptualizations of industrial epidemics and corporate (or commercial) determinants 
of health are relevant to analysis of the baby food and soda industries because they acknowledge the 
potentially problematic nature of their products (baby foods and sodas) and the agency of 
consumers but also draw attention to the industries’ role in marketing and advertising these products 
in ways that undermine consumers’ healthy decision-making and interfere in efforts to introduce 
formal regulation that would protect consumers and their health. The strategies and tactics utilized 
by the corporate sector in pursuit of this influence are captured by the notion of the corporate 
“playbook”, as explained below in section 2.4. 
 
2.4 The corporate “playbook” and the types of power that underpin it  
The corporate sector utilizes a variety of strategies and tactics to influence policies and the 
paradigms that shape them and policy-making, as will be analyzed with respect to the baby food and 
soda industries in Chapters 5 and 6, respectively. Similar strategies are witnessed across many 
industries, including tobacco, alcohol, pharmaceuticals, processed foods, asbestos, baby food, 
soda.18 These strategies have been dubbed the corporate “playbook” (Brownell & Warner, 2009; 
Madureira Lima & Galea, 2018; Wiist, 2010). As will be demonstrated in Chapters 5-7, the strategies 
and tactics that comprise the corporate playbook are iterative and mutually reinforcing, which is to 
say an actor may use one strategy or tactic to increase its ability to utilize, and the effectiveness of, 
others.  
What public health descriptions of the corporate playbook lack, however, is analysis of how 
the corporate sector is able to pursue these strategies, what power it is able to access in order to do 
so, and what power these strategies serve to enhance and reinforce. To inform my analysis in this 
regard, I draw on the political science, international relations, and international political economy 
literatures, where typologies and theories of power are central concepts. Some scholars in these 
disciplines maintain that only by examining the various elements of  political power can its full extent 
and limitations be more comprehensively understood, and that these different facets of  power are 
	
18 For examples, see Bond, 2010; Brownell & Warner, 2009; Dorfman, Cheyne, Friedman, Wadud, & 
Gottlieb, 2012; Granheim et al., 2017; Hawkins, Holden, Eckhardt, & Lee, 2016; Kearns Couzens & Taubes, 
2012; Savell, Gilmore, & Fooks, 2014; Scott, Hawkins, & Knai, 2017; Weishaar et al., 2012; Wiist, 2010.  
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not competing with one another but can overlap and be complementary and, indeed, like the 
playbook strategies, one type of  power can be used to enhance the others (Fuchs, 2007).  
Various efforts have been made to conceptualize power as being composed of different 
dimensions (M. Barnett & Duvall, 2005; Clapp & Fuchs, 2009a; Fuchs, 2005; Fuchs & Lederer, 
2008; Lukes, 1974; Strange, 2015). Lukes (2004), for example, views power as comprising of three 
dimensions: coercion (“power over”) or decision-making power (those with power will prevail in the 
decision-making); agenda-setting power (those with power determine which issues will be discussed 
and can influence the context in which the decision will be made and therefore the decision itself); 
and co-option or ideological/ideational power (those with power shape perspectives such that they 
not only determine the agenda but manipulate others’ thinking in such a way that it aligns with that 
of those in power. Barnett and Duvall’s (2005) taxonomy identifies four conceptions of  power: 
compulsory, institutional, structural and productive power.19 My analysis in this dissertation, however, will 
examine the ways in which the corporate playbook of  strategies and tactics is underpinned by the 
following three dimensions of  power – instrumental, structural and discursive power, which often 
overlap and reinforce one another (Clapp & Fuchs, 2009b; Clapp & Scrinis, 2017; Fuchs, 2005, 
2007; Levy & Egan, 2000).  
Instrumental power refers to an actor’s direct influence over another actor in order to affect 
political or policy output, for example through lobbying or financial support (Clapp & Scrinis, 2017; 
Fuchs, 2005). It is dependent on the “financial, organizational, or human resources, as well as access 
to decision-makers” (Fuchs, 2005). Combining Barnett and Duvall’s (2005) compulsory and institutional 
power and called relational power by Strange (2015, p. 27), instrumental power is the idea behind Lukes’ 
(2004) coercive or decision-making power and Dahl’s (1957, pp. 202–203) notion of  “A has power 
over B to the extent that he [sic] can get B to do something that B would not otherwise do.” Such a 
perspective assumes unilinear causality and that actors have autonomy in their decisions and actions. 
It does not consider structural sources of  power that predetermine the options available to actors 
(Fuchs, 2005). 
	
19 Compulsory power is direct control by one actor over another. Institutional power is indirect control through 
diffuse or distant relations of  interaction and focuses on differential constraints on action. Structural power 
shapes the “fates and conditions of  existence” of  actors by allocating differential capacities and advantages to 
different structural positions. It also shapes actors’ self-understanding and subjective interests, “leaving them 
willing to ‘accept their role in the existing order of  things’.” Productive power refers to “the socially diffuse 
production of  subjectivity in systems of  meaning and signification.” It “concerns discourse, the social 
processes and the systems of  knowledge through which meaning is produced, fixed, lived, experienced, and 
transformed” (M. Barnett & Duvall, 2005). 
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Structural power represents the “second face of  power” or agenda-setting power (Clapp & 
Scrinis, 2017; Fuchs, 2005; Lukes, 2004). Referring to the “structural contexts that make alternatives 
more or less acceptable before the actual and observable bargaining starts” (Fuchs, 2005, p. 776), it 
pre-determines the behavioural options of  decision-makers, making certain issues more possible to 
become a priority while others are not. As difficult as it may be to attribute the causal influence of  
instrumental power on policy outcomes, structural power is even more difficult to identify, as it may 
leave no traceable evidence (Fuchs, 2005). 
Structural power allocates differential capacities and advantages to different structural 
positions (M. Barnett & Duvall, 2005). This is the power and influence that corporations, for 
example, draw from their market position and economic significance in national and global 
economies (Clapp & Scrinis, 2017). For example, a company may influence a government by 
suggesting – although it need not say so out right for it to be understood – that it may move its 
investments and jobs out of  the country in response to an unfavourable policy (Clapp & Scrinis, 
2017; Fuchs, 2005). Material structures may not only provide actors agenda-setting power, but also 
place them in a position to make decisions and set rules (Fuchs, 2005).  
Structural power is determined by paradigms – “underlying theoretical and ontological 
assumptions about how the world works” (Campbell, 1998, p. 389). Often taken for granted, 
paradigms operate in the “cognitive background” to influence (often unconsciously) the ways in 
which actors think and talk about problems and the policy goals and instruments that are possible 
for addressing them (Campbell, 1998; Hall, 1993; Rushton & Williams, 2012). These ideational 
underpinnings depend on “deeply-embedded ideas dominant in the contemporary global political 
environment”, or what is referred to as a “deep core” (Rushton & Williams, 2012, p. 149). For 
Rushton and Williams (2012, p. 149), neoliberalism is one such deep core “because it seems to 
operate across almost all areas of global governance, and appears to ‘colonize’ and influence all the 
major paradigms of global health governance”. Deep cores such as neoliberalism, they argue, “seem 
to structure debates and shrink ‘policy space’ … , imposing constraints and limiting what is ‘sayable’, 
‘doable’—and even what is ‘thinkable’” (Rushton & Williams, 2012, p. 149).  
Structural power is also derived from, and exercised through, what Strange (2015, p. 134) has 
called the “knowledge structure”.20 The knowledge structure “determines what knowledge is 
discovered, how it is stored, and who communicates it by what means and on what terms” (Strange, 
	
20 The knowledge structure is one of four interacting structural sources of power that Strange (1996, 2015) 
writes about, the other three being the security structure, the production structure, and the financial structure. 
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2015, p. 134). It is comprised of “those who control access to knowledge and information and who 
are in a position to define the nature of knowledge” (Strange, 1996, p. ix). Strange writes that the 
knowledge structure persuades others to share fundamental beliefs – in other words, paradigms – 
about society and economy and to decide what knowledge is sought for and acquired and by whom, 
and to whom it is, or is not communicated (Strange, 1996, p. 70).  
Discursive power refers to the power derived from, and the ability of  actors to shape, norms 
and ideas. Policy is increasingly decided on the basis of  “discursive contests over the frames of  
policies” and “linking problems to specific fundamental norms and values” (Fuchs, 2005, p. 777). 
Frames “emphasiz[e] a particular definition of a problem or solution and they help shape policy 
discourses and the public policy agenda” (Scott & Nixon, 2017, p. 1). Framings and contestations 
around global health problems and potential solutions depend on underlying paradigms. Framing is 
what links paradigms operating in the cognitive background to policy debates in the foreground 
(Rushton & Williams, 2012, p. 148).  
Corporations and other actors “attempt to frame debates in ways that are amenable to their 
interests and objectives” (Rein & Schön, 1996; Snow & Benford, 1992). Through framing, they 
shape the way issues and stakeholders are conceptualized and which policy responses are possible 
and appropriate while others are improbable or precluded (M. Barnett & Duvall, 2005; Clapp & 
Scrinis, 2017; Hawkins & Holden, 2013), sometimes due to sufficient doubt having been 
manufactured about the cause of the problem or potential solutions. Framing is essential for 
corporations and their business associations seeking to create a conducive environment for policy-
making that favours industry interests, both in terms of both substantive policy and the paradigms 
that shape it and the private sector role in developing it. Part of their strategy is to influence the 
terms used to discuss issues and which aspects of them receive the most attention (Hawkins & 
Holden, 2013). 
Discursive power and framings not only depend on underlying paradigms, but, I maintain, are 
used to shape and reinforce them. For example, the private sector uses its discursive power to promote 
paradigms emphasizing partnership with, and a governance role for, the private sector. Tactics to 
achieve this aim include framing not only issues and possible policy options, but also corporations 
and industries as governance actors. These strategies are part of a long-game aimed at protecting or 
even increasing industry ability to influence substantive policy and seeking greater legitimacy and 
authority in policy-making. An actor’s political legitimacy depends on its discursive power because it 
depends on the recipient’s willingness to listen and to trust the validity of  the message, as well as the 
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actor’s expertise, capacities and intentions (Fuchs, 2005), which is possible only when the framings 
they advance align with underlying paradigms. These sources of  political legitimacy are especially 
relevant to NSAs such as corporations and their business associations as will be discussed in 
chapters that follow.  
Discursive power is “the most diverse and, at times, evasive dimensions of  power” 
(Holzscheiter, 2005, p. 724) and can influence the political process in “the broadest possible way” 
(Fuchs, 2005, p. 779). It is the most difficult kind of  power to recognize and measure because “it 
relies on persuasion, the perception of  legitimacy, and voluntary compliance rather than coercion 
and hierarchies of  legally assigned responsibility and thus the exercise of  discursive power frequently 
will not even be perceived as an exercise of  power and therefore not be questioned” (Fuchs, 2005, p. 
780). 
Like the playbook strategies and tactics, access to different types of  power is iterative and 
mutually reinforcing. For example, as will be discussed in Chapter 7, using discursive power to 
represent itself  as a “partner” and legitimate governance actor, the private sector has increased its 
instrumental and structural power by shaping paradigms that determine which policies are pursued 
and what role private actors are able to play in developing them. 
The private sector exercises these different dimensions of  power – instrumental, structural 
and discursive – through the strategies and tactics that comprise the playbook. Corporate actors seek 
to shape the political environment with tactics that include lobbying, campaign and party donations, 
and revolving doors. Lobbying is an exercise of instrumental power (Clapp & Scrinis, 2017; Fuchs, 
2005); it reflects business’s ability to influence politicians and policy-makers and resulting policy 
outputs. Lobbying is one of the corporate sector’s oldest political activities (Fuchs, 2005) and most 
obvious way of influencing policy and governance outcomes (Clapp & Scrinis, 2017). Corporate 
donations to political parties can influence decisions and behaviours of government officials (Wiist, 
2016), for example, increasing the likelihood of favourable votes on regulatory matters (D. A. Luke 
& Krauss, 2004) and reducing citations for corporate health and safety violations (Witko, 2013). 
Corporate lobbying and campaign finance activities are expanding both in quantity and in quality to 
include, for example, transnational strategies and participation in multistakeholder initiatives (Fuchs, 
2005). Nevertheless, it can be difficult to access data and information about lobbying activities, and 
even harder to attribute causation (Fuchs, 2005; Lowery, 2013).  
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The revolving door, another exercise of both instrumental and structural power, refers to the 
movement of people between the public and private sectors (including lobbyists21), and vice versa, 
taking with them potentially confidential information, personal influence and connections, and 
professional aspirations that may contribute to corporate advantage or regulatory capture (Drutman 
& Furnas, 2014; Makkai & Braithwaite, 1992). When moving from private to public sector, personal 
connections and loyalties have the potential, like a Trojan horse, to bias an individual’s positions and 
priorities in their new capacity and to pose conflicts of interest for that individual (Nestle, 2013).  
Corporations and their business associations are increasingly able to shape the political 
environment by participating directly in governmental agencies, committees and commissions and in 
partnerships with government for policy delivery. Direct participation in policy-making and delivery 
represents a shift from the corporate sector exercising instrumental power to influence policy-
makers and policy outputs to it having the ability to access structural power to have direct rule-
setting power. Multistakeholder initiatives and PPPs described above and self-regulatory initiatives 
are other examples of  the ways in which businesses and their associations are able to draw on 
structural power to participate directly in policy-making and governance, shifting rule-setting away 
from the exclusive domain of  government to also include private authority in the process.  
Putting pressure on international organizations such as the WHO and on international trade 
negotiations, and providing tied aid (meaning aid that is tied to, or requires, imports of food, other 
supplies, technical assistance, etc., from the donor country (Zedillo et al., 2001)) and in-kind 
donations to humanitarian efforts (Madureira Lima & Galea, 2018) are other ways for the corporate 
sector to exercise its instrumental power to shape the political environment. The policies and 
influence of  international organizations and the provisions of  various trade agreements determine 
the extent to which, and on what terms, corporations are able to, for example, expand into new 
markets, challenge regulatory efforts, seek increased protections, present themselves as responsible 
corporate citizens, and generally pursue their interests (Fooks & Gilmore, 2014; Friel et al., 2016; 
Neuwelt et al., 2015). 
To shape preferences (Madureira Lima & Galea, 2018), corporations and their associations 
draw on both their instrumental and especially their discursive power to frame issues, themselves 
and other actors to fit their corporate interests, and to deflect attention and manufacture doubt. As 
will be discussed in Chapters 5 and 6, for example, both the baby food and soda companies frame 
	
21 As Nestle (2013, p. 99) puts it, “Today’s public servant is tomorrow’s lobbyist.” 
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the issues as matters of consumer choice and responsibility. This “freedom of choice” rhetoric, 
disseminated using their discursive power, has the effect of shifting responsibility – or, blame – for 
any resulting problem away from companies and onto consumers (L. C. Friedman et al., 2014) in 
order to pre-empt any regulatory initiatives that may affect the industries’ bottom lines as well as 
their structural and instrumental power. Modifying and reformulating their products is another way 
that industries exercise their discursive power to encourage framings of individual choice and 
responsibility, deflect attention away from corporations and avoid regulation (Scrinis, 2016). For 
example, as will be discussed in Chapter 6, using their discursive power, soda companies frame their 
product modification and reformulation efforts as initiatives to contribute to the prevention and 
control of NCDs (Clapp & Scrinis, 2017; Nixon et al., 2015). 
To disseminate its preferred framings, the private sector exercises not only its discursive 
power but also its instrumental and structural power in order to capture the media, it markets and 
advertises its products, and it targets vulnerable populations, such as women, children, racialized 
communities, disaster-affected communities, and the populations of developing countries. 
Corporations and their associations also engage public relations companies, key opinion leaders 
(KOL) and health professions organizations to lend an authoritative and credible voice to their 
framing and messaging (Madureira Lima & Galea, 2018). 
Corporations also shape preferences by establishing corporate foundations and conducting 
global health philanthropy and corporate social responsibility initiatives (McDaniel & Malone, 2009; 
Tesler & Malone, 2008). They are able to do so by drawing on the instrumental power available 
because of the financial resources at their disposal and the structural power afforded by the lack of 
public financing for such endeavours. Because such initiatives boost public image, deflect negative 
attention, critics consider them to be a corporate tactic used to prevent regulation and gain access to 
policy-makers (Dorfman et al., 2012; Fooks et al., 2011, 2013; Hirschhorn, 2004; Lhotska et al., 
2012; WHO, 2003b; Yang & Malone, 2008). A similar way of shaping preferences is by coopting and 
capturing civil society and its formations (Madureira Lima & Galea, 2018) through partnerships and 
by forming organizations that resemble or represent themselves as civil society groups but actually 
pursue business interests. Such organizations in various industries have been called “front groups” 
(Baur, 2011; Dorfman et al., 2012; Madureira Lima & Galea, 2018; Miller & Harkins, 2010; Simon, 
2013).  
Corporate tactics for shaping the knowledge environment (Madureira Lima & Galea, 2018) 
include controlling the research process, for example by sponsoring research or publishing their own 
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research in academic publications (Aveyard et al., 2016; Bohme et al., 2005; Casswell, 2013; Kearns 
et al., 2015; Nestle, 2013, 2015), funding medical education and participating in or creating scientific 
advisory boards and science institutes (Bohme et al., 2005; Brownell & Warner, 2009; Egilman & 
Bohme, 2005; Jacobs, 2019; Nagarajan, 2014b; Nestle, 2013, 2015). These strategies enable 
corporations to exercise their instrumental and structural power to generate favourable research 
findings and then their discursive power to disseminate and amplify them in order to influence 
scientific and public opinion about the safety and appeal of their products and their credibility as a 
source of information. Corporations use these tactics to manufacture doubt about the nature and 
scope of problems, their responsibility in causing them, and the feasibility and efficacy of solutions 
(McDaniel & Malone, 2009). In this way, corporations are part of the “knowledge structure” 
described by Strange (2015, p. 134). 
Corporations make use of legal systems and the law by limiting their liability, threatening 
litigation and externalizing costs using unregulated areas of activity (Madureira Lima & Galea, 2018). 
These corporate strategies rely on law firms and public relations companies, which go beyond 
typically expected duties to also contract scientific studies, formulate scientific defences, lobby public 
officials, create “citizens’ groups” to support their industry or products, and work to discredit 
research or scientists that are unfavourable to the corporate interests (Bohme et al., 2005). These 
strategies and tactics are possible for the private sector because of the instrumental and structural 
power available due to the financial resources at their disposal. Simply said, corporations and 
business associations can afford to engage in multiple legal proceedings at once, and to draw them 
out at a cost that NGOs and the public sector in many countries are unable to match. The mobility 
of capital also affords structural power that pre-empts the introduction of regulations or legal 
challenges by governments concerned with retaining investments in their countries. 
Finally, the extra-legal tactics used by the corporate sector include fragmenting opposition 
groups by using corporations’ instrumental power and discursive power to discredit them or by 
seeking greater legitimacy by partnering with more “moderate” groups. Corporations may also 
exercise their structural power by engaging in illegal activities such as bribing, smuggling and illicit 
trade, and price fixing. Corporations either avoid prosecution altogether through out-of-court 






This chapter has outlined the changing nature of global governance, and global health governance in 
particular, which involves the opening up of spaces for NSAs to influence and participate in policy-
making and governance, including through the global shift toward a multistakeholder approach and 
PPPs. This shift has left the WHO vulnerable to conflicts of interest as it continues to adopt a 
multistakeholder approach and widen its engagement with NSAs in order to address its financial 
challenges, as will be discussed in Chapter 3. 
Drawing on the public health and global health literatures, the notions of “industrial 
epidemic” (Gilmore et al., 2011; Jahiel, 2008; Jahiel & Babor, 2007; Moodie et al., 2013) and 
“corporate (or commercial) determinants of health” (Buse et al., 2017; Hastings, 2012; Kickbusch, 
2012; Kickbusch et al., 2016; Millar, 2013) were introduced as useful ways of capturing the impacts 
of corporate actors on health and disease burden. Of particular importance for the analysis to follow 
are the conceptions of different forms of power that corporations may exercise. The concept of the 
corporate playbook (Madureira Lima & Galea, 2018) will prove especially helpful in identifying the 
various strategies and tactics corporate actors in the two sectors under study have employed. 
Chapters 5 and 6 analyze the how corporations and their business associations in the baby food and 
soda industries draw on the playbook of strategies common across many industries to influence 
substantive policy and shape public perception and discourse (Brownell & Warner, 2009; Madureira 




Chapter 3 – WHO reforms: Enhancing engagement with non-state actors 
 
3.0 Introduction 
This chapter locates the WHO as an important actor/institution in global health governance. The 
WHO is the only international health body that comprises all Member States of the United Nations. 
This composition grants the agency a unique political legitimacy and, at least in theory, democratic 
representation and accountability that does not exist in the case of other, more recently created 
global health bodies. The WHO’s main decision-making body, the WHA, is the only place where 
global health rules can be negotiated, adopted and monitored for compliance. 
Illuminating the factors behind the WHO’s turn to NSAs, the chapter places particular 
emphasis on resource constraints that have prompted it to seek partnerships with private sector 
actors to carry out its programs. Faced with this financial reality and to respond to the changing 
global health architecture, several the WHO Directors-General have undertaken reform processes, 
which have included policies to facilitate engagement with NSAs, such as the Framework of 
engagement with non-State actors (FENSA).  
This chapter provides a brief overview of the WHO and traces the financing crisis that has 
contributed to the agency’s increasing engagement with the private sector in ways that have 
implications for the agency and global health governance more broadly and that make it vulnerable 
to conflicts of interests and corporate influence on substantive policy and potentially sets itself up 
for greater dependence on for-profit entities. The chapter opens with the antecedents, creation, and 
mandate of the WHO, followed by a description of its structure and governance. It then traces the 
WHO’s embrace of closer relationships with NSAs to challenges to the WHO’s role as a global 
health leader, including the changing global health architecture, the WHO’s financing crisis, and its 
multistakeholder approach. This sets the stage for an analysis of reform processes undertaken by 
various Directors-General and the WHO’s engagement to NSAs. 
 
3.1 Antecedents to the WHO 
The WHO is not the first institutionalized form of global health governance. Between 1851 and 
1938, fourteen International Sanitary Conferences were held to reach agreements on health and 
sanitation issues. The first International Sanitary Convention on maritime quarantine requirements 
was adopted in 1851, but it became inoperative in 1865. This initial agreement was followed by a 
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multitude of conventions of limited scope relating quarantine regulations with respect to cholera, 
plague, and eventually yellow fever (WHO, 1958).22 
In December 1902, the First General International Sanitary Convention of the American 
Republics, held in Washington DC, ushered in the creation of an International Sanitary Bureau, 
which in 1923 changed its name to Pan American Sanitary Bureau (PASB). This organization was to 
influence the WHO’s structure and conflicting approaches to achieving its mandate. Evidence of 
PASB’s focus on disease surveillance and control remain, for example, in the WHO’s mass 
campaigns against specific diseases or health problems (the “vertical approach”). The other, 
“horizontal” approach seeks to address problems more holistically and for the long-term through 
social medicine (addressing the broad determinants of health) and the development of general health 
services. Upon the creation of the WHO, PASB was renamed the Pan American Sanitary 
Organization (PASO) and integrated into the new global agency, becoming its Regional Office for 
the Americas (as discussed below)) (K. Lee, 2009; WHO, 1958). In 1958, PASO was again renamed, 
becoming the Pan American Health Organization (PAHO) to signal “a redirection of interest from 
sanitation and the control of communicable diseases to health more broadly defined” (Fee & Brown, 
2002). It remains the most prominent of several regional health organizations, and is the oldest 
continuously functioning international health agency (K. Lee, 2009).  
Shortly after the creation of the International Sanitary Bureau in the Americas (now PAHO), 
in 1907 the Office International d’Hygiène Publique (OIHP) was established in Paris as a permanent 
body to collect and report epidemiological data from its Member States (K. Lee, 2009) and 
disseminate general public health information (WHO, 1958). The League of Nations Health 
Organization (LNHO) was created in 1920 but failed to take off, largely because the politically 
isolationist US, which had not ratified the League’s founding treaty, wanted to work through the 
OIHP and did not want it included in the LNHO framework (Weindling, 2006). There was 
considerable overlap, tension, and rivalry between these three major international organizations, 
LHNO, OIHP, and PASB (K. Lee, 2009; Weindling, 2006). Nevertheless, by consolidating OIHP 
and the International Sanitary Regulations and reflecting inter-relationships between health, trade, 
peace and stability, the LHNO presented an idea of what a global health institution could look like 
and provided the institutional basis for the eventual the WHO (Harman, 2012). 
	
22 After the creation of the WHO, these conventions were consolidated into a new set of International 
Sanitary Regulations, adopted by the Fourth World Health Assembly in May 1951 (WHO, 1958) and were the 
forerunner to the International Health Regulations adopted by the WHO in 1969 that remain in place, albeit 
amended, to this day (K. Lee, 2009).  
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Alongside these international (intergovernmental) organizations, non-state charitable and 
philanthropic organizations were also active in international health initiatives. The League of Red 
Cross Societies (later the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies) was 
founded in 1919 “in view of a worldwide crusade to improve health, prevent sickness, and alleviate 
suffering.” The Rockefeller Foundation’s International Health Commission was created in 1913 and 
renamed the International Health Board in 1916. It extended the work of the Rockefeller Sanitary 
Commission for the Eradication of Hookworm Disease. The Board was disbanded in 1927 and its 
work continued by the Foundation’s International Health Division (K. Lee, 2009). Other early 
international health actors included the Save the Children Fund, founded in 1919 (Dodgson et al., 
2002); the Ford Foundation, founded in 1936; and the Wellcome Trust, created in 1936 (K. Lee, 
2009). 
 
3.2 Creation of the WHO 
The idea of a world health body had not been included in the agenda for the founding meeting of 
the United Nations in 1945, with health work envisioned to be done by UNICEF (founded in 1946) 
and UN Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) (founded in 1943). However, the 
Brazilian and Chinese delegations submitted a joint declaration at the meeting, calling for a General 
Conference to be convened within a year to establish an international health organization. They 
argued that “medicine is one of the pillars of peace”. A Technical Preparatory Committee of 16 
international health experts, mostly national health ministers or senior health officials, met in Paris 
from March to April 1946 to prepare an annotated agenda, a proposed constitution and various 
resolutions to be considered at the conference. These addressed the organization’s mandate, 
governing structure, administration and financing, but left unresolved the location of the 
headquarters and whether regional organizations would be associated or fully integrated with the 
new organization.  
The International Health Conference was convened in June 1946, the first conference held 
under the UN’s auspices. It was attended by all 51 members of the UN and 13 non-Member States, 
the Allied Control Authorities for Germany, Japan and Korea and observers from relevant UN 
bodies. Existing international health organizations such as OIHP were invited in a consultative 
capacity. The Conference agreed, over the next four and half weeks, on the new organization’s 
constitution, a protocol for the dissolution of OIHP, and the setting up of an Interim Commission 
to take over health work previously done by the LNHO and UNRRA until the WHO could be 
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formally established. The Interim Commission, created to bridge the time between the drafting of 
the WHO Constitution and its coming into effect, was comprised of technical experts not 
representing their respective governments. 
The new body was different from previous international health bodies in that it was to take a 
worldwide scope of membership and operations (WHO, 1958). The Constitution stated that the 
WHO was to serve as “the directing and coordinating authority on international health work” 
(WHO, 2006, Article 2(a)). Its objective, reflecting the optimism and idealism of the post-World 
War II period in which it was established (Clift & Royal Institute of International Affairs, 2014; 
Hoffman & Røttingen, 2014), was “the attainment by all peoples of the highest possible level of 
health” (WHO, 2006, Article 1). The Constitution came into force on April 7, 1948, and the WHO 
was formally established in September 1948 (K. Lee, 2009; WHO, 1958).  
The WHO Constitution lists 22 wide-ranging functions, the first of which is “to act as the 
directing and co-ordinating authority on international health work” (WHO, 2006b Article 2(a)). Its 
other functions can be categorized as technical assistance and emergency aid (for example, helping 
governments to strengthen health services), normative work (for example, proposing conventions, 
agreements and regulations, making recommendations with respect to international health matters, 
setting standards), and promoting and advocating for better health (for example, in specific areas of 
health, and by promoting and conducting research, and by providing information, counsel and 
assistance in the field of health) (Clift et al., 2013). To perform these functions, the methods of  
operation adopted by the WHO include projects, technical meetings, expert advisory panels and 
committees, training, coordination and cooperation, and investigation and research (WHO, 1958). 
Davies (2010) describes four phases in the WHO’s authority over global health policy. 
During the first phase, from 1948 through the mid-1970s, its role was largely technical, with a focus 
on disease specific interventions and optimism about disease eradication. In the second phase, from 
the mid-1970s through to the mid-1980s, there was more emphasis on humanitarianism and using 
the WHO to promote health equity. Under the leadership of  then Director-General Halfdan Mahler 
(1973-1988), the organization had a more activist orientation. It was under his leadership that the 
Alma-Ata Declaration was adopted in 1978. In the third phase, from the mid-1980s to the mid-
1990s, the WHO took a neoliberal turn, exemplified by its extensive collaboration with the World 
Bank. During this period, the WHO’s budget was frozen, and its influence was in decline, eclipsed 
by the World Bank. The fourth phase, from the mid-1990s to 2010 saw a reassertion of  the WHO as 
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the leading international health actor and collaboration with a diverse set of  actors, including NGOs 
and private actors (Davies, 2010).  
Today the WHO remains the lead body with respect to global health governance. Some 
consider it to play a necessary and essential role in global health (Legge, 2012; Sridhar et al., 2014), 
offering unique capabilities and assets, such as its visionary Constitution that “affirms a social view 
of  health and health as a human right”, technical expertise, normative influence, and authority to 
make global health rules, including binding treaties such as the International Health Regulations and 
the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (Kamradt-Scott et al., 2015; Legge, 2012; Ollila, 
2003, 2005; Sridhar et al., 2014).  
However, its role in the “new and crowded institutional environment” (Clift et al., 2013) is 
blurred or possibly challenged by actors like the well-funded Gates Foundation and global health 
partnerships like Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance23 and the Global Fund (formerly the Global Fund to 
Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria) (Clift & Royal Institute of International Affairs, 2014; 
Hoffman & Røttingen, 2014; Szlezák et al., 2010). Questions have been raised about the WHO’s role 
and mandate in light of  this changing global health architecture (O. D. Williams & Rushton, 2011) 
and the organization’s financial constraints, discussed below. It has faced criticisms for being 
ineffective and irrelevant leading to calls for its reform (Hawkes, 2011; K. Lee & Pang, 2014; Pang & 
Garrett, 2012; Robbins & Freeman, 2015), not least following its delayed response to the 2014 Ebola 
crisis in West Africa (Belluz & Hoffman, 2015; Gostin, 2015; Kamradt-Scott, 2016). There have 
been calls for strengthening the WHO (Kamradt-Scott et al., 2015; Legge, 2012; Moon et al., 2010) 
and upholding its constitutional mandate as “the directing and coordinating authority on 
international health work” (WHO, 2006b). 
 Among the proposals for change, Hoffman and Røttingen (2014) suggest splitting the 
WHO in two, thereby separating its technical and political mandates. Lee and Pang (2014) call for 
the retirement of  the old the WHO and the reinvention of  the global health organization, perhaps 
with curtailed mandate and powers but more binding authority, and Smith and Lee (2017) argue that 
institutional innovation, not renovation, is what is necessary. The reform efforts of  various 
Directors-General are discussed below, and former Director-General Chan’s efforts to facilitate 
greater engagement with NSAs, and the increasing influence of  the private sector on global health 
through such partnerships and hybrid organizations are discussed in Chapter 7. 
	
23 Formerly the GAVI Alliance, and before that the Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunisation (GAVI). 
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3.3 Structure and governance 
The WHO was intended to form a core part of  the post-war order, providing more concerted 
international cooperation with respect to health and uniting pre-existing health bodies “through 
clear leadership and unrivalled technical expertise” (K. Lee, 2009). The new agency was set up with 
three tiers, with its governance and operations distributed to global, regional, and country levels. 
While this arrangement has “enabled the WHO to combine centralized policy leadership with 
decentralized operational capacity” (K. Lee, 2009), “in practice, the appropriate distribution of  staff, 
financial resources and perhaps most importantly, decision-making power across the headquarters, 
regional and country levels has remained an ongoing source of  tension” (Gostin et al., 2015). 
The main components of  the WHO’s organizational structure include the World Health 
Assembly (WHA), the Executive Board, the Secretariat, the Director-General, Regional Offices and 
Country Offices. These components have remained unchanged since the WHO’s formal 
establishment in 1948 (K. Lee, 2009). 
WHA is the decision-making body for the WHO. It meets in Geneva each May to determine 
the organization’s policies. It appoints the Director-General, supervises the Organization’s financial 
policies and reviews and approves the proposed programme budget. The WHA considers reports by 
the Executive Board, and instructs it on matters upon which further action, study, investigation, or 
report may be required (WHO, 2018g). The WHA can also adopt regulations, which are binding on 
Member States unless they opt out (K. Lee, 2009). 
The WHA is comprised of  delegations from Member States, of  which there are currently 
194 (WHO, 2018g). All Member States are able to send delegations (Youde, 2012), which may 
consist of  not more than three delegates (K. Lee, 2009). While these delegates are representatives of  
governments, and preferably the national health administration, from the outset there has been an 
emphasis on technical capabilities and competence in the field of  health (K. Lee, 2009). Relevant 
international organizations and NGOs that have been recognized with Official Relations status, as is 
discussed below, may send delegates as observers with certain non-voting privileges. 
Decisions are made following the “one state, one vote” principle. In theory, this means that 
all countries have equal say, no matter their size or power, in determining the WHO’s direction. In 
practice, however, many decisions are never put to a vote. Some are agreed by consensus and 
presented as a recommendation in the form of  resolutions. Some key decisions about priority setting 
may be made by the Executive Board, Secretariat, or by Member States or other actors providing 
earmarked funding (K. Lee, 2009). As will be discussed below, this extra funding for specific 
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programs, over which the WHA has no control, has financed an increasing proportion of  the 
WHO’s budget, effectively shrinking the WHA’s control over the WHO’s activities (Davies, 2010). 
“Each state may have one vote, but due to variable technical capacity, they are not equally able to 
influence the policy process” (K. Lee, 2009). 
The main functions of the Executive Board are to oversee implementation of the WHA 
decisions, put WHA priorities into practice, and to advise the WHA as it requests (WHO, 2018g). 
The WHA elects Member States to select delegates, alternates and advisors. The Executive Board is 
comprised of 34 members who are “technically qualified in the field of health” (not including 
alternates and advisors) (Youde, 2012). They are expected to serve in their individual capacity as 
technical experts and not represent the interests of their respective states. Members are elected for 
three-year terms, and each year one-third of the members are changed (K. Lee, 2009). 
The Executive Board meets in Geneva typically twice a year. The main meeting in January 
agrees upon the agenda for the forthcoming WHA and adopts resolutions to be forwarded to the 
WHA. The second, smaller meeting is held in May, immediately following the conclusion of  the 
WHA, to address more administrative matters (WHO, 2018g). Additional meetings are held as 
required (Youde, 2012). 
The Secretariat is the WHO’s administrative and technical organ, and is responsible for 
implementing the organization’s activities, including carrying out most of  the programmatic work 
and ensuring the organization functions when the WHA and Executive Board are not in session (K. 
Lee, 2009)Youde, 2012). The Secretariat has a decentralized structure that embodies the three tiers 
comprising the single institution that is the WHO. It consists of  the headquarters in Geneva, six 
regional offices and 149 field offices (K. Lee, 2009; WHO, 2019e). The decision to place the 
headquarters in Geneva was made at the International Health Conference in 1946, and it is located 
at the former site of  the LNHO (K. Lee, 2009). The Secretariat is headed by a Director-General 
(discussed below) based in Geneva, who leads the organization as a whole and oversees permanent 
bureaucratic structures (Youde, 2012). In January 2019, the WHO employed more than 7,000 
people, including technical and support staff  from more than 150 countries across its three tiers 
(WHO, 2019d). Technical staff  is mostly medical professionals. This number is down from 8,500 
technical and support staff  in 2009 (K. Lee, 2009).  
The Director-General is the organization’s chief  technical and administrative officer. The 
Director-General is appointed for a five-year term, which is renewable for another term. The 
Director-General oversees implementation of  the WHO policy and programs, including 
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appointment of  Secretariat staff, preparation of  annual financial statements, and drafting the 
program budget (K. Lee, 2009). Historically, the Executive Board assessed candidates that Member 
States nominated for the position and advanced one individual to be formally elected — “rubber-
stamped” — by the WHA. Political jostling and campaigning would take place behind the scenes 
during the nomination and selection process. However, under pressure by public health campaigners, 
the election process has become increasingly more open. As of  the election in 2017, the WHA elects 
the Director-General from a short-list of  up to three candidates that the Executive Board selects 
from nominations made by Member States (WHO, 2018b). 
The current Director-General is Dr. Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus of  Ethiopia. He was 
elected by the WHA on May 23, 2017, out of  a short list of  three candidates⁠.24 His five-year term 
began on July 1, 2017. He succeeded Dr. Margaret Chan, who had served as Director-General from 
January 4, 2007, having been appointed by a special meeting of  the WHA on November 9, 2006. In 
May 2012 the WHA appointed Chan for a second term that started July 1, 2012 and ended June 30, 
2017 (WHO, 2006a, 2012a). 
Another element of  the WHO’s three-tiered structure is its six regional offices. This 
arrangement was designed to allow the WHO to maintain global and regional cohesions, but also 
flexibility to address the particular health needs of  different regions and countries (WHO, 1958). 
Within three years of  the WHO’s creation, existing regional health organizations were incorporated 
into the new organization and new ones were created to ensure geographical balance (K. Lee, 2009).  
Regional offices are responsible for carrying out much of  the WHO’s programmatic work 
but, having a high degree of  independence and decision-making power, may undertake their own 
initiatives as well (Youde, 2012; Lee, 2009). As a part of  this autonomy, each regional office selects 
its own Regional Director, and the WHO Director-General does not have direct control over 
leadership at the regional level. This was intended to promote stronger ties with Member State 
governments while incorporating existing organizations but has resulted in some tensions between 
the Secretariat and regional offices (Youde, 2012).  
The six regions and the corresponding offices are: African Region (AFRO), the Region of  
the Americas (AMRO)25, South-East Asia Region (SEARO), European Region (EURO), Eastern 
	
24 The other two candidates were Sania Nishtar of  Pakistan and David Nabarro of  the UK. 
25 PAHO serves as the WHO’s Regional Office for the Americas, but maintains its independence, 
embodying the “ongoing tension between independent regional bodies and need for the WHO to provide 
cohesion and centralized leadership” (K. Lee, 2009). An example of the types of issues raised by this dynamic 
is discussed in Chapter 6; PAHO in October 2012 accepted financial support from food and beverage 
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Mediterranean Region (EMRO), and the Western Pacific Region (WPRO). Each Member State is 
associated with a regional office, usually on a geographic basis but in some exceptional cases for 
political reasons. For example, Israel is part of  EURO because Arab countries in EMRO objected to 
cooperating with the Israeli government (K. Lee, 2009), and South Korea is part of  the Western 
Pacific region along with geographic neighbours Japan and China while North Korea belongs to the 
South-East Asia region (Youde, 2012). 
In 2005 there were around 144 the WHO country offices located in Member States deemed 
in need of  country-level support (K. Lee, 2009). In 2017 the WHO operated 149 field offices in 
addition to its Geneva headquarters. Countries that do not have a WHO office are covered by a 
nearby field office of  the appropriate regional office (WHO, 2019e). Country offices vary in size. 
Each one is headed by a WHO Representative, who is a trained physician not of  that country, and 
appointed and answerable to the relevant regional office (K. Lee, 2009). 
The role of  country offices is to work with the respective government to implement the 
WHO policies and programs and to support the development of  the country’s health system. The 
office is located within the country’s ministry of  health. The WHO country offices serve three main 
functions: providing policy advice and technical support; information, public relations and advocacy; 
and management and administration (K. Lee, 2009). 
 
3.4 Financing the WHO: model and challenges 
Financing for the WHO comes in two forms. Assessed contributions by the WHO’s Member States 
(or Regular Budget Funds, RBFs) are used to finance the organization’s core budget and are meant 
to provide “guaranteed, long-term, predictable financing” (Sridhar et al., 2014). Assessed 
contributions are calculated biennially according the UN scale of  ability to pay (GNP and 
population), similar to the formula used by other UN specialized agencies (Davies, 2010), frozen in 
1982 (Legge, 2012). As a result, a small number of  high-income countries provide most of  its core 
funding, although according to the formula, no single state can contribute more than one-third of  
the WHO’s annual budget (K. Lee, 2009). The largest provider of  assessed contributions is the US, 
which was originally responsible for 25% of  core funds, but that share dropped to 22% after 
protests by the US government in 2001 (K. Lee, 2009).  
	
companies as part of a multistakeholder initiative on noncommunicable diseases (NCDs), which the WHO 
rules would prohibit the office’s other legal entity, AMRO, doing (Moscetti & Taylor, 2015; Philpott, 2012; 
WHO, 2012g; Wilson & Kerlin, 2012). 
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The second form of  financing is voluntary contributions (or Extra-budgetary Funds, EBFs) 
earmarked for specific projects. This financing is given primarily by other UN organizations, 
Member States, NGOs, private companies or individuals (K. Lee, 2009). The WHO’s Constitution 
states that it “may accept and administer gifts and bequests made to the Organization provided that 
the conditions attached to such gifts or bequests are acceptable and are consistent with the 
objectives and policies of  the Organization.” Although present as a small proportion of  the WHO’s 
budget from early in the organization’s existence, voluntary contributions now comprise the vast 
majority of  the WHO’s financing. This has had an impact on not only its operations (Youde, 2012) 
but also its role as a global health leader and its norm-setter (Kruse & Kaya, 2017; Ollila, 2005), as is 
discussed below and in Chapter 7. 
The increased proportion of  the WHO’s financing that comes from voluntary contributions 
has had a major impact on the WHO operations and its role as a global health leader (Youde, 2012). 
Since the 1980s, an ever-increasing proportion of  the WHO funding comes in the form of  
voluntary contributions for special programs, over which the WHO has no control, as is discussed 
below. Although financing for global health more than quadrupled between 1990 and 2011, much of  
the money has bypassed the WHO (van de Pas & van Schaik, 2014), which some in the international 
and donor communities see as “clodhopping and ineffective” (Clift & Royal Institute of  
International Affairs, 2014). This situation has prompted discussion over whether the WHO should 
undertake a wide range of  activities by spreading resources thinly or concentrate its attention and 
efforts on certain strategic activities to make more impact in fewer areas. There is also debate over 
whether the WHO should direct its resources to certain levels, whether global, regional or country 
(K. Lee, 2009). The WHO was never intended to perform every function that might contribute to 
global health, such as serving as a funding agency, nor even a research organization. In the current 
“far more complex institutional environment,” it is all the more necessary for it to perform its 
much-needed coordinating role (Clift & Royal Institute of  International Affairs, 2014). 
The WHO budget included voluntary contributions from very early in its existence, although 
on a limited scale. Until the 1950s, voluntary contributions came from two main sources. The first 
was the Expanded Programme for Technical Assistance (1949) established to promote economic 
development through the transfer of  skills and to channel voluntary contributions through UN 
organizations for development activities. The WHO used funds from the EPTA to strengthen health 
administrations, control communicable diseases, and train professional and auxiliary staff. The 
second source was the UN Special Fund (1950) established to mobilize greater resources for UN 
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economic and social development activities, which was consolidated in 1962 as the UNDP (K. Lee, 
2009). From the 1950s onward, however, there was a significant and steady increase in the amount 
of  voluntary contributions made to the WHO, providing a vital source of  financing for disease 
control and eradication programs such as the Intensified Malaria Eradication Programme (1955) and 
the Intensified Smallpox Eradication Programme (1967) (K. Lee, 2009).  
By 1970, 20% of  the total budget came from voluntary contributions, with over half  of  this 
coming from other UN agencies. The proportion increased steadily in the following years with the 
creation of  special programs for research on human reproduction and tropical diseases. A study of  
voluntary contributions published in 1975 concluded that an upward trend was necessary if  the 
WHO was to pursue its constitutional mission and that these funds could allow an increase in 
technical cooperation with a broader array of  actors and draw attention to new areas of  work. At 
that time, voluntary contributions were seen as a vote of  confidence in the WHO, helping it to 
expand its programmatic portfolio (K. Lee, 2009).  
Member States have contributed to this imbalance between assessed and voluntary 
contributions in several significant ways. Member States have resisted any increase in their assessed 
contributions. In the 1980s, in a context of  financial austerity and the rise of  neoliberalism, major 
donors (known as the Geneva Group) introduced a policy of  zero real growth (adjusting for 
inflation) to the assessed contributions to all UN organizations. This policy was replaced in 1993 by 
an even more austere policy of  zero nominal growth (not inflation adjusted), thereby reducing the 
WHO’s budget in real terms (K. Lee, 2009) by as much as 20% in the 1990s (Bloom et al. 1999, 
911). This zero growth, first real and then nominal, necessitated attracting more voluntary 
contributions (Vaughan et al., 1996). Furthermore, Member States have not always paid their dues in 
full and remained in arrears (K. Lee, 2009; Sridhar et al., 2014). In 2001, 61% of  Member States had 
paid their assessed contributions in their entirety, 25% had made no payments; in 1992 only 49% 
had paid in full. In 2004, for example, the voting rights were suspended of  23 Member States that 
were in arrears: Afghanistan, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Central African Republic, 
Chad, Comoros, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Georgia, Guinea-Bissau, Iraq, Kyrgyzstan, Liberia, 
Nauru, Niger, Republic of  Moldova, Somalia, Suriname, Tajikistan, Togo, Turkmenistan and Ukraine 
(WHO, 2004c).  
By the early 1980s the voluntary contributions proportion of  the total the WHO budget was 
steadily increasing. Alongside the policy of  zero growth in assessed contributions (discussed above), 
this trend represented a vote of  confidence in special programs, and also a vote of  no-confidence in 
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the WHO and its operations (Godlee, 1995; K. Lee, 2009). Leading Member States increasingly 
questioned the WHO’s efficacy and its political commitments. For example, critics called the Alma-
Alta Declaration overly idealistic, too expensive and perhaps even socialist. They wanted more 
vertical interventions focusing on specific diseases and conditions (Magnussen et al., 2004). Donors 
financed vertical programs with voluntary contributions, over which they had a high degree of  
control compared with assessed contributions, the use of  which was determined by the entire WHA 
(Godlee, 1995; Youde, 2012). Because voluntary contributions are directed toward specific, 
particular interests26 (not a general fund), the WHA has next to no control over them (Davies, 
2010). Indeed, the special programs they finance are not under the control of  the WHA, the 
Executive Board, or the Director-General and secretariat, with each program having its own director 
and “a management executive committee made up of  donors’ representatives” (Godlee, 1995).  
Some Member States have raised concerns about the impact of  the imbalance between 
assessed and voluntary contributions on the WHO’s effectiveness (Youde, 2012), its programmatic 
autonomy and budgetary decision-making powers (K. Lee, 2009; Legge, 2012; Walt, 1993), and its 
potentially distorting impact on the WHO’s priorities and the coherence of  its programs (Legge, 
2012). A report commissioned by the governments of  Australia, Norway and the UK in 1994 
concluded that donor preferences expressed through voluntary contributions unduly influenced the 
WHO’s policy agenda (Vaughan et al., 1995). The report found that voluntary contributions lead to 
distorted and disproportionate funding of  programs, competition among programs, variation in 
systems of  accountability and transparency, and prevented longer-term program planning because 
of  their time-limited nature (Vaughan et al., 1995). Special programs financed through voluntary 
contributions were described as “undermining from above” (Godlee, 1995). Sridhar and Woods 
(2013) draw attention to what they term “Trojan multilateralism”, whereby wealthy states provide 
earmarked funding that may look like multilateralism, but actually “is covertly introducing bilateral 
goals and interests into multilateral institutions. 
Nevertheless, voluntary contributions remain a significant part of  the WHO’s financing and 
appear unlikely to decline. In 2007, the US and UK were the top two sources of  voluntary 
contributions, at 25% and 24%, respectively, followed by the World Bank-GAVI affiliate (16%), 
Canada (12 %), Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation (11.8%), and Commission of  European 
Communities (10.2%) (Sridhar, 2012). By 2010, the Gates Foundation, giving US $446 million, was 
	
26 The vast majority of  voluntary contributions — 91% in 2010-2011 (van de Pas & van Schaik, 2014) — are 
earmarked for specific donor-driven priorities and programs. 
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the second biggest financial contributor to the WHO after the US (van de Pas & van Schaik, 2014), 
and it remained in the top three alongside the US and UK in 2013 (Sridhar et al., 2014). 
The proposed 2008-09 budget recommended a level of  assessed contributions from 
Member States of  US$929 million, an increase of  4% over the previous biennium. At about 23% of  
the total budget of  4.227 billion, this level of  assessed contributions combined with miscellaneous 
income of  $40 million was intended “to maintain a reasonable balance” with voluntary contributions 
of  $3.268 billion (WHO, n.d.c). A proposal in 2015 to increase assessed contributions by 5% was 
not approved by the WHA (Clift & Røttingen, 2018). In 2017, the WHA approved an increase in 
assessed contributions from US$929 million (covering only 20% of  the total program budget in 
2016-2017) to US$ 956.9 million for the 2018-2019 program budget (WHO, 2016g, 2017a). This 
additional US$28 million represents an increase of  about 3%, far short of  the 10% increase that had 
been proposed by then Director-General Chan (WHO, 2016g). 
 
3.5 Responding to financing challenges: the WHO reform 
A series of  analyses in the early 1990s highlighted several concerns about the operations of  the 
WHO that remain relevant today. These concerns included the growing imbalance, described above, 
between core programs and special programs financed by voluntary contributions and accountable 
to donors rather than the WHA, the increased emphasis on technical assistance and project 
execution instead of  the WHO’s analytical and normative functions; weak performance at country 
level and deficiency in skills related to health policy economics and management; the tension 
between the WHO’s vertical programing and its advocacy for integrated primary health care; the 
autonomy of  the regional offices and their politicization; and a series of  deficiencies in management, 
including finance, recruitment, coordination, budgetary planning, and general bureaucratic 
inefficiencies (Clift et al., 2013). 
A number of  reports in 1993 identified similar issues and made recommendations for 
reforms. For example, a UN Joint Inspection Unit report identified “serious and complex problems 
of  constitutional, political, managerial and programmatic nature” in the WHO’s three-tier 
organizational structure. It recommended that regional directors should no longer be elected by 
Regional Committees, but instead they should be selected and nominated by the Director-General 
and confirmed by the Executive Board (Clift et al., 2013). Under Hiroshi Nakajima, the Director-
General at the time, these issues were discussed at length by the Executive Board but little change 
was undertaken (Clift et al., 2013). 
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Director-General Gro Harlem Brundtland, who held the office from 1998 to 2003, arrived 
to the position with a clear vision for reform. In her view, the WHO had two main tasks. One was 
its “work on the ground” to combat disease, to provide advice on best practices, to set norms and 
standards and to support research and development (Clift et al., 2013). The other was “to put health 
on the world stage and secure a role for the WHO in the definition of  the new development agenda 
underpinned by the values of  equity, human dignity and human rights” (van de Pas & van Schaik, 
2014). A key component of  Brundtland’s efforts toward advancing this second task was ushering in 
the WHO’s first binding treaty, the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC), which was 
aimed at reining in the powerful tobacco industry (van de Pas & van Schaik, 2014). As the FCTC 
was developed, NGOs collaborated with the Secretariat against the tobacco industry’s aggressive 
strategies. This was an unprecedented role for NGOs in global health governance and allowed them 
to gain importance in diplomatic policy deliberations on global health issues (van de Pas & van 
Schaik, 2014). 
Irrespective of  her firm stance on the tobacco industry, Brundtland was a strong advocate 
of  multistakeholder cooperation and partnering with the private sector.27 Her stance concurred with 
the shift toward the private sector for financing and collaboration in addressing development, 
poverty and human rights issues, within the broader UN system engineered by Secretary General 
Kofi Annan. In her first speech after her election, Brundtland set the tone for her term in office by 
calling, for “open and constructive relations with the private sector” (WHO, 1998, cited in Buse & 
Walt, 2000, Reid & Pearse, 2003 and Lee, 2009).  
Brundtland promoted the new global business model of  multistakeholder cooperation and 
sought to align the WHO’s way of  working along the lines of  the new Global Compact⁠28 (van de 
	
27 Even before she was the WHO Director--General, she favoured partnership between government and 
industry. She said in 1990: 
“Partnership is what is needed in today’s world, partnership between government and industry, between 
producers and consumers, between the present and the future. We need to build new coalitions. We must 
agree on a global agenda for the management of change. We must continue to move from confrontation, 
through dialogue to cooperation. Collective management of the global interdependence is … the only 
acceptable formula in the world of the 1990s” (Lohmann, 1990 cited in (Richter, 2004c)). 
28 The UN Global Compact was started in July 2000 on the initiative of former UN Secretary-General Kofi 
Annan. Under the scheme, corporations pledge to implement ten principles relating to human rights, labour 
standards and environmental sustainability. From 50 initial corporations, the Compact now engages more 
than 9,500 companies in more than 160 countries. Partners included UN agencies, transnational NGOs such 
as Amnesty International, World Wide Fund for Nature, and Oxfam, and international labour federations 
(Ruggie, 2004). However, from the outset many public-interest NGOs and NGO networks feared that “the 
Global Compact would weaken rather than strengthen efforts to hold corporations publicly accountable and 
democratic decision-making during a time of neoliberal economic globalization” (Richter, 2004a, p. 12).  
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Pas & van Schaik, 2014). Soon after assuming office, she formed the cluster on External Relations 
and Governing Bodies, whose mission included a call “to build partnerships and alliances with other 
key actors such as other UN agencies, NGOs and the private sector” (K. Lee, 2009). According to 
David Nabarro, then Executive Director at Brundtland’s office, financial constraints were a motive 
for increasing partnerships with the private sector: “We certainly needed private financing. For the 
past decades, governments’ financial contributions have dwindled. The main sources of  funding are 
the private sector and the financial markets” (quoted in Motchane, 2003, p. 396). In addition to 
financial contributions, Brundtland appointed individuals from the private sector to prominent 
positions within the WHO’s senior ranks (K. Lee, 2009). 
Brundtland’s reforms resulted in an expansion in voluntary contributions, including public-
private partnerships (PPPs) in health, as mentioned above. However, some of  the many global 
public-private initiatives preferred not to channel resources through the WHO, seeing it as a 
potential partner rather than lead or coordinating agency (K. Lee, 2009). The Bill and Melinda Gates 
Foundation has been particularly influential in this respect, helping to shape the decisions of  other 
funding bodies and also, thereby, global health priorities, to the extent that it has been referred to as 
“the ‘pied piper’ of  global health” (Birn, 2014).  
Despite her reform efforts, Brundtland was unable to secure an increase in core funding for 
the organization, which is even more precarious today, and partnerships with the private sector were, 
and remain, controversial (Clift et al., 2013). Her successor, Lee Jong-Wook (2003-2006)29, who had 
been closely involved in Brundtland’s the WHO reform process as her Senior Policy Advisor in her 
cabinet, picked up where she left off. As her policy advisor, he remained committed to supporting 
Member States by strengthening the WHO’s regional and country structure (WHO, 2019b) and this 
commitment continued into his time as Director-General. In his address to the WHO staff  in July 
2003, he made clear his intention to decentralize the WHO and strengthen its presence and impact 
at the country level. He aimed to do this by giving country offices greater resources and authority, 
and empowering them to “work more effectively and accountably” with governments in responding 
to local health needs (J. Lee, 2003a). In November of  that year he remarked several times that 
change, renewal and reform were important values, but so was continuity (J. Lee, 2003b, 2003c). 
Director-General Margaret Chan (2007-2017) initiated a reform process in January 2010 by 
convening an informal consultation on the future of  financing for the WHO and the need for 
	
29 Dr. Lee passed away suddenly on May 22, 2006. 
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predictability and sustainability in this respect (WHO, 2011a). Participants in the consultation raised 
more fundamental questions about the role of  the WHO and the nature of  its operations in a 
rapidly changing global health environment. The reform was expanded to include priority setting, 
governance and management, but financing remained the fundamental problem at the core of  the 
initiative. The reform process began in earnest in May 2011 when the WHA considered the 
Director-General’s report on the future of  financing, and gave the official mandate for reform 
(WHO, 2011a). 
With respect to engaging with NSAs, while initiating the reform process, in 2011 the WHA 
requested a detailed concept paper on the subject of  holding a World Health Forum in November 
2012 (WHO, 2011a), which will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 7. However, the idea was 
later abandoned due to a lack of  support among Member States (MMI & DGH, 2011; van de Pas & 
van Schaik, 2014; WHO, 2011d, p. 2). The Executive Board held a Special Session on the WHO 
reform (also discussed in Chapter 7) in November 2011, where several options were discussed for 
expanding engagement with NSAs. In the longer-term, it was agreed that options for a framework to 
guide stakeholder interactions (while expressing the WHO’s role as a directing and coordinating 
authority) would be explored (WHO, 2011d). At its 65th meeting in May 2012, the WHA requested 
several draft policy papers about the WHO’s engagement with NGOs and private commercial 
entities, respectively, and about the WHO’s hosting of  health partnerships (WHO, 2012c). This 
initiated a four-year process of  consultation and development resulting in the WHA’s adoption of  
FENSA in May 2016 (WHO, 2016f). 
Although the reforms initiated by Chan sought to address a wide range of  issues, they did 
not address head-on the WHO’s role in the changed, and changing, global health architecture, and 
whether more fundamental changes to the organization’s governance, management and financing 
structures were necessary in order for it to reach its potential (Clift et al., 2013). Among other 
challenges, one observer noted, the process was “bedevilled by the same problem that led to the 
funding crisis in the first place—a switch in power from the assembly of  Member States to donors 
(including some Member States as well as other donors) with specific interests” (Legge, 2012). 
One initiative under Chan’s leadership that was aimed at “improving the transparency, 
alignment, and predictability of  the WHO’s financing,” was the establishment of  a financing 
dialogue to address budgetary gaps before the implementation of  biennial budgets begin.30 Civil 
	
30 An extraordinary meeting of  the Programme, Budget and Administration Committee of  the Executive 
Board in December 2012 proposed several new initiatives, one of  which was the financing dialogue. These 
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society organizations expressed concerns early on, however, that rather than leading to increases in 
assessed contributions by Member States, the new approach would further institutionalize the 
WHO’s donor dependence (van de Pas & van Schaik, 2014). The financing dialogue was launched 
on June 24, 2013, underpinned by the principles of  alignment, predictability and flexibility, and 
transparency. Member States made specific commitments relating to these principles. Subsequent 
financing dialogues were held in November 2013, November 2015, and October 2016.  
The October 2016 finance dialogue meeting was held to address the expected budgetary gap 
in the 2016-2017 program biennium. In May 2016, the WHA had approved a budgetary increase of 
US$160 million for the new the WHO Health Emergency Programme, raising the agency’s total 
budget for 2016-2017 to US $3.354 billion. However, there was expected to be a gap between 
budget and financing of US$500 million by the end of the biennium. During the meeting numerous 
Member States announced new financial contributions (WHO, 2016h). Director-General Chan also 
made the case for a 10% increase in assessed contributions, which would amount to an additional 
US$93 million (WHO, 2016g). As mentioned above, Member States at the WHA in May 2017 did 
not approve an increase of this size, but agreed to a 3% increase (WHO, 2017a). 
The Director-General since July 1, 2017 is Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus. As Minister of  
Health in Ethiopia from 2005-2012, Tedros led a comprehensive reform of  the country’s health 
system. Within months of  taking office as the WHO Director-General, he outlined his vision for “A 
transformed the WHO”. To meet the health needs of  the 21st century, in Tedros’ view, the WHO 
will need to broaden and intensify its engagement with a wider range of  stakeholders across the 
public, private and civil society sectors. His priorities include “strong, visionary leadership to put the 
WHO at the centre of  global health,” managerial reform aimed at attracting and retaining talent, and 
securing “more predictable and flexible funding for the WHO by positioning health as a security, 
economic and development priority” (WHO, 2018f). 
Yet, by the end of  his first year in the office, Tedros was seen by some observers in May 
2018 as having “quietly abandoned Margaret Chan’s reform agenda” (Huang, 2018). Rather than 
addressing issues concerning the WHO’s internal management, such as the balance of  staff  skills 
and accountability, and its funding structure, Tedros chose to focus – with early indications showing 
some success – on improving the agency’s emergency response capacities (Huang, 2018). Others, 
however, were more generous in their assessment of  Tedros’s first year. Richard Horton, Editor in 
	
proposals were then endorsed by the Executive Board at its meeting in January 2013 (WHO, 2013f) and by 
the WHA in May 2013 (WHO, 2013g). 
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Chief  of  the medical journal The Lancet said during a panel at the WHA that “there has been a 
dramatic change at the WHO in the past year under the leadership of Dr. Tedros” (Ravelo & 
Chadwick, 2018 n.p). He indicated that the door had been opened to cooperation between the 
WHO and the academic community, which the WHO had not been receptive to previously. The 
Director-General of  the International Federation of  Pharmaceutical Manufacturers and 
Associations also appreciated Tedros’s continued focus on partnerships (Ravelo & Chadwick, 2018). 
In his opening speech at the Executive Board in January 2019, Tedros outlined his vision for 
transforming the WHO into a “modern” and “agile organization”. He said, “Transformation is not 
about tinkering at the edges,” and called it instead a “fundamental revamp” (Tedros, 2019). He said 
the transformation was building on the efforts of  his predecessor Chan and aligned with wider 
reforms taking place across the UN. He outlined four main shifts: measurable impact, relevance in 
all countries, normative and technical excellence, and innovation, with a focus on digital health. He 
said that in practice, the transformation would consist of  four parts: a new strategy, new processes, a 
new operating model and a new culture for the WHO (Tedros, 2019). 
Now two years into his term, it is still too soon to gauge whether Tedros’s reforms – or 
transformation, to use his more recent terminology – will be any more successful than those 
initiated by Brundtland, Lee, and Chan at structuring, managing, and positioning the WHO in such a 
way that it is able to provide the leadership and coordination that global health requires. 
 
3.6 Conclusion 
This chapter gave an overview of the antecedents, history and structure of the WHO. Particular 
emphasis was placed on the challenges posed by growing budgetary gaps caused by Member States 
refusal to increase their assessed contributions. The WHO has tried to bridge the budgetary gaps by 
relying on voluntary contributions, including by partnering with private sector actors in 
multistakeholder initiatives and PPPs. Several Directors-General have undertaken reform to try to 
address the agency’s financial constraint. These reforms have included adopting a multistakeholder 
approach and turning to the private sector and philanthropic organizations for partnerships. More 
recently, then Director-General Margaret Chan initiated reforms that included the introduction of 
FENSA, a new policy to govern and facilitate the WHO’s engagement with NSAs. The contentious 
development and adoption of FENSA are analyzed in Chapter 7. The analysis includes critiques of 
the policy and its implications for the WHO and for global health governance more broadly, as well 
as its effect on the ability of profit-oriented NSAs to engage with the WHO in order to influence 
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substantive policies and paradigms that shape policy-making. Increased reliance on and partnership 
with the private sector comes with risks by exposing substantive policy at the WHO and its policy-
making, norm-setting and governance to corporate influence and by creating deeper reliance on 
private funding in ways that undermine the WHO’s mandate.  
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Chapter 4 – Contextualizing the case studies: baby food and soda industries 
 
4.0 Introduction 
As described in Chapter 1, this dissertation examines two issue areas to evaluate corporate influence 
on, and participation in, global health policy-making amid the changing nature of global (health) 
governance. The chapter serves two purposes within the dissertation. The first is to outline the 
health effects of policy decisions taken at the World Health Organization (WHO) in terms of the 
health and well-being of the world’s population and the significance, therefore, of the baby food and 
soda industries’ engagement to influence global policies and regulations relating to their products in 
order to increase their sale and consumption, and to shape paradigms that determine which policies 
are pursued and what role private actors are able to play in developing them. The second is to 
introduce the structural context within which these industries work to influence both substantive 
policies and paradigms to create environments conducive to their interests. This context determines 
the strategies and types of power available to these industries, but it has also been shaped by these 
and other industries by drawing, iteratively, on these same strategies and sources of power. 
The case studies, discussed in detail in Chapters 5 and 6, analyze the ways in which private 
sector actors in these two industries use the corporate playbook to influence substantive policy and 
paradigms relating to their products. Their track-records of putting their profits ahead of health in 
the public interest, along with concerns about non-state actor participation in global health 
governance and policy-making, raise questions about the implications for the WHO and global 
health policy-making as the lead global health agency seeks to increase its engagement with such 
actors, especially for-profit entities and their associations. 
The first case study focuses on the marketing of baby milks and foods and their impact on 
infant health outcomes. The marketing of these products is linked with decreased breastfeeding 
rates, resulting in increased infant illness and mortality. It was identified as a global health problem 
nearly five decades ago (Baer & Marguiles, 1980; Jelliffe, 1972; Sokol, 2005). While baby milk 
marketing is “a problem that most people thought had gone away [in] the 1970s and 1980s,” it is 
“the forgotten issue of our time” (Mason & Greer, 2018, p. 1) and one that continues to have 
widespread impacts on infant health around the world. The medical journal The Lancet has said the 
shift to formula, “[m]ultiplied across populations and involving multinational commercial interests, 
… has catastrophic consequences on breastfeeding rates and the health of subsequent generations” 
(Lancet, 2016, p. 404). The second case study concerns sugar-sweetened beverages, or soda, and 
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their contribution to NCDs such as obesity and diabetes. Soda manufacturers play a significant role 
in driving up the consumption of soda, just as Big Food contributes to the increased consumption 
of processed foods high in salt, sugar, and fat (Beaglehole & Yach, 2003; Stuckler et al., 2012; Wiist, 
2006b, 2010). The two cases are examples of what the public and global health literatures term 
“industrial epidemics”, recognizing the industries’ products and activities as vectors of disease. 
These activities shape the environment in which consumers make decisions about feeding their 
babies, making them what these literatures call the “corporate determinants of health”.  
This chapter begins with an overview of the health benefits of breastfeeding for infants and 
mothers, its economic benefits for families and states and what’s at stake if breastfeeding is not 
protected through substantive policy and actions. It describes the link between the marketing of 
baby milk and declining breastfeeding rates, and growing calls for the regulation of baby food 
marketing at the global level. The chapter introduces baby food market leaders Nestlé and Danone, 
and the main baby food industry associations. It also outlines relevant global policies that relate to 
the marketing of baby milk and to infant and young child nutrition. Turning to the soda industry, 
the chapter provides an overview of the issue, starting with the effects of soda consumption on 
health, specifically in terms of NCDs such as diabetes and obesity. It provides an introduction to 
soda market and industry, including market leaders The Coca-Cola Company and PepsiCo, as well as 
soda industry business associations such as the International Food and Beverage Association and the 
American Beverage Association. The chapter also outlines relevant global policies that relate to the 
soda industry.  
 
4.1 Baby food issue and importance to public health 
Breastfed babies are generally healthier and more likely to achieve optimal growth and development 
compared with those who are fed formula milk. The lives of an estimated 800,000-823,000 children 
could be saved every year, and the health and development of millions more children greatly 
improved, if breastfeeding practices were improved to recommended optimal standards (Black et al., 
2013; Victora et al., 2016). The WHO recommends that all babies be breastfed within an hour of 
birth and exclusively breastfed (no other food or drink, not even water) for their first six months, 
and that breastfeeding continue along with complementary foods to the age of two years or beyond 
(Kramer & Kakuma, 2012; WHO, 2019g). Breastfeeding provides protection against mortality due 
to infectious diseases (Sankar et al., 2015), incidence and severity of diarrhea and respiratory 
infection (Horta & Victora, 2013), and ear infections (Bowatte et al., 2015). There are also long-term 
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health benefits for breastfed infants and young children. Breastfeeding is associated with a lower 
prevalence of obesity among children (Woo & Martin, 2015), a decreased likelihood of type 2 
diabetes and of overweight/obesity among adults (Horta et al., 2015b), and improved cognition and 
performance in intelligence tests (Horta et al., 2015a). 
Breastfeeding also confers health benefits to mothers. For example, breastfeeding is 
protective against breast and ovarian cancers (Chowdhury et al., 2015). Present rates of breastfeeding 
prevent almost 20,000 annual deaths from breast cancer, and another 20,000 could be prevented by 
scaling up breastfeeding practices (Victora et al., 2016). Exclusive and predominant breastfeeding 
delays the return of postpartum menstruation, which has the effect of preserving iron stores and 
spacing pregnancies, which benefits women’s health. Breastfeeding also reduces the mother’s risk of 
type 2 diabetes (Aune et al., 2014; Chowdhury et al., 2015).  
In addition to touting health benefits for babies and mothers, some breastfeeding advocates 
have also appealed to economic perspectives by pointing to the cost of not breastfeeding to families 
(Sobel et al., 2012) and states (Bartick & Reinhold, 2010; Bhutta et al., 2013; Gupta & Khanna, 1999; 
Gupta & Rohde, 1993; M. J. Renfrew et al., 2012; J. P. Smith et al., 2007)), the economic benefits of 
improving breastfeeding practices (Pokhrel et al., 2014; M. J. Renfrew et al., 2012), and the amount 
of investment necessary to do so (Holla et al., 2013; Horton et al., 2009; Rollins et al., 2016; 
UNICEF, 2013).  
Advocates maintain that breastfeeding is a matter of children’s and women’s rights (Holla et 
al., 2013; UNICEF, 2013). In November 2016, UN human rights experts31 issued a joint statement 
that said: “Breastfeeding is a human rights issue for both the child and the mother” (OHCHR, 
2016). The experts reminded States of their obligations under relevant international human rights 
treaties to provide all necessary support and protection to mothers and their infants and young 
children to facilitate optimal feeding practices, including by ending inappropriate marketing of 
breast-milk substitutes (OHCHR, 2016). 
Although many factors influence infant feeding decisions,32 a vast literature finds that the 
marketing practices of baby food companies have been particularly detrimental to global 
breastfeeding rates (Baer & Marguiles, 1980; J. P. Brady, 2012; Lancet, 2016; Sokol, 2005; C. 
	
31 UN Special Rapporteurs on the Right to Food and on the Right to Health, the Working Group on 
Discrimination against Women in Law and in Practice, and the Committee on the Rights of the Child. 
32 Other factors that influence infant feeding decisions include mother’s health and perceptions of 
breastfeeding, societal attitudes, birthing experience, lactation counseling, availability of maternity leave, 
support from family and friends, etc. 
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Williams, 1939).33 Advertising is designed to represent formula-feeding as aspirational, convenient, 
and more nourishing than breastfeeding, and to create doubt in mothers’ minds about their ability to 
breastfeed. Free samples disrupt the establishment of breastfeeding and an adequate milk supply. 
Incentives to doctors and other health workers (in the form of gifts, sponsorships, trips, and so on) 
encourage their endorsement of company products to mothers. All of these tactics contribute to 
normalizing bottle-feeding and making it appear preferable to breastfeeding.  
The replacement of breastmilk with other less nutritive and protective or inappropriately 
prepared milks or other fluids has a negative impact on infant morbidity and mortality due to a 
downward spiral of undernutrition and infection. This phenomenon has been dubbed “bottle baby 
disease” (Baer & Marguiles, 1980). Declining breastfeeding rates were linked with the promotion of 
milks for babies as early as 1939 by paediatrician Dr. Cicely Williams, who argued that deaths 
resulting from such “misguided propaganda on infant feeding” should be considered murder (M. 
Brady & Oliveira Brady, 2004; C. Williams, 1939). Concern over the aggressive promotion of 
formula milks increased over the 1960s as more doctors published research that echoed Dr. 
Williams’ observation and established the negative impact of marketing and advertising on 
breastfeeding practices. One pediatrician scholar coined the term ‘commerciogenic malnutrition’ to 
describe the impact of the promotion of milks and baby foods on infant nutrition status (Jelliffe, 
1972). The WHO passed two resolutions (in 1974 and 1978) calling on Member States to make 
efforts to promote breastfeeding, including by regulating sales promotion (WHO, 1974, 1978). The 
1974 resolution explicitly noted: “the general decline in breastfeeding, related to socio-cultural and 
environmental factors, including the mistaken idea caused by misleading sales promotion that 
breastfeeding is inferior to feeding with manufactured breastmilk substitutes” (WHO, 1974 
Preamble para 1). The United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) had also identified aggressive 
promotion of baby milks as a key factor contributing to the decline of breastfeeding in many areas 
of the developing world (Baer & Marguiles, 1980).  
UN agencies first met to discuss the matter in November 1970; however, the statement that 
was issued as an outcome reflected the baby food industry’s participation in the discussions (Sokol, 
	
33 Conversely, industry executives have admitted that increases in breastfeeding are bad for business. 
“There’s definitely an offset from – a slight increase or an uptick in breastfeeding rates,” Kasper Jakobsen, 
Chief Executive of Mead Johnson until June 2017, has said (Mason & Greer, 2018, p. 31). Abbott’s chief 
executive Miles White also acknowledged that “an increasing breastfeeding rate in China” may limit the 
company’s sales in the long term, although annual sales increases of 6% are “still a healthy rate” (Mason & 
Greer, 2018, p. 32). 
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1997). In 1972, the International Organization of Consumers Unions (IOCU), now called 
Consumers International, proposed a draft Code of practice for advertising of infant foods. The Codex 
Alimentarius Commission (the UN agency that deals with international quality and labelling 
standards for food products) felt the Code was outside its mandate, however, and should be taken 
up instead by the WHO and UNICEF (Chetley, 1986; Sokol, 1997).  
The issue entered the public’s purview in 1973 when it was highlighted in New Internationalist 
magazine (Geach, 1973). The following year, the development agency War on Want published a 
booklet entitled The Baby Killer (Muller, 1974). The booklet was translated into German by a small 
Swiss student group called the Arbeitsgruppe Dritte Welt (Third World Working Group) and 
published under a new title that translated as Nestlé Tötet Babies (Nestlé Kills Babies) (Sasson, 2016; 
Sokol, 1997). The press in Switzerland, where Nestlé’s headquarters are based, gave the report 
extensive coverage (Sokol, 1997). Nestlé was furious and sued the students for libel, earning the 
company a great deal of negative publicity over the course of the two-year court case (Allain, 2005; 
Sasson, 2016). The group was eventually found guilty on one count of libel concerning the book 
title, and Nestlé dropped the other three counts. The judge told Nestlé to change its marketing 
tactics if it wished to be “spared the accusation of immoral and unethical conduct” (Sokol, 2005, pp. 
7–8). Perhaps unsurprisingly, however, the company changed little. On July 4, 1977, a consumer 
boycott of Nestlé was launched in North America in protest at the company’s inaction.  
Then US Senator Edward Kennedy, as chair of a subcommittee on Health and Scientific 
Research, held a hearing on the advertising and promotion of infant formula in developing 
countries. The hearing drew more public attention to the issue and led to increased pressure on the 
infant food companies. Senator Kennedy requested then WHO Director-General Halfdan Mahler to 
convene and international meeting on the topic (Sokol, 2005). 
In October 1979, the WHO and UNICEF held a joint meeting on infant and young child 
feeding that brought together 150 participants, including officials from the UN and other specialized 
agencies, delegates from governments, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and industry as 
well as experts in various disciplines. It was the first time that NGOs and industry sat as equal 
participants with government delegates in a UN meeting (Baer & Marguiles, 1980; Chetley, 1986). 
The meeting called for “‘urgent action to promote the health and nutrition of infants and young 
children’ and cited ‘poor infant feeding practices and their consequences’ as ‘one of the world’s 
major problems’” (Baer & Marguiles, 1980, p. 72). The meeting recommended: “There should be an 
international code of marketing of infant formula and other products used as breastmilk substitutes” 
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and the WHO and UNICEF were “requested to organize the process for its preparation” 
(WHO/UNICEF, 1979, p. 29). The World Health Assembly (WHA), the policy-making body of the 
WHO, endorsed this call in May 1980 (WHO, 1980a). 
The WHO and UNICEF led the drafting process in consultation with experts, government 
delegations, NGOs and industry. The industry lobbied through the International Council of Infant 
Food Industries (ICIFI), which Nestlé had set up along with seven other infant formula 
manufacturers to counter negative publicity during the company’s libel trial, to try to influence the 
drafting process. NGOs also lobbied the WHO and UNICEF, urging that the Code should be as 
strong and protective as possible. The NGOs resented that the two UN agencies seemed to be 
acting as mediators between the NGOs and industry, rather than taking the lead to protect infant 
health (Sokol, 2005). Four drafts of the Code were prepared over a period of 18 months leading up 
to its presentation before the WHO Executive Board in January 1981 and the WHA in May 1981. 
Nestlé expected that attention to the issue and the Boycott would die down with high-level 
negotiations over the Code underway. But with the US vote against the Code came renewed 
attention to the issue and growing calls to boycott. To salvage the company’s suffering reputation, in 
December 1983 Nestlé management decided to negotiate with the activists. Two months later, the 
company signed an agreement to comply fully with the International Code of Marketing of Breast-
milk Substitutes, described below, in all markets but Europe. The Boycott was suspended for six 
months and then called off in September 1984. However it started again in 1988, coordinated from 
the UK, when Nestlé continued to market its products in violation of the Code (Allain, 1989, 2005; 
Sasson, 2016).  
 
4.2 The baby food market and industry 
The baby food market was valued at US$44.8 billion in 2014,34 a figure that was projected to reach 
$70.6 billion by 2019 (Rollins et al., 2016). These sales, unlike those of other commodities, seem to 
be resilient to market downturns. Even during a global recession in 2009, baby formula sales 
continued to grow by 7-8% annually (E. Renfrew, 2014; Rollins et al., 2016). It was projected in 
2014 to be “the fastest growing packaged food category over the next 5 years, achieving growth in 
excess of 7% a year” or even as high as 8-9%, until 2019 (E. Renfrew, 2014). In 2013, four 
	
34 Up from $2 billion in 1987 (Mokhiber, 1987), less than $15 billion in 1998 (Mason & Greer, 2018), US $17 




companies together controlled 55% of the global baby milk market value: Nestlé, Danone, Mead 
Johnson35 and Abbott Laboratories (Baker et al., 2016). 
Two companies dominate the baby food market. Nestlé has for a long time been considered 
the market leader, both in terms of its size and its influence. In 2011, the company reportedly 
claimed 23% of the baby food market. Next in terms of market share is Danone, which had 14% of 
the market since acquiring Royal Numico in 2007, and Mead Johnson was in third position with 
11% of the global market (Euromonitor, 2011; Mason et al., 2013; Yeong & Allain, 2014). Nestlé 
was also the leader in terms of its marketing scale and aggressiveness, although in recent years 
Danone has amped up its promotional efforts (see, for example, Yeong & Allain, 2014, 2017). 
Growth in the baby food market is largely dependent on emerging economies, especially the 
lucrative Asia Pacific market, where the middle class is growing. Danone Baby Nutrition saw sales 
grow by 10.7% in 2011, largely because of markets in Asia, which accounted for 40% of its business 
(Danone SA, 2012). Also in 2011, Mead Johnson reported net sales growth36 of 17%, with growth 
of 26% in Asia and Latin America, compared with growth of just 3% in North America/Europe 
(Mead Johnson Nutrition, 2012). 
Despite stiff competition for market share, baby food companies put aside their commercial 
competition to protect their interests and fight for their common good. The baby food industry 
formed two main bodies to represent its collective interests, the International Council of Infant 
Food Industries (ICIFI) and the International Association of Infant Food Manufacturers (IFM). 
ICIFI was initiated by Nestlé in 1975 ahead of the Third World Action Group libel trial. The eight 
initial members were Cow & Gate, Dumex, Meiji, Morinaga, Nestlé, Snow Brand, Wakado and 
Wyeth (Sokol, 2005). By 1981, it represented companies accounting for 85% of baby food sales to 
the developing world (ICIFI, 1981). 
In 1984, ICIFI was replaced by IFM, which continued to represent the industry’s interests 
regarding baby food marketing. The IFM started out representing 33 companies but lost 13 by 1985 
and dropped to 14 by 2005 (Allain, 2005). Described in 2015 on its website as a “non-profit 
organization founded in 1984 to protect and promote infant and young child nutrition around the 
globe” (IFM, 2015), IFM continued to represent industry’s interests globally, including at the WHO, 
	
35 Mead Johnson was purchased by Reckitt Benckiser (RB) in February 2017 for $16.6 billion (Jarvis, 2017; 
Mead Johnson Nutrition, 2017). 
36 Mead Johnson focuses on paediatric nutrition; many, but not all, of its products are breastmilk substitutes. 
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the Food and Agriculture Organization, the Codex Alimentarius Commission, and UNICEF, until it 
was disbanded at the end of  2016 (Abbott, 2017).  
The baby food industry presents the issue as being a matter of individual consumer choice 
(for examples, see Mehdi & Wagner-Rizvi, 1998; Yeong & Allain, 2014, 2017). They say that 
breastfeeding is not always desired or possible, and that they manufacture a product to fill a 
legitimate need. Baby food companies try to represent themselves as trustworthy and responsible by 
introducing company or industry codes of conduct (Danone, 2016; ICIFI, 1975; Nestec Ltd., 2010, 
2017) and participating in various voluntary self-regulation initiatives such as the United Nations 
Global Compact and the FTSE4Good Index (FTSE Russell, 2019; UN Global Compact, 2019). 
These framings and activities by baby food companies and their industry associations – and the 
corporate playbook strategies and types of power underpinning them – are analyzed in Chapter 5. 
 
4.3 Key global policies regulating baby food marketing 
The marketing of baby food products is at the heart of the issue and has been the most contentious 
subject of global policy-making in connection with infant and young child nutrition. The 
International Code of Marketing of Breast-Milk Substitutes (the Code), along with subsequent, 
relevant WHA resolutions, is the key global instrument in this regard. The WHA adopted the Code 
in May 1981 (WHO, 1981b). The vote was 118 in favour, one against (the US), and three 
abstentions (Argentina, Japan, and Korea) (Chetley, 1986; Joseph, 1981). The International Code 
was adopted as a “minimum requirement,” and governments were to “implement it in its entirety” 
as “national legislation, regulations or other suitable measures” (WHO, 1981d). The Code provides 
for Member States to report annually to the WHO Director-General and for the Director-General to 
report to the WHA in even years on the status of its implementation (Articles 11.6 and 11.7) (WHO, 
1981b). The WHA also adopts a resolution on infant and young child feeding in even years, with the 
exceptions of 1998⁠37 and 202038. These subsequent resolutions provide clarity, respond to new 
	
37 That year, although it was reporting year, Nestlé and IFM successfully lobbied to convince government 
representatives that a resolution was not necessary “since the new Director-General of the WHO would 
arrange global consultations with the NGOs.” In a last-ditch effort to make sure a resolution on infant 
feeding would be adopted, Zimbabwe tabled a resolution and gathered co-sponsors. However, a day before 
the debate, Zimbabwe ceded to the pressure of the lobbyists and the WHO Secretariat (likely due to time 
constraints because of several big-name guest speakers in connection with celebrations of the WHO’s 50th 
anniversary) and withdrew the proposed resolution (Allain, 2005). 




product or marketing trends or other relevant matters, or introduce new initiatives to protect, 
promote and support infant and young child nutrition.  
The provisions of the Code stipulate that, with respect to products covered by the scope of 
the Code,39 there is to be no advertising to the public, no free samples provided to mothers, and no 
promotion of products in health care facilities. Company representatives may not contact mothers. 
Companies may not provide financial or material inducements or product samples to health 
workers. Product labels may not bear baby pictures or other pictures or text that may idealize 
formula use and must include a statement of the superiority of breastfeeding and instructions for 
safe preparation, among other things. Unsuitable products, such as sweetened condensed milk, may 
not be promoted for use by babies. Information to health workers should be restricted to scientific 
and factual matters. Health professionals are to disclose to their institution any fellowships, research 
grants, or conferences provided by baby food manufacturers (WHO, 1981b).  
The International Code acknowledges in its Preamble that the baby food industry has “an 
important and constructive role to play in relation to infant feeding, and in the promotion of the aim 
of this Code and its proper implementation” (WHO, 1981b, p. 7). It also specifies in Article 11.3 
that companies are to abide by the Code’s provisions whether or not the countries they operate in 
have enacted legislation to implement it: 
Independently of any other measures taken for implementation of this Code, 
manufacturers and distributors of products within the scope of this Code should regard 
themselves as responsible for monitoring their marketing practices according to the 
principles and aim of this Code, and for taking steps to ensure that their conduct at every 
level conforms to them. (WHO, 1981b, p. 14) 
 
Although the WHO is the home agency for the Code, it does not directly monitor company 
compliance. Responsibility for monitoring was assigned to governments, although professional 
groups and NGOs were also designated a watchdog role. 
In May 2016, the WHA “welcome[d] with appreciation” through resolution 69.9 (WHO, 
2016b) another important policy on baby food marketing: the “technical guidance on ending the 
inappropriate promotion of foods for infants and young children” (WHO, 2016e, para. 1). 
Significantly, the Guidance clarifies that the Code and subsequent relevant WHA resolutions apply 
to all commercially produced foods or beverages specifically marketed as suitable for feeding 
children up to 36 months (3 years) of age, including “follow-up-formulas” and “growing-up milks” 
	
39 The Code applies to the marketing of breastmilk substitutes, baby foods and products such as bottles and 
teats. The determination of milks and foods that fall within the scope of the Code is discussed in Chapter 5. 
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(WHO, 2016e). The industry had long maintained these milk products did not fall within the scope 
of the Code. Indeed, as will be discussed in Chapter 5, baby food companies invented these 
differentiated products in order to circumvent the Code. The Guidance also specifies the conditions 
under which complementary foods may be promoted (including which messages may and may not 
be included in their promotion) and explicitly prohibits cross-promotion to promote breastmilk 
substitutes and practices such as sponsorships, gifts, and free supplies, and address the prevention of 
conflicts of interest (WHO, 2016e). 
The civil society group and IBFAN-member International Code Documentation Centre 
noted that the Resolution could have closed some vulnerable gaps by explicitly urging Member 
States to “implement the Guidance as a minimum requirement, prioritize public health obligations 
over trade obligations, and ensure Codex standards be coherent with all the WHO policies” (ICDC, 
2016 n.p.) The group also pointed to the recently published Joint WHO/UNICEF/IBFAN report 
on national implementation of the International Code and relevant resolutions as evidence that 
“much still remains to be done to protect children against commercial greed” (ICDC, 2016 n.p. 
WHO et al., 2016). 
The most recent the WHO policy document specifically on infant feeding is a resolution 
adopted at the WHA in May 2018. Member States met four times ahead of the WHA to develop a 
draft consensus text for the resolution (WHO, 2018j), which observers expected to be adopted 
without incident. However, unhappy with the provisions in the draft resolution, the US delegation 
threatened countries that supported it with trade sanctions and advanced its own proposed text 
(Byatnal, 2018; Jacobs, 2018; US Delegation to WHO, 2018; WHO, 2018k). After several days of 
redrafting, a decidedly weaker resolution was adopted (Byatnal, 2018). These events will be discussed 
in more detail in Chapter 5. 
Also at the WHA in May 2018, the Director-General brought to the notice of Member 
States a report about a Draft Approach for the Prevention and Management of Conflicts of Interest 
in the Policy Development and Implementation of Nutritional Programmes at Country Level. 
Although this policy has potential relevance to baby food industry activities at the national level, it is 
discussed in this dissertation in Chapter 7 in connection with FENSA. 
In a resolution WHA 65.6, which also endorsed a Comprehensive Implementation Plan 
(CIP) on maternal, infant and young child nutrition (WHO, 2012d, 2012e),40 the WHA in May 2012 
	
40 The Comprehensive Implementation Plan (CIP) aims to alleviate the double burden of malnutrition (over- 
and under-nutrition) in children, focusing efforts on the period from conception through the first two years 
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had requested the Director-General to “develop risk assessment, disclosure and management tools 
to safeguard against possible conflicts of interest in policy development and implementation of 
nutrition programmes consistent with the WHO’s overall policy and practice” (WHO, 2012e, para. 
3(3)). Two years later, WHA decision 67(9) requested informal consultations to develop these 
assessment and management tools for conflicts of interest in nutrition for consideration by the 
Assembly in 2016 (WHO, 2014f). 
A technical consultation was held in Geneva on October 8 and 9, 2015, bringing together 
experts from various fields and diverse stakeholders, as well as Member States as observers. The 
Secretariat then prepared a draft approach taking into consideration the WHO’s overall policies and 
practices, including the Framework of engagement with non-state actors (FENSA),41 which is 
discussed in detail in Chapter 7. A public consultation was held September 11-29, 2017. The draft 
approach to preventing and managing conflicts of interest in country-level nutrition programs was 
presented at the WHO Executive Board and the WHA in January and May 2018, respectively, as a 
living document that may be revised as necessary and that “the Secretariat [would] pilot … at 
country level in the six the WHO regions to test its applicability and practical value” (WHO, 2017c, 
para. 28, 2018i, para. 28).  
  
4.4 Soda and its association with non-communicable diseases (NCDs) 
Soda is not the sole cause of NCDs such as diabetes and obesity, but extensive research points to its 
consumption as a contributing factor to, or even a key driver of, the global rise in rates of obesity 
and diabetes, beginning in childhood and continuing into adulthood (Basu et al., 2013; Bleich & 
Vercammen, 2018; Hu & Malik, 2010; Malik et al., 2006, 2010; Singh et al., 2015; Vartanian et al., 
2007).  
The WHO, NGOs, various scholars, and the media refer to the increased incidence of 
NCDs such as obesity and diabetes as an “epidemic”42 (for example, Gertner & Rifkin, 2018; 
	
of life. It sets six global targets to be achieved by 2025, the fifth of which is to increase the rate of exclusive 
breastfeeding in the first six months to 50% (WHO, 2012d, 2012e). 
41 Policies on the WHO’s engagement with NGOs and the private sector had also been requested by 
Member States at the 2012 WHA in decision 65(9) (WHO, 2012c). FENSA was adopted in 2016 through 
resolution WHA69.10 (WHO, 2016f). 
42 The framing of obesity as an “epidemic” is contested, disputed and highly politicized, however, as are the 
terms “obesity” and “obese” (see, for example, Firth, 2012; Medvedyuk, Ali, & Raphael, 2017; Millstone, 




Herrera, 2015; NCD Alliance, 2017; Nesheim & Nestle, 2015; the WHO, 2015). NCDs contribute 
41 million deaths (or 71% of all deaths) worldwide each year (WHO, 2018l). This is an increase from 
36 million deaths (or 64% of all deaths) globally in 2012 (WHO, 2012g). NCDs disproportionately 
affect people in low- and middle-income countries; more than 75% (32 million) of global deaths due 
to NCDs occur in these countries (WHO, 2018l). Diabetes accounts for 1.6 million NCD deaths 
and is the fourth leading cause of NCD deaths, after cardiovascular diseases (17.9 million), cancers 
(9.0 million), and respiratory diseases (3.9 million) (WHO, 2018l). 
The prevalence of diabetes is increasing (International Diabetes Federation, 2017; Mathers & 
Loncar, 2006; WHO, 2018m; Wild et al., 2004). According to the International Diabetes Federation 
(2017), 425 million adults (8% of, or 1 in 11, adults) aged 20-79 years have diabetes, although half of 
these (212 million) are undiagnosed. For the age range 18-99 years, the number of people with 
diabetes is 451 million. If trends continue, by 2045, 629 million 20-79-year-olds or 693 million 18-
99-year-olds will have diabetes. Diabetes was estimated to cause the deaths of 4.0 million people 
aged between 20 and 79 years of age, which is the equivalent of one death every eight seconds. 
Deaths due to diabetes comprised 10.7% of deaths among people in this age group – more than the 
combined total of deaths from infectious diseases. Nearly half (46.1%) of the people in this age 
group who died due to diabetes were under the age of 60 years (International Diabetes Federation, 
2017). 
Diabetes was once considered a disease of the West and of affluence, but it has now spread 
to every country in the world and is increasingly common among the poor (Hu, 2011; Hu & Malik, 
2010). Three-quarters of people with diabetes live in low- and middle-income countries; 
approximately two-thirds of people with diabetes (279 million) live in urban areas. Spending on 
diabetes comprises 12% ($727 billion) of global health expenditure (International Diabetes 
Federation, 2017). 
According to the WHO, overweight and obesity are linked to more deaths worldwide than 
underweight, and are major risk factors for NCDs such as cardiovascular diseases (which were the 
leading cause of death in 2012), diabetes, musculoskeletal disorders, and some cancers (WHO, 
2018h). The prevalence of obesity tripled between 1975 and 2016 (WHO, 2018h). There are more 
people worldwide who are obese than who are underweight. According to global estimates by the 
WHO, 39% of the world’s adult population (aged 18 years and older) – 39% of men and 40% of 
women – were overweight in 2016. This equates to more than 1.9 billion overweight adults. Of 
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these, 650 million – 13% of the world’s adult population (11% of men and 15% of women) – were 
obese in 2016 (WHO, 2018h). 
Overweight and obesity were once considered problems seen primarily in high-income 
countries. However, their rates are now increasing in low-and middle-income countries as well, 
especially in urban areas (WHO, 2018h). The global spread of western diets – energy-dense foods 
high in fat and sugars but low in vitamins, minerals and other micronutrients (WHO, 2019a) – is 
exacerbating preventable chronic conditions such as diabetes (Hu, 2011).  
The increasing rates of overweight and obesity among children are especially alarming. The 
WHO terms childhood obesity “one of the most serious public health challenges of the 21st century” 
(WHO, 2019a). According to estimates by the WHO, in 2016, 41 million children under the age of 5 
years were overweight or obese. Over 340 million children and adolescents between 5 and 19 years 
of age were overweight or obese; this figure comprises just over 18% of all children and adolescents 
in this age bracket (18% of girls and 19% of boys), up from just 4% in 1975. Of these, 124 million 
children and adolescents aged 5-19 years (6% of girls and 8% of boys, up from just under 1% in 
1975) were obese (WHO, 2018h). In 2016, nearly half of the children under five who were 
overweight or obese lived in Asia, and in Africa, the number of overweight children had increased 
by nearly 50% since 2000 (WHO, 2018h). 
The reasons why soda consumption contributes to obesity and diabetes go beyond excessive 
caloric intake (i.e. more calories consumed than expended). Research shows increased insulin 
demand (Hu, 2011) and decreased satiety associated with calories derived from sodas and other 
fructose-laden beverages (Bellisle & Rolland-Cachera, 2001; James & Kerr, 2005; Pan & Hu, 2011; 
Popkin, 2012), and suggest that preventing or reducing soda consumption can play a major role in 
preventing obesity and diabetes (Hu, 2011; James et al., 2004; James & Kerr, 2005; Malik et al., 
2010). 
 
4.5 The soda market and industry 
The global carbonated soft drink market was valued at $392.6 billion in 2016 (Grand View Research 
Inc., 2018). More than half of all sodas are produced by large multinational corporations, primarily 
market leaders Coca-Cola and PepsiCo (Alexander et al., 2011), which together controlled 72% of 
the global sales market in 2014 (StreetAuthority, 2014). Coca-Cola, the largest non-alcoholic 
beverage company in the world, controlled 42% of the global soda market in 2014, with soda 
comprising 75% of its global sales (StreetAuthority, 2014). Pepsi controls 30% of the global soda 
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market, although soda comprises a smaller proportion – and shrinking, due to product 
diversification – of its overall sales compared with Coca-Cola (StreetAuthority, 2014). The third-
largest soda manufacturer is Dr. Pepper Snapple (Nestle, 2015). The product line of Nestlé, the 
world’s largest food and beverage company (and manufacturer of baby milk and foods, as discussed 
above and in Chapter 5), also includes sugar-sweetened beverages.  
In the decade between 2000 and 2010, Coca-Cola and PepsiCo experienced increased 
growth in sales volume, net revenue and net profit. Over that period, Coca-Cola’s net revenue 
increased more than 100% to $35,119 million (The Coca-Cola Company, 2011), and PepsiCo’s rose 
159% to $54,538 million (PepsiCo, 2011). Coca-Cola’s global profit rose more than 400% from 
$2,177 million in 2000 to $11,859 million in 2010. PepsiCo’s net profit increased nearly 150% to 
$6,320 over the same period (Kleiman S. et al., 2011). 
However, these global figures conceal the US soda market’s negative sales trend over the 
same period. Although Coca-Cola’s soda sales grew by 4% between 2000 and 2005, its sales fell 13% 
between 2005 ($15,318 million) and 2010 ($13,348 million), resulting in an overall decline of 9% 
over the decade. Similarly, PepsiCo’s soda sales increased 4% in the first half of the decade, and then 
fell 17% from 2005 ($11,755 million) to 2010 ($9,792 million) for an overall decline of 13% 
(Kleiman S. et al., 2011). 
In response to these declining sales in the US, soda companies are turning their attention to 
international markets (Nestle, 2015), which the companies have long recognized as growth 
opportunities (Nesheim & Nestle, 2015) with their larger profit margins, growing populations, and 
rising purchasing power. As an example of the potential for international market growth, in Brazil, 
PepsiCo’s soda sales grew 131% from $293 million in 2000 to $675 million in 2010, and Coca-Cola’s 
sales grew by 72% to $5,686 million over the same decade (Kleiman S. et al., 2011). Soda sales in 
China over the same period similarly increased: by 149% to $3,539 million for Coca-Cola and by 
129% to $1,653 million for PepsiCo (Kleiman S. et al., 2011).  
Coca-Cola markets its products in more than 200 countries, and 82% of its revenues come 
from international (i.e. non-US) sales, especially from Mexico, China, Brazil, and Japan, which 
accounted for 31% of worldwide sales volume (Coca-Cola Company, 2018). Sparkling beverages, 
including soda, comprised 70% of international sales, and trademark Coca-Cola comprised 46%, in 
2018 (Coca-Cola Company, 2018). PepsiCo also sells its products in more than 200 countries, but 
only 43% of its net revenue came from outside the US, with 20% coming from Mexico, Russia, 
Canada, the United Kingdom and Brazil (PepsiCo, 2018). 
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Coca-Cola and PepsiCo (as well as Nestlé and eight other of the world’s largest food 
companies) are members of the International Food and Beverage Alliance (IFBA), an international 
lobby group founded in 2008 “to empower consumers to eat balanced diets and live healthier lives” 
(IFBA, 2018c) in response to the 2004 Global Strategy on Diet, Physical Activity and Health, 
discussed below. IFBA actively lobbies at global and national levels to protect the interests of its 
members, including in connection with the Political Declaration on the Prevention and Control of 
NCDs, which the United Nations General Assembly High-Level Meeting on the topic adopted in 
September 2011, the WHO’s Draft Guideline on sugars intake for adults and children in March 
2014 (IFBA, 2013), which will be discussed in Chapter 6, and the development of FENSA, which 
will be discussed in Chapter 7. 
The current Co-Chairs of IFBA are Michael Goltzman, Vice President of International 
Government Relations & Public Affairs, The Coca-Cola Company, and Chavanne Hanson, Deputy 
Head, Global Public Affairs, Nestlé (IFBA, 2018a). Past Co-Chairs have included Jorge Casimiro, 
Group Director, International Government Relations and Public Affairs at Coca-Cola, and Janet 
Voûte, Global Head of Public Affairs at Nestlé and former Partnership Advisor with responsibility 
for the UN Global Compact and the Global Network for NCDs, as discussed in Chapters 5 and 6 
(Baby Milk Action, 2010; Voûte et al., 2012).  
Another significant industry trade group is the American Beverage Association (ABA), 
founded in 1919.43 Soda market leaders Coca-Cola, PepsiCo and Dr. Pepper Snapple are members, 
as are Canada Dry and Nestlé. The ABA “serves as liaison between the industry, government and 
the public, and provides a unified voice in legislative and regulatory matters. As the national voice 
for the non-alcoholic refreshment beverage industry, the ABA staff of legislative, scientific, 
technical, regulatory, legal and communications experts effectively represent members' interests” 
(ABA, 2018). The group has lobbied heavily against soda taxes, including by creating a front group 
and promoting individual responsibility as the solution to obesity (Dorfman et al., 2012). Both of 
these tactics are discussed in Chapter 6. 
Sugar industry trade organizations often represent soda industry interests because sugar is a 
constituent ingredient in many soda products. For example, the Sugar Association, Inc. represents 
the sugar industry in the US. It is also a member in another trade organization, the World Sugar 
	
43 ABA was founded in 1919 as the American Bottlers of Carbonated Beverages and renamed the National 
Soft Drink Association in 1966 (ABA, 2018). 
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Research Organisation (WSRO), which represents more than 30 international members, including 
the Sugar Association, Inc. and Coca-Cola (WSRO, 2012).  
Like the baby food industry, soda companies and trade associations frame the issue as a 
matter of individual consumer choice and responsibility (ABA, 2014; AFBC, 2018; Brownell & 
Warner, 2009; Firth, 2012; Kwan, 2009; Nestlé, 2019a; Nestle, 2015; Scott et al., 2017). In addition, 
they frame soda consumption as a question of balancing caloric intake with output (Freedhoff, 2014; 
Huehnergarth, 2015; Koplan & Brownell, 2010; The Coca-Cola Company, 2012). Like the baby 
food industry, soda companies undertake self-regulation and other voluntary measures to draw 
attention to their role in addressing health concerns, thereby suggesting that they can be trusted to 
take responsible measures without government imposing legislation. One such voluntary measure is 
through product reformulation or modification, such as by reducing the sugar content of their 
beverage portfolios (Coca-Cola, 2018; PepsiCo, 2014). For example, PepsiCo reported in its 2013 
Sustainability Report that it had removed 402,000 metric tons of added sugar from its total beverage 
portfolio in North America (US and Canada only) as compared to 2006 levels (PepsiCo 2014). These 
framings and activities by soda companies and their industry associations – and the corporate 
playbook strategies and types of power underpinning them – are analyzed in Chapter 6. 
 
4.6 Key global policies relating to soda 
The only global policy relating directly to soda is a set of recommendations on the marketing of 
food and non-alcoholic beverages to children. However, policies relating to NCDs and to diet and 
physical activity are also relevant to, and impact upon, the soda industry. Similarly, because sugar is a 
constituent ingredient in many soda products, the WHO’s guideline on sugar intake levels is also 
relevant to the soda industry. Industry interventions during the development of several of these 
polices will be discussed in Chapter 6. 
In 2000 the WHA adopted the Global Strategy for the Prevention and Control of NCDs 
(A53/14) (WHO, 2000b). To achieve its three main objectives,44 the Global Strategy spells out the 
	
44 The Global Strategy’s three main objectives are: 1) to map the emerging epidemics of  NCDs and to 
analyze the latter’s social, economic, behavioural and political determinants with particular reference to poor 
and disadvantaged populations, in order to provide guidance for policy, legislative and financial measures 
related to the development of  an environment supportive of  control; 2) to reduce the level of  exposure of  
individuals and populations to the common risk factors for NCDs, namely tobacco consumption, unhealthy 
diet and physical inactivity, and their determinants; and 3) to strengthen health care for people with NCDs by 
developing norms and guidelines for cost-effective interventions, with priority given to cardiovascular 
diseases, cancer, diabetes and chronic respiratory diseases (WHO, 2000b). 
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different roles for international partners, the WHO and Member States. While adopting the Strategy 
through resolution WHA53.17 (WHO, 2000c), the WHA recognized “the leadership role that the 
WHO should play in promoting global action against NCDs and its contribution to global health 
based on its advantages compared to other organizations.” To coordinate efforts by international 
partners, it calls for “an innovation mechanism” to “ensure joint work within the United Nations 
system and with major international agencies, [NGOs], professional associations, research 
institutions and the private sector”.  
According to the Global Strategy, “the WHO has the unique authority and the clear mandate 
to lead the development and implementation of the global strategy for the prevention and control of 
[NCDs] …” (WHO, 2000b). The WHO is to provide the leadership and necessary evidence base, 
and to set the general direction and priorities for 2000-2003 “consonant with the corporate strategy 
of  the WHO Secretariat”, with a focus on global partnerships, global networking, technical support, 
and strategic support for research and development (WHO, 2000b). While adopting the Strategy 
through resolution WHA53.17, the WHA requested the Director-General “to strengthen existing 
partnerships and develop new ones, notably with specialized national and international [NGOs]” 
and “to pursue dialogue with the pharmaceutical industry” (WHO, 2000c). Notably, there was no 
mention of  partnerships with the private sector, and no dialogue with industries other than the 
pharmaceutical industry. 
An Action Plan for the Global Strategy for 2008-2013 was adopted by the WHA in May 
2008 (WHO, 2008). The action plan, based on the Global Strategy on NCDs adopted in 2000, built 
on the additional mandate provided to the WHO by the adoption in 2003 of the Framework 
Convention on Tobacco Control (WHO, 2005) and the WHO Global Strategy on Diet, Physical 
Activity and Health (WHO, 2004a). It was intended to provide Member States with “a roadmap to 
establish and strengthen initiatives for the surveillance, prevention and management of NCDs” and 
to “highlight] the pressing need to invest in NCD prevention as an integral part of sustainable 
socioeconomic development” (WHO, 2008). The Action Plan sets out six objectives.45 Under each, 
	
45 The Action Plan’s six objectives are: 1. To raise the priority accorded to NCDs in development work at 
global and national levels, and to integrate prevention and control of  such diseases into policies across all 
government departments; 2. To establish and strengthen national policies and plans for the prevention and 
control of  NCDs; 3. To promote interventions to reduce the main shared modifiable risk factors for NCDs: 
tobacco use, unhealthy diets, physical inactivity and harmful use of  alcohol; 4. To promote research for the 
prevention and control of  NCDs; 5. To promote partnerships for the prevention and control of  NCDs; and 




actions are listed for Member States, the WHO Secretariat and international partners to undertake. 
In developing the Action Plan, the WHO also held two separate consultations with NGOs and the 
food and non-alcoholic beverages industry, respectively, in February and March 2008 (WHO, 2008). 
An updated Global Action Plan (GAP) was developed for 2013-2020 (WHO, 2013a). Like 
its predecessor, the GAP was intended to provide “a road map and a menu of  policy options for all 
Member States and other stakeholders, to take coordinated and coherent action, at all levels, local to 
global, to attain … nine voluntary global targets” (WHO, 2013a, p. 8). Following on from 
commitments made in the Political Declaration, the GAP recognizes that governments have the 
primary role and responsibility in responding to the challenge of  NCDs, and the importance of  
international cooperation to support national efforts (WHO, 2013a, p. 12). The GAP states it is 
“consistent with the WHO’s reform agenda, which requires the Organization to engage an 
increasing number of  public health actors, including foundations, civil society organizations, 
partnerships and the private sector in work related to the prevention and control of  [NCDs]” 
(WHO, 2013a, p. 9). The soda industry’s efforts to shape the paradigms in connection with the GAP 
are discussed in Chapter 6. 
The Global Strategy on Diet, Physical Activity and Health (Global Strategy on DPAH) 
constitutes another policy with relevance to the soda industry (WHO, 2004a). The WHA endorsed 
the Strategy in May 2004 (resolution WHA57.17). The Global Strategy on DPAH contends that “the 
private sector can be a significant player in promoting healthy diets and physical activity” and lists 
many different sectors, including the food industry, that “all have important parts to play as … 
advocates for healthy lifestyles. All could become partners with governments and [NGOs] … to 
encourage healthy eating and physical activity” (WHO, 2004a, sec. 61). The WHO commits in the 
Global Strategy on DPAH to “hold discussions with the transnational food industry and other parts 
of the private sector in support of the aims of the Strategy, and of implementing the 
recommendations in countries” (WHO, 2004a, sec. 50). 
An expert committee formed as part of the development of the Global Strategy on DPAH 
in February 2003 published a draft report that recommended limiting the intake of sugars to less 
than 10% of daily energy intake (WHO/FAO, 2003). The draft report received extensive criticism 
from the soda and sugar industries and their sugar dependent country allies, especially the United 
States (Boseley, 2003c; Brownell & Nestle, 2004; Brownell & Warner, 2009). The Global Strategy on 
DPAH subsequently presented to the WHA no longer contained the 10% limit, and instead 
recommended simply “limit the intake of free sugars” (WHO, 2004a). Chapter 6 discusses these 
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events and the soda industry’s response to new guidelines on sugar intake (described below) that 
were proposed in 2014 and finalized in 2015. The intervention of the soda industry and their allies 
demonstrates the significance to them of guidelines limiting sugar intake. 
In May 2010 the WHA adopted a Set of Recommendations on the Marketing of Food and 
Non-Alcoholic Beverages to Children. Developed with substantial input from Member States and 
other stakeholders, the purpose of the recommendations was to guide Member State efforts in 
developing or strengthening policies in this connection (WHO, 2010b). The development process 
for the set of recommendations included dialogues with NGOs and the private sector, respectively 
in November 2008 (WHO, 2010a).  
The set of recommendations begins by describing the background and development process 
of the recommendations, followed by an evidence section. Twelve recommendations are then 
organized under the following five sub-headings: rationale, policy development, policy 
implementation, policy monitoring and evaluation, and research. The resolution endorsing the set of 
recommendations urges Member states and the Director-General to take proposed actions to 
implement the recommendations (WHO, 2010b). Member states are urged “to cooperate with civil 
society and with public and private stakeholders in implementing [these recommendations]... in 
order to reduce the impact of that marketing [of non-alcoholic beverages], while ensuring avoidance 
of potential conflicts of interest” (WHO, 2010d). 
However, according to Taylor et al. (2012, p. 3), the set of recommendations “does not 
effectively address the extent or underlying nature of the global challenge” and “fails to articulate 
global standards, engage industry in the development and compliance of relevant standards or fully 
engage the WHO in the monitoring of potentially abusive marketing practices.” On these grounds, 
Taylor et al. (2012) have called for the development of a the WHO/UNICEF Global Code of 
Practice on the Marketing of Unhealthy Foods and Beverages to Children. 
The 2011 and 2018 Political Declarations on the Prevention and Control of NCDs are two 
other policy documents with relevance to the soda industry (UNGA, 2011, 2018). These Political 
Declarations were the outcome documents from the UN General Assembly High-level Meetings on 
the Prevention and Control of NCDs. The Political Declaration from the first meeting, held in New 
York on September 19-21, 2011, outlines actions to be taken by the international community. With 
respect to the private sector, the 2011 Political Declaration calls on it, where appropriate, to take 
measures to implement the Set of Recommendations on the Marketing of Food and Non-Alcoholic 
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Beverages to Children, and to produce and promote healthier food products, including through 
reformulation, among other actions (UNGA, 2011, para. 44).  
Another High-level Meeting of the General Assembly on NCDs was held in July 2014. The 
outcome document of this meeting was a resolution that acknowledged that there had been “limited 
progress” toward achieving the measures directed at the private sector in the 2011 Political 
Declaration (UNGA, 2014, para. 26). The General Assembly’s third High-level Meeting on NCDs 
was held in September 2018. This meeting approved a second Political Declaration on NCDs, which 
reaffirmed the WHO’s leadership role and committed to measures to combat NCDs. With respect 
to the private sector, the 2018 Political Declaration re-iterated the directions to industry in the first 
Political Declaration (UNGA, 2018, para. 44). 
The WHO’s creation of the Global Coordination Mechanism on NCDs (GCM/NCD) in 
2014 represented a significant step toward institutionalizing the multistakeholder approach to 
preventing and controlling NCDs. According to terms of reference adopted by the WHA in May 
2014, the purpose of the GCM/NCD is “to facilitate and enhance coordination of activities, 
multistakeholder engagement and action across sectors” at all levels, and “to contribute to the 
implementation of the WHO Global NCD Action Plan 2013–2020.” It is to do so while “avoiding 
duplication of efforts, using resources in an efficient and results-oriented way, and safeguarding the 
WHO and public health from any undue influence by any form of real, perceived or potential 
conflicts of interest” (WHO, 2014e Annex, Appendix 1, para. 1). The GCM/NCD is to be led by 
Member States, and other participants may include United Nations funds, programmes and agencies 
and other international partners, and non-State actors (NSAs) (WHO, 2014e Annex, Appendix 1, 
para. 5).  
An Information Note on GCM/NCD participants states that organizations that are to be 
invited to pre-register for selection consideration would include business associations that had 
participated in informal dialogues that the WHO had organized relating to NCDs. They also would 
include NGOs in Official Relations with the WHO (WHO, 2014g, para. 8 a.1), which at the time, as 
will be discussed in Chapter 7, included business associations, such as the International Life Sciences 
Institute (representing Nestlé, Coca Cola, Kellogg, Pepsi, Monsanto, Ajinomoto, Danone, General 
Mills and others). According to the Note, interested organizations were to be screened to ensure 
they “Are not in any way involved in production or marketing of products that directly harm human 
health, including specifically tobacco and arms” (emphasis added WHO, 2014g, para. 7). However, 
the Principles, Eligibility and Selection Criteria for Participants subsequently introduced has softened 
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this stance, to say: “GCM/NCD will exercise particular caution, especially while performing a 
screening and risk assessment, when engaging with the private sector and other non-State actors 
whose policies or activities are negatively affecting human health and are not in line with the WHO’s 
policies, norms and standards, in particular those related to noncommunicable diseases and their 
determinants” (WHO, n.d.-a, para. 7). Although the prohibition on entities related to the tobacco or 
arms industries remains part of the criteria (WHO, n.d.-a, paras. 5–6), the food and beverage 
industry association IFBA, described above, made it through the screening and is included in the list 
of GCM/NCD participants (WHO, 2019c). 
Early documentation related to the GCM/NCD made reference to the then under 
development rules relating to engagement with NSAs, the Principles, Criteria and Selection of 
Participants document establishes that engagement with NSAs as part of the GCM/NCD is 
governed by FENSA (WHO, n.d.-a, para. 1,4-5). As a result, for example, the assessment of NSAs 
will determine which of the four policies that comprise FENSA will apply, that is NGOs, private 
sector entities/international business associations, philanthropic foundations or academic 
institutions (WHO, n.d.-a, para. 8). The GCM/NCD selection of participants would also consider “a 
balanced representation of the four groups of non-State actor entities” (WHO, n.d.-a, para. 10). 
In March 2015 the WHO released an updated Guideline on sugars intake for adults and 
children (WHO, 2015b). The new guideline recommended that both adults and children reduce their 
intake of free sugars to less than 10% of total energy intake, or in other words, to less than six 
teaspoons. In a change from the previous guideline (from 2003, described above in connection with 
the Global Strategy on DPAH), it additionally recommended further reducing sugar consumption to 
below 5% of total energy intake for additional health benefits. The previous guideline, from 2003, 
had also suggested that sugar should account for no more than 10% of a healthy diet, without the 
suggestion of a further reduction to below 5% of total energy intake.  
The soda industry and its allies intervened in 2003, as mentioned above, and again in 2014 to 
try to influence the recommended maximum sugar intake level in both sets of guidelines, as will be 
discussed in Chapter 6. This intervention demonstrates the significance of the sugar intake 
guidelines to the soda industry. 
Taxes are sometimes imposed on certain products such as tobacco and alcohol in order to 
discourage behaviours that could be harmful to the individual or to others in society. Soda is another 
product for which taxation is being considered. There is increasing evidence that “appropriately 
designed taxes on sugar-sweetened beverages would result in proportional reductions in 
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consumption levels” (Waqanivalu et al., 2016). With soda consumption identified as contributing to 
diabetes, obesity, and other NCDs, as discussed above, its reduction would lead to improved health 
outcomes. 
Soda taxation can take several forms, including as an excise tax (levied before point-of-sale, 
resulting in an increased shelf price), a sales tax (added at point-of-sale), and a value-added tax 
(levied by percentages at each stage of production and distribution) (Chriqui et al., 2013). 
Proponents see so-called “sin taxes”, such as a tax on soda, as a means to improving public health 
and also raising revenue for social programs, while opponents consider them a paternalistic 
government intervention and regressive in the sense that they target products most heavily 
consumed by the poor (Allcott et al., 2019; Brownell et al., 2009).  
Soda taxes have been introduced in many countries and municipalities, including in seven 
cities in the US, and in 39 countries (Allcott et al., 2019), and proposed in many more. However, the 
soda industry has resisted – and prevented – the introduction of soda taxes in many jurisdictions by 
deploying the strategies of the corporate playbook.46 At the global level, the US – home to Coca-
Cola and PepsiCo – blocked soda’s inclusion alongside tobacco and alcohol in a the WHO report as 
a product for which taxation was recommended as an appropriate fiscal policy for addressing NCDs 
(Keaton & Cheng, 2018; WHO Independent High-level Commission on Noncommunicable 
Diseases, 2018), as will be discussed in Chapter 6. 
 
4.7 Conclusion 
This chapter established the significance of, and context for, the baby food and soda industries’ 
engagement with the WHO to influence global policies and regulations and to shape paradigms 
relating to their products in order to increase their sale and consumption. It drew attention to the 
effects of policy decisions taken at the World Health Organization (the WHO) on the health and 
well-being of the world’s population. The marketing of baby food products is linked with decreased 
breastfeeding rates, resulting in increased infant illness and mortality. Breastfeeding has many health 
benefits for infants and mothers and economic benefits for families and states. The consumption of 
soda is related to higher risk of NCDs, such as diabetes and obesity. These health effects highlight 
the importance of the baby food and soda industries’ efforts to influence global policies and 
regulations and shape paradigms relating to their products in order to increase their sale and 
	




consumption. The chapter also provided relevant background for Chapters 5 and 6 by introducing 
market leaders in the baby food and soda industries, the respective industry business associations, 
and relevant global policies and guidelines relating to the industries’ products and operations. This 
chronology of policies and guidelines shows that numerous efforts have been made at the global 
level to minimise negative health impacts relating to these products and their marketing; Chapters 5 
and 6 will analyze industry efforts to minimise the impact of these initiatives on the sale and 
consumption of their products. The structural context within which these industries work to 
influence both substantive policies and paradigms to create environments conducive to their 
business interests determines the strategies and types of power available to them. At the same time 







Chapter 5 – Corporate engagement on baby food policy 
 
5.0  Introduction 
This chapter analyzes the ways in which baby food companies and their associations have worked to 
access global health policy-making at the WHO relating to their products. The baby food industry 
seeks to influence substantive recommendations by the WHO, especially with respect to the 
marketing of its products, which can have both immediate and long-term impacts on corporate 
profitability. The baby food industry also makes efforts to shape paradigms that determine which 
policies are pursued and what role private actors are able to play in developing them.  
The marketing of baby food products is at the heart of the issue and has been the most 
contentious subject of global policy-making in connection with infant and young child nutrition. As 
described in Chapter 4, the marketing of breastmilk substitutes (such as infant formula, and 
beverages or foods intended for use from too young an age) has been linked with declining 
breastfeeding rates, and the resultant impact on infant morbidity and mortality. As outlined in 
Chapter 2, the public and global health literatures have captured such negative health outcomes to 
which corporate products or activities contribute by terming them “industrial epidemics”. The 
corporate impacts on health – both directly through the promotion of products that can be harmful 
to health and indirectly by influencing substantive policy and paradigms relating to their products 
and industry role in governance and policy-making – are also understood as the “corporate (or 
commercial) determinants of health” (Buse et al., 2017; Hastings, 2012; Kickbusch, 2012; Kickbusch 
et al., 2016; Millar, 2013).  
As discussed in Chapter 2, similar strategies to influence policy and shape paradigms are 
witnessed across many industries who follow what some have called the corporate “playbook”. 
Section 5.1 below analyzes how the baby food industry uses the corporate playbook’s strategies and 
tactics to influence the WHO’s substantive policies relating to baby food products, especially with 
respect to their marketing, product differentiation and the optimal duration of exclusive 
breastfeeding. Some of the types of strategies that are evident in the analysis include lobbying, 
inventing and shaping perceptions about differentiated products to circumvent global and national 
regulations and to extend their product line, and manufacturing doubt about the scope of the Code 
and the optimal duration of exclusive breastfeeding. The analysis also considers the types of power 
upon which the industry draws in pursuit of these strategies and tactics, as well as, where relevant, 
their reinforcing effects on the industry’s strategies and the power subsequently available to it.  
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After this examination of baby food industry efforts to influence substantive policy, section 
5.2 analyzes the ways in which the industry uses the playbook strategies to shape paradigms 
conducive to both its substantive policy interests and its long-game interests, including the 
establishment of the industry as a governance actor. The paradigms analyzed below are: 1) individual 
consumer choice, 2) corporate responsibility and trustworthiness, and 3) industry legitimacy as a 
governance actor. These paradigms create an environment conducive to companies and their 
associations arguing against regulation and in favour of voluntary measures and representing 
themselves as legitimate partners in developing health-related policy. Some of the types of strategies 
for encouraging these paradigms that are evident in the analysis include shaping the knowledge 
environment, perceptions and the political environment by framing issues and actors, undertaking 
self-regulation and other voluntary measures and participating in collaborative initiatives.  
 
5.1 Corporate efforts to influence substantive policy 
This section analyzes five key substantive policies or policy areas that affect the sale and 
consumption of baby food products and the ways in which the industry uses playbook strategies and 
tactics from the corporate playbook to influence them, especially in relation to the marketing of 
baby milk and food products. The five key substantive policies or policy areas analyzed below are as 
follows: 1) the International Code of Marketing of Breast-Milk Substitutes, 2) product differentiation 
and reformulation, 3) the optimal duration of exclusive breastfeeding 4) the Guidance on ending 
inappropriate promotions of foods for infants and young children, and 5) the 2018 World Health 
Assembly (WHA) Resolution on Infant and Young Child Nutrition. In doing so, it considers the 
types of power upon which the industry is drawing while pursuing these strategies and tactics, as 
well as, where relevant, the reinforcing effects on the strategies, tactics, and power subsequently 
available to it. 
 
5.1.1 International Code of Marketing of Breast-Milk Substitutes 
The International Code of Marketing of Breast-Milk Substitutes (the Code), described in Chapter 4, 
is the key global instrument relating to baby food. Adopted in May 1981, the Code prohibits the 
marketing of breastmilk substitutes and related products, making it easier for women and families to 
make informed decisions about feeding their infants and young children. In October 1970 the WHO 
and UNICEF had held a joint meeting on infant feeding that resulted in the recommendation to 
establish a code to regulate the marketing of infant formula and related products (WHO/UNICEF, 
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1979). The first draft prepared by the WHO and UNICEF staff (published in February 1980) 
incorporated many of the suggestions included in the background material for the October meeting 
and many made during the meeting. Thinking the draft was near completion, the WHO staff 
organized a series of consultations in February and March 1980 to address any outstanding 
concerns, with the intention of having the code presented as a final document in the May 1980 
WHA for ratification. 
During the drafting process, however, the baby food industry utilized the playbook strategy 
of shaping the political environment by putting pressure on international organizations. The industry 
found an ally in doing this in the United States, a milk exporting country, and was able to draw on 
the instrumental and structural power afforded that country by its size and influence as a political 
and economic actor. Deploying their structural and instrumental power as companies based in the 
US, Wyeth, Abbott/Ross and Bristol-Myers lobbied American delegates to the WHO’s Code 
drafting consultations, and the American delegates in turn lobbied representatives from other 
countries as well as the WHO staff (Chetley, 1986; Sokol, 2005). Apart from its political and 
economic significance globally, the US at that time contributed 25% of WHO’s regular budget 
(Chetley, 1986).  
When the first draft of the Code was published in February 1980, the three American baby 
food companies worked to shape the knowledge environment by using their discursive power to 
manufacture doubt about the document. These companies said the draft Code was “seriously 
defective by almost any measure. It contained a long series of unwarranted and absolute prohibitions 
and restriction of legitimate commercial activity” (Chetley, 1986, pp. 76–77). Wyeth hired former 
under-secretary of state Bill Rogers to arrange a private briefing with State Department officials. 
Wyeth’s hiring of Rogers is an example of the so-called “revolving door” between the public and 
private sectors, a tactic for controlling the political environment by bringing to his new position with 
Wyeth potentially confidential insider information and personal influence and connections within 
the State Department. The private briefing was an opportunity for Wyeth to mobilize the company’s 
structural and instrumental power as a US-based company to convey its position on the draft Code 
to the instrumentally and structurally powerful and internationally significant State Department and 
to recruit it as an ally. Nine days after the March 20 briefing, the US government sent a letter to the 
WHO calling for a voluntary or recommendatory code of general nature, adding that a mandatory 
code “could not be accepted by the United States” (Chetley, 1986, p. 77). In addition to shaping the 
political environment through lobbying and putting pressure on the WHO, the letter from the US 
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government on behalf of the US-based baby food companies also aimed to shape the policy 
discourse and preferences away from mandatory code and toward voluntary measures, including by 
framing the former as unfeasible. 
Besides the three American companies, much of the baby food industry’s lobbying to shape 
the political environment and influence the Code’s drafting process was undertaken by the 
International Council of Infant Food Industries (ICIFI), which Nestlé had set up along with seven 
other infant formula manufacturers to counter negative publicity during the company’s libel trial 
(discussed in Chapter 4). A spokesperson from ICIFI, which was headed by a Nestlé vice-president, 
called the first draft of the Code “wholly irresponsible” and said that if adopted, “it would surely kill 
hundreds and hundreds of babies” (Chetley, 1986, p. 77). His statement aimed to shape preferences 
by manufacturing doubt and framing the draft Code as a dangerous policy response. 
Although developing countries supported the first draft of the Code, milk-exporting 
countries – Denmark, France, West Germany, Netherlands, New Zealand, Switzerland and the US – 
rejected it. The US also called for full inter-governmental negotiation of the contents of the Code, a 
move that at once implied that the WHO and UNICEF had overstepped their mandates, and sought 
to drag out the negotiation process and weaken the resulting provisions (Chetley, 1986). As a result, 
several more drafts were developed with consultations held between May and November 1980.  
That summer, ICIFI hired retiring WHO Assistant Director-General Dr. Stanislaus Flache 
as its first executive secretary (Chetley, 1986). His official first day with ICIFI was August 1, 1980; 
however, a leaked letter from Nestlé lawyer Carlo Fedele to a Nestlé director suggested that Flache 
was already working informally for ICIFI as early as June 1980, while he was still with the WHO 
(Ratner, 1981). ICIFI’s hiring of Flache is another example of the “revolving door” between the 
public and private sectors, a well-known playbook tactic for controlling the political environment. 
Flache brought to his new position with ICIFI potentially confidential insider information and 
personal connections within the WHO that could contribute to the association’s instrumental power 
to influence the negotiations surrounding the drafting of the Code. More recent examples of the 
revolving door between the public sector and the baby food industry are discussed below. 
During the Code negotiations, ICIFI made its presence felt at the WHO meetings in 
Geneva, not far from Nestlé’s headquarters in Vevey, and elsewhere, “wining and dining country 
delegates and the WHO officials” (Ratner, 1981). During the WHA in May 1981, when the Code 
was up for debate, ICIFI hosted a “Hospitality and Information” Suite at Geneva’s luxurious 
International Hotel. All government delegates as well as journalists were invited to the Suite where 
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they were offered food and drink. Industry lobbyists also took government delegates to expensive 
restaurants to win them over to opposing the Code (Sokol, 2005). Lobbying, “one of the oldest 
forms of political activity by business” (Fuchs, 2005, p. 780), is a playbook tactic for shaping the 
political environment through state and institutional capture. It is a tactic especially accessible to 
corporate actors because of the range and scale of resources – instrumental power – at their 
disposal, relative to those available to other actors, such as civil society organizations. 
In public ICIFI claimed that it was participating in the negotiations in good faith and 
intended to abide by the resulting Code, however, it was a different story behind the scenes. For 
example, the Multinational Monitor reports that an ICIFI memo circulated at consultations the 
summer before the Code was adopted made it clear that the industry would not comply if certain 
changes were not made to the draft Code. When the WHO Executive Board met in January 1981 to 
approve the draft Code for presentation to the WHA, some members received a letter from ICIFI 
that said that the “World Industry has found this present draft code unacceptable” (Ratner, 1981). In 
April 1981, ICIFI circulated a summary statement in which it described the Code as being “detailed 
and unnecessarily restrictive” and its provisions as “unacceptable,” “too detailed, counterproductive 
and, in parts, incompatible with the constitutional requirements of a number of countries,” and 
“unworkable and unrealistic” (ICIFI, 1981). 
WHO officials decided to present the Code to the WHA in May 1981 for adoption as a 
recommendation rather than a regulation. While a recommendation is not legally binding on 
Member States, it was thought that a unanimously-supported recommendation would carry more 
moral weight and be more persuasive than a regulation that did not have unanimous support, 
especially the backing of the US (Chetley, 1986; WHO, 1981b, 1981a). According to the WHO 
Constitution, “Regulations … come into effect for all Member States after due notice has been given 
of their adoption by the Health Assembly except for such Members as may notify the Director-
General of rejection or reservations within a period stated in the notice” (WHO, 2006b Article 
22).47 In contrast, recommendations rely entirely on moral force. 
The Executive Board’s decision to present the Code for adoption as a recommendation 
rather than a regulation was in response to pressure from the American delegates (Chetley, 1986; 
Sokol, 2005), who had exercised the country’s structural and instrumental power to shape the 
	
47 This differs from conventions or agreements, which Member States must ratify within 18 months after the 
adoption of the convention or agreement by the WHA, or in case of non-acceptance, provide a statement of 
the reasons (WHO, 2006b Article 20).  
	 81	
	
political environment and policy response preferences. Although the American delegation had 
indicated that the US would support the Code if it were adopted as a recommendation, this position 
changed with the election of Ronald Reagan as president. The US was the only country to vote 
against the Code when it was adopted during the WHA in May 1981 (Chetley, 1986; Joseph, 1981; 
Sokol, 2005). 
 
5.1.2 Product differentiation - Follow-on milk, growing up milk, milk for mothers 
Almost as soon as the Code was adopted in 1981, baby food companies invented differentiated 
products called follow-up (or follow-on) formulas in order to circumvent its provisions (Faircloth, 
2007; Mason et al., 2013; NCT, 2010; Sokol, 2005). The Code of course makes no mention of such 
formulas because they did not exist when it was being developed and adopted.  
Baby food manufacturers sought to shape the perceptions of, and preferences for, these 
newly-created formulas by manufacturing doubt about the scope of the Code and the nature of the 
products. Baby food manufacturers claimed that milks for babies over six months of age were not 
“breastmilk substitutes” because they were promoted only for older babies who were no longer 
breastfeeding. As will be discussed below, the Code does not specify by age the products covered 
within its scope. The baby food companies thus could argue that these follow-up milks were not 
covered by the Code and therefore not subject to the same marketing restrictions as infant formula 
intended for younger babies. Flexing their instrumental and structural power as significant economic 
actors, baby food companies have also lobbied many governments, especially in less industrialized 
countries, not to include follow-up milk within the scope of their national measures (Faircloth, 2007; 
Sokol, 2005).  
Baby food companies’ aggressive marketing of these new products worked to persuade 
parents that they were necessary for the growth and development of their babies and young children 
(Mason & Greer, 2018). This manufactured demand for these products is an example of the 
playbook strategy of preference shaping exercised through the use of discursive power, as well as the 
structural power afforded by the growing (and also manufactured) perception of baby food 
companies as experts on infant feeding and the endorsement of health care providers. Furthermore, 
the labels and promotion of follow-up formulas cross-promoted the nearly identical labels of the 
companies’ standard infant formula brands, which the companies were not permitted by the Code 
and regulations in many countries to advertise (Champeny et al., 2016; Pereira et al., 2016; 
WHO/UNICEF, 2019).  
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Addressing this trend by baby food manufacturers, in 1986 the WHA adopted resolution 
WHA 39.28, which declared that “the practice being introduced in some countries of providing 
infants with specially formulated milks (so-called follow-up milks) is not necessary” (WHO, 1986). 
The WHO reiterated this position in a statement on the use and marketing of follow-up formula, 
additionally noting their potential for confusion and for undermining exclusive breastfeeding up to 
six months of age and sustained breastfeeding up to two years or beyond. The statement also stated 
explicitly that when follow-up formula is marketed as suitable as a partial or total replacement for 
breastmilk, or when it is represented in a manner that results in it being perceived or used as such, it 
falls within the scope of the Code (WHO, 2013h).  
No longer able to argue that follow-up milks were not covered by the Code, the industry 
introduced “growing-up” or “toddler milks” for one-, two-, or three-year-old children. Similar 
branding and packaging resulted in cross-promotion of the full product line of breastmilk substitutes 
while advertising products not covered by the Code or national regulations. Not surprisingly, one 
type of milk formula has sometimes been mistaken for another (Baumslag & Michels, 1995; Berry et 
al., 2010, 2012; Cattaneo et al., 2015; Mason & Greer, 2018; NOP World for Department of Health, 
2005; Palmer, 2009; Richter, 2001; Scientific Advisory Committee on Nutrition, United Kingdom, 
2008; Sobel et al., 2011; WHO, 2013h; Yeong et al., 2010).  
In response to this development, in May 2016 the WHA adopted a resolution welcoming 
technical guidance on ending the inappropriate promotion of foods for infants and young children 
(WHO, 2016b), which specifically addressed the baby food industry’s expanding product line and 
cross-promotion. This Guidance will be discussed below along with industry efforts to weaken the 
resolution. In early 2019, the WHO and UNICEF issued an Information Note on the cross-
promotion of infant formula and toddler milks. The note stated explicitly that the “promotion of 
toddler milks is a strategy to circumvent national Code legislation” (WHO/UNICEF, 2019, p. 1). It 
also says that cross-promotion is a common and effective strategy and that it creates potentially 
dangerous confusion for families (WHO/UNICEF, 2019). 
 
5.1.3 Optimal duration of exclusive breastfeeding 
The baby food industry has worked to shape preferences by using its discursive power to 
manufacture doubt about the products included within the scope of the Code. As noted, the Code 
does not specify by age the products covered within its scope. Instead it defines a breastmilk substitute 
as “any food represented as a partial or total replacement for breastmilk, whether or not suitable for 
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that purpose” and a complementary food as “any food … suitable as a complement to breastmilk or to 
infant formula, when either becomes insufficient to satisfy the nutritional requirements of the 
infant” (WHO, 1981b). Any liquid or food consumed by a baby before the recommended age for 
introducing complementary foods following the period of exclusive breastfeeding, necessarily replaces 
breastmilk and is therefore covered by the Code, as does any milk-type product consumed during 
the entire recommended duration of breastfeeding. 
As noted in Chapter 4, technical guidance in May 2016 clarified that the Code and 
subsequent relevant WHA resolutions apply to all commercially produced foods or beverages 
specifically marketed as suitable for feeding children up to 36 months (3 years) of age, including 
“follow-up-formulas” and “growing-up milks” (WHO, 2016e). Until then, however, the Code’s 
definitions of breastmilk substitutes and complementary foods hinged on the optimal duration of 
exclusive breastfeeding and age for introducing complementary foods. The baby food industry had a 
lot at stake in this respect. The shorter the recommended duration of exclusive breastfeeding and 
the lower the age at which complementary foods are recommended to be introduced, the earlier 
their follow-up formulas and complementary foods can be marketed for use by, and, according to 
the industry’s interpretation of the definition of breast-milk substitutes, actively promoted. A change 
from four months to six months of exclusive breastfeeding means two months of missed promotion 
and lost sales of follow-on formulas and complementary foods. 
The optimal duration of exclusive breastfeeding and age for introducing complementary 
foods have been the subject of numerous reviews (Kramer & Kakuma, 2012; Lutter & World Health 
Organization, Diarrhoeal Disease Control Programme, 1992; H. A. Smith & Becker, 2016; 
Underwood B. A. & Hofvander Y., 1982; WHO, 2002) and WHA resolutions. The recommended 
duration of exclusive breastfeeding evolved over time from “four to six months” to “about six 
months” but, despite these numerous reviews and resolutions, it remained a subject of great 
debate.48  
	
48 In 1990, WHA Resolution 43.3 recommended exclusive breastfeeding for the first “four to six months” of 
life, a range that was considered a transitional period for adjusting to solid foods. In 1992, WHA resolution 
45.34 reaffirmed exclusive breastfeeding during the first four to six months of life and that complementary 
foods should be introduced “from about six months”. In 1994, WHA Resolution 47.5 recommended 
complementary feeding from about six months of age, along with continued breastfeeding” (WHO, 1994). 
Despite this resolution, however, the WHO continued to refer to exclusive breastfeeding for four to six 
months (Sokol, 2005). In 1995, a WHO Expert Committee report reaffirmed the recommendation of 4-6 
months as the duration of exclusive breastfeeding and the age for introducing complementary foods. This 
sparked debate over whether the recommendation should be a range (four to six months) or whether the 
phrase “about six months” allowed suitable flexibility for individual and regional variations (Brown et al., 
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Baby food companies used their discursive power to shape preferences and frame the scope 
of the issue by insisting that only infant formula marketed for use below the recommended duration 
of exclusive breastfeeding was covered by the Code. They continued, therefore, to market all other 
products, such as follow-up milks discussed above, for use after that age (Berry et al., 2010). They 
also lobbied hard to try to prevent the recommended duration of exclusive breastfeeding being 
changed from “four to six months” to “about six months” (Sokol, 2005). At the WHA in May 2000, 
the Brazilian delegation proposed a resolution that reaffirmed 1994’s WHA Resolution 47.5 and its 
unambiguous recommendation of “appropriate complementary feeding practices from the age of 
about six months, along with continued breastfeeding” (WHO, 1994), which more than 61 countries 
had by then adopted as national policy (Rundall & Sterken, 2000). The proposed resolution sparked 
a long debate, following which the Assembly eventually requested that the next Executive Board 
meeting, scheduled for January 2001, set up a drafting group to incorporate necessary amendments. 
The revised draft resolution was to be tabled at the WHA in May 2001 (Peck, 2000; Rundall & 
Sterken, 2000).  
However, in July 2000 the baby food industry, represented by the International Association 
of Infant Food Manufacturers (IFM), which had replaced ICIFI in 1984, set out to lobby the WHO 
to delay “[a]ny action dealing with Infant and Young Child Nutrition … until the WHA 2002” 
(emphasis original, IFM, 2000). To support this position, IFM’s lobbying message pointed to a large 
international growth study and a review of the relevant scientific literature, based on which the 
WHO planned to submit updated infant and young child feeding recommendations to the 2002 
WHA. Aiming to influence perceptions surrounding the matter and make clear the industry’s 
position, the IFM document says: “The current pressure to push through a Resolution on Infant and 
Young Child Feeding in 2001 does not allow sufficient time to conduct the kind of reasoned, 
science-based study that the WHO had planned” (IFM, 2000).  
According to civil society activists, however, IFM wanted the delay because the Codex 
Alimentarius Commission (which determines quality and labelling standards for food products) was 
due to decide its labelling standard at the end of November 2001. The activists maintained that the 
industry knew it would be in a better position to push through four-months as the Codex labelling 
	
1998). In 1998 the WHO published a thorough review of scientific evidence with respect to the 
recommended length of exclusive breastfeeding and the appropriate age of introduction of complementary 
foods. The authors of the review recommended that full term infants should be exclusively breastfed until 




standard if the WHA resolution could be delayed until after the Codex meeting (Baby Milk Action, 
2001). This manoeuvre represents another example of the IFM’s exercise of its existing structural 
and instrumental power with the aim of further enhancing it. 
The British Medical Journal (BMJ) reported on the baby food industry’s lobbying effort by 
simply detailing the content of the IFM document (Yamey, 2000). Eager to counter possible 
negative impressions created by the lobbying and to make the industry position appear reasonable, 
IFM’s secretary general responded with a letter that said the BMJ article “[did] not reflect reality and 
deliver[ed] information out of its complete context” (Bronner, 2000). He added that the association 
believed January 2001 was too soon to recommend raising the age of introduction of 
complementary foods on the basis of the scientific studies being undertaken at the time (Bronner, 
2000).  
The BMJ article also quoted the WHO’s technical officer in nutrition calling the tabling of a 
resolution on infant feeding in 2001 “‘a distraction’ from the ‘cyclical mandate to go to the [WHA] 
every two years, on even years, to report on infant and young child nutrition’” (Yamey, 2000, p. 
591). IBFAN activists pointed out that tabling a resolution in 2001 had been instructed by the 
WHA. The technical officer’s comment was therefore inappropriate, given the WHA’s decision-
making process, and did not respect the wishes of the Assembly (Peck, 2000; Rundall & Sterken, 
2000). Far from being “a distraction”, as the technical officer had described it, a proposed resolution 
on infant feeding in 2001 was the fulfillment of the instructions in 2000 of the Assembly as the 
decision-making body of the WHO. 
In 2000, the WHO had commissioned a systematic review of scientific studies relating to the 
optimal duration of exclusive breastfeeding. In 2001 the review concluded that there was no benefit 
to, and in fact some harm in, introducing complementary foods between four and six months, rather 
than waiting until about six months of age (Kramer & Kakuma, 2002). In March 2001, the WHO 
convened an expert consultation to consider the results of the review. The report of the expert 
consultation recommended definitively “exclusive breastfeeding for six months, with introduction of 
complementary foods and continued breastfeeding thereafter” (WHO, 2001a, p. 3, 2002, p. 2).  
Referencing the expert consultation report, in May 2001 the WHA adopted the revised 
resolution (WHA54.2) on infant feeding, as it had requested the year before, which recommended 
“exclusive breastfeeding for six months” and “safe and appropriate complementary foods, with 
continued breastfeeding for up to two years of age or beyond” (WHO, 2001b). However, the clarity 
of this resolution did not end the baby food industry’s efforts to create confusion about the scope of 
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the Code and to market its products, necessitating additional interventions by the WHO to end 
inappropriate promotion.  
 
5.1.4 Guidance on ending the inappropriate promotion of foods for infants and young 
children (2016) 
The 2016 Guidance on ending inappropriate promotion of baby foods is a substantive policy that brings 
together the abovementioned concerns about marketing, product differentiation and the optimal 
duration of breastfeeding. As discussed in Chapter 4, through resolution 69.9 in May 2016 the WHA 
“welcome[d] with appreciation” the “technical guidance on ending the inappropriate promotion of 
foods for infants and young children” (WHO, 2016b, para. 1). Significantly, the Guidance clarifies 
that the Code and subsequent relevant WHA resolutions apply to all commercially produced foods 
or beverages specifically marketed as suitable for feeding children up to 36 months (3 years) of age, 
including “follow-up-formulas” and “growing-up milks” (WHO, 2016e). The baby food industry 
had long maintained that these milk products did not fall within the scope of the Code and had 
invented differentiated products in order to circumvent its provisions, as discussed above. The 
Guidance also specifies the conditions under which complementary foods may be promoted 
(including which messages may and may not be included in their promotion) and explicitly prohibit 
cross-promotion to promote breastmilk substitutes and practices such as sponsorships, gifts, and 
free supplies, and address the prevention of conflicts of interest (WHO, 2016e). 
Business associations representing the baby food industry intervened to shape preferences 
and perceptions during the development of the Guidance. In a joint statement in response to the 
draft Guidance presented at the Executive Board meeting in January 2016, the International Special 
Dietary Foods Industries Federation (ISDI) and IFM said: “It is inappropriate and arbitrary to 
designate all milk based products for young children up to 36 months of age as breast milk 
substitutes (BMS)” (ISDI & IFM, 2016). In terms of the Guidance’s recommendation on optimal 
infant and young child feeding, which emphasizes “the use of suitable, nutrient-rich, home-prepared, 
and locally available foods that are prepared and fed safely”49 (WHO, 2016e, para. 10), ISDI and 
IFM emphasized individual consumer choice, saying the recommendation was “penalizing the right 
to choose and denying parents, caregivers and [health care providers] the right of access to 
	
49 In accordance with Guiding principles for complementary feeding of the breastfed child (PAHO, 2003), 
Guiding principles for feeding non-breastfed children 6–24 months of age (World Health Organization, 
2005), and the Global strategy for infant and young child feeding (WHO, 2003a). 
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information may lead to unintended health consequences” (ISDI & IFM, 2016, p. 1). This argument 
both relies on and reinforces underlying paradigms that emphasize individual choice, thereby 
shifting responsibility away from companies and onto consumers, in order to create an environment 
conducive to the industry’s preferred policy responses. Baby food industry strategies to shape such 
paradigms will be analyzed in Section 5.2.   
ISDI and IFM’s statement sought to shape perceptions surrounding the promotion of their 
follow-up and growing-up milks. The Guidance recommends that “there should be no cross-
promotion to promote breast-milk substitutes indirectly via the promotion of foods for infants and 
young children” (WHO, 2016e, para. 15). Specifically, it says complementary foods and breastmilk 
substitutes should not have similar package designs, labelling and materials. Moreover, companies 
that market breast-milk substitutes should not establish relationships with parents and other 
caregivers through direct or indirect promotion of their other food products (WHO, 2016e). ISDI 
and IFM countered that “disproportionate provisions restricting branding and intellectual property 
rights threaten incentives for innovation, jeopardizing the continued advancement of nutritional 
science” (ISDI & IFM, 2016, p. 2). They argued for the removal of the proposed prohibition against 
using similar colour schemes, designs, names, slogans, mascots or other symbols and direct or 
indirect promotion of non-breastmilk substitute products with parents, other caregivers and health 
care providers (ISDI & IFM, 2016). Part of the justification for calling for the removal of these 
proposed restrictions was that it may “negatively impact consumer trust” and that implementation 
would be “extremely challenging … without violating existing international trade obligations” (ISDI 
& IFM, 2016, p. 2). Trustworthiness is essential to the baby food industry’s discursive power and its 
ability to shape paradigms to create environments conducive to the sale of its products and policies 
in support of their interests.  
 The baby food industry also benefited from the actions of its allies in related industries, 
such as the International Dairy Foods Association (IDFA).50 IDFA sent its comments on the draft 
Guidance to the US government. Its statement worked to shape perceptions about the consultative 
process and the resulting draft Guidance, and about the private sector’s role as a governance actor. 
IDFA’s comments endorsed ISDI and IFM’s position and expressed concern “about the 
	
50 IDFA is a Washington D.C.-based association representing 550 companies in the U.S.’s $125-billion/year 
dairy manufacturing and marketing industries and their suppliers. It is composed of three constituent 
organizations: the Milk Industry Foundation (MIF), the National Cheese Institute (NCI) and the International 




overreaching and dangerous direction the guidance takes toward prohibiting the marketing and 
promotion of safe, healthy and nutritious dairy foods” that are “widely-recognized as being good for 
young children during the complementary feeding and post-breastfeeding stages of early life” 
(IDFA, 2016, p. 1). The statement says: “These restrictions would directly conflict with the 
nutritious foods that the U.S. government provides to infants and young children through the 
federal child nutrition programs” (IDFA, 2016, p. 1). IDFA said that it was “also alarmed by the 
non-transparent, flawed process by which the WHO has developed this guidance and others, and 
urge[d] the U.S. government to work aggressively toward improving the WHO’s processes and 
procedures to ensure the organization builds and maintains greater trust among all stakeholders” 
(IDFA, 2016, p. 1).  
However, the consultative process surrounding the development of the Guidance was open 
and extensive: when the draft WHO recommendations were open to public comment between July 
and August 2015, more than 300 comments were received from a wide range of stakeholders, 
including industry, NGOs and academia. The WHO also consulted Member States and other United 
Nations organizations in August and held dialogue meetings with NGOs and baby food 
manufacturers. In January 2016, the Executive Board discussed a revised version of the draft 
Guidance. The WHO reviewed additional comments from Member States in the Spring of 2016 
(Grummer-Strawn, 2018), before the WHA adopted Resolution 69.9, welcoming the Guidance 
attached as an annex. The IDFA’s undated comments to the US government appear to have been 
prepared in connection with this review. 
Manufacturing doubt and shaping perceptions about the Guidance, Nestlé’s website 
emphasized the fact that the document was “neither adopted or approved”, but “welcomed with 
appreciation” (Nestlé, 2019b). The company attributed this decision to what it called a 
“misalignment” between the Guidance’s “extension of the restrictions on the marketing of products 
designed for children aged up to 36 months” and the position “expressed by Nestlé and others” 
(such as ISDI and IFM, as mentioned above) that “infant nutrition products for babies aged 6–36 
months are not ‘breast-milk substitutes’ (with the marketing restrictions this implies) but are part of 
a broader diet for infants and young children” (Nestlé, 2019b). 
Nestlé maintained that the fact that the Guidance had been merely “welcomed with 
appreciation” in Resolution 69.9 and not “adopted” or “approved” meant Member States were 
under no obligation to implement it. The company said that the WHO’s Office of Legal Counsel 
had clarified this point, yet “some organizations were still pushing for implementation of Resolution 
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69.9 by Member States” (Nestlé, 2019b). However, the Office of Legal Counsel’s clarification had 
been to correct the misrepresentation by the WHO representative at the Thirty-ninth Session of the 
Codex Committee on Nutrition and Foods for Special Dietary Uses. The WHO representative had 
said that the operative terms “welcomes”, “welcomes with appreciation”, “notes”, and “notes with 
appreciation” all express approval, although somewhat less strongly (Codex Alimentarius 
Commission, 2018, para. 13). The Office of Legal Counsel’s correction clarified that these terms 
have different meanings and are not used synonymously with “approves”, adding that Resolution 
WHA69.9 had been adopted by consensus on May 28, 2016 (Codex Alimentarius Commission, 2018 
Addendum). Nevertheless, contrary to Nestlé’s stance, the Office of Legal Counsel’s clarification 
does not indicate that Member States are under any less obligation to implement the Guidance than 
had it been “approved” or “endorsed” by the WHA in the resolution.  
Indeed, WHA Resolution 69.9 urges Member States “to take all necessary measures in the 
interest of public health to end the inappropriate promotion of foods for infants and young 
children, including, in particular, implementation of the guidance recommendations” (WHO, 2016e, 
para. 2). It called upon manufacturers and distributors of foods for infants and young children “to 
end all forms of inappropriate promotion, as set forth in the guidance recommendations” (WHO, 
2016e, para. 2). The Resolution requests the Director-General “to provide technical support to 
Member States in implementing the guidance recommendations” (WHO, 2016e, para. 7(1)). As 
Grummer-Strawn (2018, p. 683) notes, “It seems hard to argue that the WHA did not accept the 
Guidance recommendations when it called for implementation by all relevant stakeholders.”  
 
5.1.5 2018 Resolution on IYCF 
A resolution on infant and young child nutrition was tabled at the WHA in May 2018, an even year, 
as prescribed by the Code. Led by Ecuador, Member States had met four times ahead of the 
Assembly to develop a draft consensus text for the resolution (WHO, 2018j). The draft resolution 
addressed five critical areas: the Baby-Friendly Hospital Initiative (BFHI), implementation and 
monitoring of the Code and subsequent, relevant WHA resolutions; the Guidance on ending 
inappropriate marketing of foods for infants and young children (adopted in 2016), appropriate 
infant and young child feeding in emergencies, and conflicts of interest in nutrition programs 
(IBFAN/ICDC, 2018).  
As Member States had agreed on a draft consensus text, the resolution was expected to be 
adopted without incident. However, unhappy with various provisions of the proposed resolution, 
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the US delegation threatened countries that supported the resolution with trade sanctions and 
withdrawal of military aid (Byatnal, 2018; Jacobs, 2018). The US delegation submitted its own one-
page “Decision Point” for maternal, infant and young child nutrition (US Delegation to WHO, 
2018; WHO, 2018k). Of the five critical areas the consensus text aimed to safeguard, the US text 
makes little mention of the International Code, the need for marketing restrictions, especially the 
2016 Guidance, or the need for safeguards against conflicts of interests (Baby Milk Action, 2018). As 
a result of the US intervention, the Chairman of the WHA sent the proposed resolution for several 
days of further drafting by a committee chaired by Thailand, with the US delegation participants 
outnumbering those from other countries (IBFAN/ICDC, 2018). Amid the threats of trade 
retaliation and withdrawal of military aid, Ecuador eventually withdrew from introducing the 
proposed resolution (Byatnal, 2018; Jacobs, 2018). The proposed resolution was instead tabled by 
the Russian Federation, co-sponsored by 14 other Member States51, and supported by all others 
except the United States (Baby Milk Action, 2018). The US delegation was able to make this threat 
aimed at controlling to control the political environment on behalf of the American baby food 
companies because of the milk-producing country’s instrumental and structural powers. 
The resolution that the WHA ultimately adopted (WHO, 2018e) was decidedly weaker than 
that which had been initially proposed. The resolution contained only one mention of the Code and 
omitted references to subsequent relevant WHA resolutions, the 2016 Guidance, and mechanisms 
for Code monitoring and enforcement (Baby Milk Action, 2018; Byatnal, 2018; IBFAN/ICDC, 
2018). These are all elements that would have reinforced measures to regulate the baby food 
industry’s ability to market their products. Reflecting the troublesome global trend toward 
multistakeholderism, the resolution also mentions “multisectoral approaches” in connection with the 
development, implementation, and monitoring and evaluation of laws, policies and programmes 
aimed at protection and promotion, including education, and support of breastfeeding 
(IBFAN/ICDC, 2018). Critics saw the “significantly weak” (Byatnal, 2018) resolution as “an overt 
and gradual attempt by industry-friendly countries to water-down a whole body of work that [had 
been] built up around the Code over the years” (IBFAN/ICDC, 2018). One veteran civil society 
activist52 described the move by the US as “tantamount to blackmail” and “holding the world 
	
51 Nepal, Sierra Leone, Canada, Botswana, Pakistan, Panama, Gambia, Georgia, Ghana, Senegal, 
Mozambique, Thailand and Zambia  
52 Patti Rundall, OBE, Policy Director of UK-based Baby Milk Action.  
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hostage” while “trying to overturn nearly 40 year of consensus on the best way to protect infant and 
young child health” (Jacobs, 2018). 
The above analysis of five key substantive policies or policy areas that affect the sale and 
consumption of baby food products has shown that the baby food industry has used strategies and 
tactics from the corporate playbook underpinned by various types of power. Baby food companies 
and their business associations lobbied the WHO and Member States, finding allies in milk-
exporting countries such as the US, which rejected early drafts of the Code and lobbied on the 
industry’s behalf. To circumvent the Code and national legislation and to extend their product line, 
baby food companies invented differentiated products – so-called “follow-up (or follow-on) milk” 
for older infants and later “growing-up (or toddler) milks” for one-, two-, or three-year-old children. 
They worked to shape perceptions of such products, thereby manufacturing demand for them and 
arguing that they were not included within the scope of the Code. The baby food industry has also 
created doubt about the scope of the Code by using its discursive power to manufacture doubt 
about the optimal duration of exclusive breastfeeding, which it has lobbied to keep as low as 
possible. It lobbied intensely in connection with a substantive policy that brings together marketing, 
product differentiation and the optimal duration of breastfeeding: the 2016 Guidance on ending 
inappropriate promotion of baby foods. Business associations representing the baby food industry 
intervened to shape the parameters of the debate during the development of the Guidance. The 
analysis shows that these strategies and the power that underpin them have been iterative and 
reinforcing. 
 
5.2 Shaping paradigms to create a conducive environment 
In addition to intervening on specific substantive policy areas, the baby food industry uses the 
playbook strategies to shape paradigms conducive to both its substantive policy interests and its 
long-game interests, including the establishment of the industry as a governance actor. Business 
operates within an existing social system of certain norms and ideas – or, paradigms – and can be 
both benefitted and at times constrained by them. However, business also uses its discursive power 
to shape these very norms and ideas (Fuchs, 2005). The baby food industry uses a variety of 
corporate playbook strategies and tactics to promote paradigms emphasizing, for example, 1) 
individual consumer choice, 2) corporate responsibility and trustworthiness, and 3) industry’s 
legitimacy as a governance actor, as we shall see below. Some of the types of strategies for 
encouraging these paradigms that are evident in the analysis include shaping the knowledge 
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environment, perceptions and the political environment by framing issues and actors, undertaking 
self-regulation and other voluntary measures and participating in collaborative initiatives.  
 
5.2.1 Framing the baby food issue as a matter of individual consumer choice 
An environment for policy-making conducive to the baby food industry’s interests depends on 
perceptions about the baby food issue itself. One way the industry shapes consumer and policy-
maker perceptions, a strategy from the corporate playbook, is by using its discursive power to frame 
the issue as a matter of individual consumer choice. Baby food companies and their associations 
often refer to mothers’ “choices” about infant feeding, emphasizing the individual’s right to choose. 
This “freedom of choice” rhetoric has the effect of shifting responsibility – or, blame – for any 
resulting problem away from companies and onto consumers (L. C. Friedman et al., 2014). 
In an effort to shape perceptions, baby food product labels indicate that they are for use 
“when breastfeeding is not possible”. This message seeks to create the impression that mothers 
often have difficulty breastfeeding and must look for alternatives. Baby milks are thus portrayed as 
filling a legitimate need. To be sure, the need is legitimate; however, the extent of the “need” has 
been manufactured in part by the industry’s efforts to undermine breastfeeding. The baby food 
industry also works to shape preferences by positioning its product as a close replica of mother’s 
milk, often going so far as to claim that it is “closest to mother’s milk” or “approaches breastmilk” 
(Mehdi & Wagner-Rizvi, 1998; Yeong & Allain, 2014, 2017). This messaging also gives the 
impression that the product is a safe and equivalent alternative to breastfeeding. 
Baby formula manufacturers also try to shape preferences by distinguishing their product 
from their competitors’ with health claims about allergies and intelligence enhancement, for 
example, that play off parents’ desire to choose the best product for their babies (Mehdi & Wagner-
Rizvi, 1998; Yeong & Allain, 2014, 2017). Many of these health claims are misleading, 
unsubstantiated by scientific evidence, and even fraudulent (see for example, Boyle et al., 2016; 
British Medical Journal Publishing Group, 2015; Jasani, Simmer, Patole, & Rao, 2017; White, 2015). 
Like Big Food, the baby food industry uses nutritional claims and reformulation to boost sales and 
to bolster perceptions of its trustworthiness as a responsible corporate citizen (Clapp & Scrinis, 






5.2.2 Corporate responsibility and trustworthiness 
It is critical to the baby food industry’s discursive power and its playbook strategies for controlling 
the political environment and shaping preferences to appear trustworthy. Nestlé, in particular, seeks 
to demonstrate that it has left behind the marketing practices that led to the bad publicity back in the 
1970s and instead aims to win the trust of consumers and policy-makers. Market leaders Nestlé and 
Danone, for example, have worked to gain public trust by participating in various voluntary 
initiatives such as the United Nations Global Compact and the FTSE4Good Index53 (FTSE Russell, 
2019; UN Global Compact, 2019) and by self-regulating with their own codes of conduct (Danone, 
2016; Nestec Ltd., 2010, 2017). Besides framing companies as trustworthy, self-regulation and 
voluntary initiatives are a way to pre-empt or weaken formal regulation (Fuchs, 2005; Hawkes C., 
2005; Sharma et al., 2010; Utting & Clapp, 2008), as will be discussed below. 
Corporations subscribing to the Global Compact pledge to implement ten principles relating 
to human rights, labour standards, environmental sustainability and anti-corruption measures. Nestlé 
became a member of the Global Compact in 2002, two years after it was launched. Membership in 
the Global Compact provided the company (and by extension the baby food industry) a new 
platform for establishing its political legitimacy and shaping norms in favour of self-regulation. 
Critics of Nestlé’s inclusion feared that it served as an endorsement of this political legitimacy and of 
its preferred solution of self-regulation, and facilitates closer ties with top political officials (Richter, 
2004a). There was concern that, despite the Global Compact’s stated intentions, corporations 
“might still use such a value-based learning platform to avoid complying with existing international 
regulatory instruments, such as the International Code … and to undermine any future attempts to 
regulate their behaviour and other efforts to curb corporate power such as public exposure and 
pressure” (Richter, 2004a). It is important to note that the baby food corporations’ participation in 
the Global Compact does not depend upon or reflect their compliance with the Code.  
Representing an opportunity similar to that of  the Global Compact, the FTSE4Good Index 
is “designed to measure the performance of companies demonstrating strong environmental, social 
and governance practices” (FTSE Russell, 2019 n.p.). Unlike the Global Compact, however, the 
FTSE4Good Index does consider the marketing practices of  baby food companies, albeit with lower 
– and diminishing – standards. Baby food manufacturers were initially obliged to demonstrate 
compliance with the Code in order to be included in the FTSE4Good index, but new criteria adopted 
	
53 FTSE stands for Financial Times Stock Exchange. The FTSE Group operates around 250,000 financial 
indices, including FTSE4Good, a series of ethical investment stock market indices (FTSE Russell, 2019). 
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in 2003 require only that they demonstrate that policies and systems are in place to eventually 
achieve Code compliance (Save the Children, 2007). Yet, no manufacturers were able to meet even 
this reduced standard. FTSE4Good revised the criteria again in September 2010, maintaining that it 
was not able to engage with companies that were excluded from the index, and that it was better to 
introduce requirements that companies were able to meet and gradually raise the standards over time 
(FTSE, 2011; Makepeace, 2011).  
In March 2011, Nestlé became the first baby food manufacturer to be included in the 
FTSE4Good Index (FTSE, 2011; Nestec Ltd., 2017). This provided the company with opportunity 
to exercise its discursive power to protect its instrumental and structural power. It enabled it to 
suggest that its marketing practices complied with the Code, and to undermine regulatory efforts to 
hold it accountable. In at least one instance Nestlé referred to the WHO compliance in the same 
sentence as its inclusion in FTSE4Good. However, FTSE wrote to Nestlé to clarify that its 
assessment is based on the FTSE4Good criteria and does not reflect compliance with the Code. 
Therefore the two should not be conflated (Makepeace, 2011). Despite this clarification, in January 
2014 The Guardian quoted Nestlé Chairman Peter Brabeck-Letmathé as having described the 
company as: “the only infant formula producer which is part of  FTSE4Good. We are being checked 
and controlled by FTSE4Good. They make their audits in different parts of  the world and we have 
to prove that we are complying with the WHO Code and up to now we can prove that in everything 
we are” (Confino, 2014). This statement leaves readers with the impression that the company is 
meeting international baby food marketing standards, when it is only meeting the much narrower 
FTSE4Good criteria.  
Danone met the FTSE4Good criteria in 2016 and joined Nestlé in the index (Mason & 
Greer, 2018). A third baby food manufacturer, Mead Johnson, has been included on the index by 
way of  its purchase by RB (formerly Reckitt Benckiser), which was already included on the index. 
RB had to bring Mead Johnson in line with the FTSE4Good criteria for baby food manufacturers by 
mid-2019 if  it was to remain on the index (Mason & Greer, 2018). RB announced in December 
2018 that it had secured continued FTSE4Good accreditation by satisfying the index’s baby food 
criteria (RB, 2018). Now that more baby food companies have been included, FTSE4Good could 
strengthen the watered-down criteria for inclusion so the index becomes more credible (Mason & 
Greer, 2018). However, FTSE4Good has declined to review its criteria for the time being. In any 
case, FTSE4Good itself  reported in June 2017 that its latest breastmilk substitute marketing 
verification process had revealed continued violations by both Nestlé and Danone. By early 2018, it 
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appeared no action had been taken to remove either company from the index (Mason & Greer, 
2018). 
Besides building trust, engaging in self-regulation and voluntary initiatives like the Global 
Compact and the FTSE4Good Index is intended to help companies prevent or undermine calls for 
more stringent and effective formal regulation by public actors (Fuchs, 2005; Hawkes C., 2005; 
Sharma et al., 2010; Utting & Clapp, 2008). Such efforts are examples of the playbook strategies that 
both draw on and reinforce companies’ discursive, instrumental and structural power. In this regard, 
the trend in global governance toward self-regulation is an important source of structural power for 
business. The extent to which voluntary codes of conduct are accepted as sufficient grants individual 
companies like Nestlé and the baby food industry collectively political legitimacy that bolsters their 
instrumental and discursive power in order to influence substantive policy and reinforce a regulatory 
environment in which collaboration and partnership appears necessary and sufficient, and formal 
regulation unreasonable and unwarranted. 
The baby food industry has been lobbying against government regulation and in favour of 
voluntary codes of conduct and self-regulation since the 1970s when ICIFI, spearheaded by Nestlé, 
circulated and widely publicized a Code of Ethics (ICIFI, 1975) two days after the end of the first 
hearing of the Nestlé libel trial (Sokol, 2005). The move was meant to counter the bad publicity and 
demonstrate that the baby food industry was working to solve the problem. However, in this case, 
the ICIFI Code of Ethics, which allowed most marketing practices as long as breastfeeding was 
mentioned as the first choice for infant nutrition (Sokol, 2005), did not satisfy calls for the regulation 
of baby food marketing, and the industry was not able to prevent the adoption of the public 
regulation in the form of the Code.  
In February 1982, Nestlé developed its own set of instructions on how its employees were to 
implement the newly adopted Code as evidence that the company conducts its business in a 
responsible and ethical manner and that it is therefore trustworthy. Revised versions of the Nestlé 
Charter were issued in October 1982, in 1996, and 2004. In July 2010, Nestlé issued a completely 
revised Policy and Instructions for Implementation of the WHO International Code of Marketing of Breast-Milk 
Substitutes (Nestec Ltd., 2010) as part of its efforts to meet the FTSE4Good Inclusion Criteria for 
the Marketing of Breast Milk Substitutes (Nestec Ltd., 2017). This document was updated and re-
issued in September 2017 as The Nestlé Policy and Procedures for the Implementation of the WHO 
International Code of Marketing of Breast Milk Substitutes (Nestec Ltd., 2017). Danone also developed a 
Policy for the marketing of breast-milk substitutes and a Procedures manual for its implementation in July 
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2011, which has undergone three revisions, with the most recent edition taking effect June 1, 2016, 
the same month the company was included in the FTSE4Good index, having met the inclusion 
criteria regarding breastmilk substitute marketing.  
However, Nestlé’s and Danone’s self-regulation policies and procedures fall short of the 
requirements set out in the Code because they make geographical distinctions about where and to 
which products the policies apply and disregard subsequent, relevant WHA resolutions that clarify 
certain provisions of the Code and are to be taken together with it as a whole. Nestlé, for example, 
frames the negative impacts of formula promotion as a problem that affects only low- and middle-
income countries (LMICs) and therefore does not warrant Code compliance or formal restrictions on 
product promotion in high income countries. For example, its current Policy and Procedures for the 
Implementation of the WHO Code of Marketing of Breast Milk Substitutes creates a false distinction between 
‘lower-risk countries’ and ‘higher-risk countries’ based on levels of mortality, morbidity and acute 
malnutrition among children under five years of age, noting that in ‘higher-risk countries’, the 
company follows the Nestlé Procedures when they are stricter than the local legislation (Nestec Ltd., 
2017).  
Nestlé’s Policy and Procedures apply only to formulas for use up to the age of twelve months 
(Nestec Ltd., 2017), while the expert consultation on the optimal duration of breastfeeding (WHO, 
2001a, 2002), referenced in WHA Resolution 54.2 (WHO, 2001b), recommended that infants should 
continue to be breastfed for up to two years or beyond, along with nutritionally adequate 
complementary foods, meaning milk products marketed for use during that period are covered by 
the Code. Furthermore, the 2016 Guidance on ending inappropriate promotion of foods for infants and young 
children clarify that the Code and subsequent relevant WHA resolutions apply to all commercially 
produced foods or beverages specifically marketed as suitable for feeding children up to 36 months 
(3 years) of age, including “follow-up-formulas” and “growing-up milks” (WHO, 2016e). This 
means that Nestlé’s Policy and Procedures fall far short of the Code’s requirements, even if they do meet 
the FTSE4Good inclusion criteria. 
Danone makes the same distinction between ‘lower-risk’ and ‘higher-risk’ countries, using 
the same criteria, and extends the range of products covered by its policy in ‘higher-risk countries’. 
Worldwide its policy covers infant formula for use up to six months of age and any other food or 
beverage for use below six months of age, as well as bottles and teat. In ‘higher risk countries’, it also 
applies to follow-on formula for use from six to twelve months, and complementary foods and 
drinks for use under six months of age (Danone, 2016). This distinction between lower and higher-
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risk countries can be traced back to the FTSE4Good Breast Milk Substitutes marketing inclusion 
criteria (FTSE Russell, 2017). The Code, and subsequent WHA resolutions, however, apply equally to 
all countries, and make no distinction based on rates of mortality or acute malnutrition.  
 
5.2.3 Industry legitimacy as a governance actor 
Baby food companies and their associations have sought legitimacy as governance actors by copying 
civil society formations and creating their own organizations to represent themselves as civil society 
organizations even though they actually pursue business interests. Such organizations, found in in 
various industries, have been called “front groups” (Baur, 2011; Dorfman et al., 2012; Madureira 
Lima & Galea, 2018; Miller & Harkins, 2010; Simon, 2013). Madureira Lima and Galea (2018) label 
this tactic “civil society capture” and note that such groups confer legitimacy to industry claims [and 
policy positions] and deflect criticism. This tactic coopts the structural power increasingly accorded 
to civil society organizations as political actors and enhances the instrumental, structural and 
discursive power available to corporate actors. 
To institutionalize this power, several of these groups have applied – some of them 
successfully – for Official Relations status with the WHO, even though one of  the criteria for being 
granted that status, according to the Principles governing relations between the WHO and NGOs, 
was that the applicant must be “free from concerns which are primarily of  a commercial or profit-
making nature” (WHO, 1987a, para. 3.1). Official Relations status confers certain privileges on 
organizations, including the ability to attend certain the WHO meetings, access documents and 
influence certain processes. In this way, the status bestows additional instrumental power on 
organizations, boosts their structural power and lends credibility and legitimacy to their discursive 
power. It positions corporations, through their business associations, to lobby and influence the 
WHO and its Member States. It also provides a platform from which to deploy the playbook 
strategies of  shaping the political environment and shaping preferences, perceptions and paradigms 
surrounding various issues. 
The baby food industry association ICIFI applied for Official Relations status in 1981, under 
the new leadership of Dr. Stanislaus Flache, who, as described above, had recently retired as the 
WHO Assistant Director-General (Chetley, 1986; Ratner, 1981) and thus possessed connections 
within the WHO, insider understanding of the significance of the status and the criteria and 
procedure for having it granted. The Executive Board considered ICIFI’s application in January 
1981, but deferred its decision for a year in order for working relations between the WHO and 
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ICIFI to be strengthened (Chetley, 1986; WHO, 1980b, 1981c). The following year, the Standing 
Committee on NGOs again recommended that a decision regarding ICIFI’s application be deferred 
for another year while its activities in relation to the Code were observed (WHO, 1982, p. 38). Yet 
another deferral came in 1983, when the Standing Committee requested more information about the 
potential benefits and usefulness of, and concerns about, collaboration between ICIFI and the 
WHO. The question was also raised as to whether a group comprised entirely of commercial 
companies should be given Official Relations status, although it was pointed out that two other such 
groups54 were already in Official Relations with the WHO (WHO, 1983). ICIFI did not reapply for 
Official Relations the following year, and in 1984 the organization was replaced by the International 
Association of Infant Food Manufacturers (IFM), which did not pursue this status. 
The International Special Dietary Foods Industries Federation (ISDI), representing the 
global specialized nutrition industry, including Nestlé and Danone, is another business group that 
applied for Official Relations status with the WHO. The WHO granted the status to ISDI in 1987 
(WHO, 1987b), but withdrew it in January 2014 (WHO, 2014c) not because of  the group’s close 
connection with commercial entities, even though this was forbidden by the eligibility criteria 
detailed in the Principles, but because “the organization had reported inadequate progress in the 
implementation of  the plan of  collaboration. The WHO had not received the deliverables expected 
during the collaboration period” (WHO, 2014c, para. 20). 
Although ICIFI, IFM and ISDI were transparently named, the intentions and business 
interests of some groups can be less clear. The International Life Sciences Institute (ILSI), for 
example, is a front group that represents itself as a non-profit organization with a mission to 
“provide science that improves public health”. ILSI’s members include manufacturers of baby food 
– and, relevant to Chapter 6, soda55 (ILSI, 2016). The WHO granted Official Relations status to 
ILSI in 1988 and withdrew it in January 2015 when the group came up for review in accordance 
with the Principles (WHO, 2015e). During the review, the Standing Committee noted that “a 
member company of one of the group’s branches is owned by a company that manufactures and 
sells tobacco products” (WHO, 2014h, para. 8). The Standing Committee’s concern was not ILSI’s 
	
54 Official Relations status had already been granted to the International Federation of Pharmaceutical 
Manufacturers’ Associations (IFPMA) in 1971, and the World Federation of Proprietary Medicine 
Manufacturers in 1977. 
55 For example, baby food manufacturers Abbott Nutrition, DSM Nutritional Products, Fonterra, 




ties with commercial enterprises in general, which the Official Relations eligibility criteria forbid, but 
ILSI’s link with tobacco, one of two industries with which the WHO explicitly refuses to work.56 To 
address these concerns and try to pre-empt loss of its Official Relations status, at the 2015 ILSI 
Annual Meeting, the ILSI Board amended its bylaws to prohibit membership of any company or 
affiliate that “engages in the manufacture, production, marketing, sale or distribution of tobacco 
products” (Hentges, 2015; WHO, 2015d, para. 9). Despite these efforts, the Standing Committee 
withdrew ILSI’s Official relations status. The Standing Committee noted that, considering that the 
bylaws had been amended just a few days earlier, and only after the review had been published, “the 
Institute had not been fully transparent in its relations with the WHO,” and it was furthermore not 
possible to verify that the changes had been implemented (WHO, 2015d, para. 9).  
Like Wyeth, which hired Rogers, and ICIFI, which hired Flache, Nestlé has deployed the 
revolving door strategy to bolster its credibility and trustworthy reputation. It has recruited several 
senior UNICEF officials into prominent roles within the company. With the WHO, UNICEF co-
hosted the 1979 meeting that led to the adoption of the Code and it has supported national efforts 
to introduce legislation to give the Code legal effect. The former executive director of UNICEF 
from 2005 to 2010, Ann Veneman, was voted onto the Nestlé Board of Directors at its April 14, 
2011 shareholder meeting (AP, 2011). After the shareholder meeting, she acknowledged that “Nestlé 
isn’t fully complying with a voluntary breast milk code adopted by World Health Organization” and 
pledged to “work from within to change the world’s biggest food and beverage company” (AP, 
2011). Veneman currently serves on the Nestlé’s Creating Shared Value Council (Nestlé, 2020). 
Given Veneman’s expertise and experience with UNICEF, her recruitment and retention not only 
suggest her personal and professional endorsement of Nestlé, but also provide the company access 
to her insider information and personal connections acquired as UNICEF’s top official, including 
those of its close ally the WHO.  
Distancing UNICEF from Veneman’s new role, a spokesperson had a day earlier said that 
Veneman had left the agency a year before and was now a private citizen. She also confirmed that 
UNICEF did not take funding from Nestlé, and that Nestlé continued to violate the Code 
(Nebehay, 2011). Whereas Veneman waited a year after leaving UNICEF before joining Nestlé, 
Janet Voûte, joined Nestlé in December 2010 as Global Head of Public Affairs with no cooling off 
period following her position at the WHO as Partnership Advisor with responsibility for the UN 
	
56 The other forbidden industry is the arms industry. 
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Global Compact and the Global Network for NCDs (NCDnet), which she masterminded (Baby 
Milk Action, 2010). She is now Chairperson of the Nestlé Creating Shared Value Council (Nestlé, 
2020).  
The analysis in this section has shown that the baby food industry has used playbook 
strategies and tactics to promote paradigms emphasizing individual consumer choice, corporate 
responsibility and trustworthiness, and industry’s legitimacy as a governance actor. Some of the 
types of strategies evident in the above analysis include shaping the knowledge environment, 
perceptions and the political environment by framing issues and actors, undertaking self-regulation 
and other voluntary measures and participating in collaborative initiatives. These paradigms create an 
environment conducive to companies and their associations arguing against regulation and in favour 




This chapter has analyzed the ways in which baby food companies and their associations have used 
the corporate playbook to influence global health policy-making at the WHO. The baby food 
industry seeks to shape the WHO’s substantive recommendations that are related to its products and 
thus can have both immediate and long-term impacts on profitability.  
The analysis in this chapter has shown that in order to influence these substantive policies 
and policy areas, baby food companies and their business associations lobbied the WHO and 
Member States, finding allies in milk-exporting countries such as the US, which rejected early drafts 
of the Code and lobbied on the industry’s behalf. To circumvent the Code and national legislation 
and to extend their product line, baby food companies invented differentiated products – so-called 
“follow-up (or follow-on) milk” for older infants and later “growing-up (or toddler) milks” for one-, 
two-, or three-year-old children. They shaped perceptions of such products, thereby manufacturing 
demand for them and arguing that they were not included within the scope of the Code. The baby 
food industry has also created doubt about the scope of the Code by using its discursive power to 
manufacture doubt about the optimal duration of exclusive breastfeeding, which it has lobbied to 
keep as low as possible. The baby food industry lobbied intensely in connection with a substantive 
policy that brings together marketing, product differentiation and the optimal duration of 
breastfeeding: the 2016 Guidance on ending inappropriate promotion of baby foods. Business 
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associations representing the baby food industry intervened to shape the parameters of the debate 
during the development of the Guidance.  
The chapter has also analyzed the ways in which the baby food industry has engaged in a 
long-game to shape the paradigms that determine which policies are pursued and what role private 
actors are able to play in developing them. The analysis in this connection shows that the baby food 
industry also uses these playbook strategies to promote paradigms emphasizing individual consumer 
choice, industry legitimacy as a governance actor, and corporate responsibility and trustworthiness. 
These paradigms create an environment conducive to companies and their associations arguing 
against regulation and in favour of voluntary measures and representing themselves as legitimate 
partners in developing health-related policy. The baby food companies’ ultimate objective in 
encouraging these paradigms is to protect or increase their ability to make a profit.  
The baby food industry’s well-documented track-record of using the corporate playbook to 
influence substantive policy and paradigms conducive to its interests raises questions about the 
implications for WHO as the agency seeks to increase its engagement with such actors, especially 





Chapter 6 – Corporate engagement on soda policy 
 
6.0  Introduction 
This chapter analyzes the ways in which soda companies and their associations, like the baby food 
industry, have worked to shape global health policy-making at the WHO. The soda industry seeks to 
influence the WHO’s substantive policies and recommendations that can have both immediate and 
long-term impacts on profitability. The soda industry also makes efforts shape paradigms that 
determine which policies are pursued and what role private actors are able to play in developing 
them.  
Corporate impacts on health – both directly, through promotion of products that can be 
harmful to health, and indirectly, by influencing substantive policy and paradigms relating to 
products and industry’s role in governance and policy-making – can be labelled “corporate (or 
commercial) determinants of health” (Hastings, 2012; Kickbusch, 2012; Kickbusch et al., 2016; 
Millar, 2013). Others argue that corporate efforts to shape global health governance contribute to an 
“industrial epidemic” of non-communicable diseases (NCDs), such as obesity and diabetes(Gilmore 
et al., 2011; Jahiel, 2008; Jahiel & Babor, 2007; Moodie et al., 2013). 
As discussed in Chapter 2, similar strategies to influence policy and shape paradigms are 
witnessed across many industries who follow what some have called the corporate “playbook”. 
Section 6.1 below analyzes how the soda industry uses strategies and tactics from the corporate 
playbook to influence the WHO’s substantive policies relating to soda products, particularly with 
respect to the WHO’s guidelines on sugar intake levels (because sugar is a constituent ingredient in 
many soda products) and the taxation of soda products as a part of efforts to prevent and control 
NCDs. Some of the types of strategies that are evident in the analysis include shaping perceptions 
and preferences by lobbying and manufacturing doubt about soda’s contribution to the obesity 
epidemic and its appropriateness as a product recommended for taxation for addressing NCDs. The 
analysis also considers the types of power upon which the soda industry is able to draw in pursuit of 
these strategies and tactics, as well as, where relevant, the reinforcing effects on the strategies, tactics, 
and power subsequently available to it. For example, as a part of these strategies, the soda industry 
also drew on the instrumental and structural power of allies in the US government and other sugar 
dependent countries. 
Compared with the baby food industry, there have been fewer substantive policy initiatives 
relating to soda. This difference is partly because, as mentioned in Chapter 1, the negative health 
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effects of consuming soda are a relatively recent global concern, and also because the causal 
relationship between the marketing and consumption of soda and health outcomes is more difficult 
to isolate. Soda is not the exclusive cause of diabetes, obesity, and other NCDs, but extensive 
research points to its consumption as a contributing factor to, or even a key driver of, the global rise 
in their rates. Perhaps aided by this less attributable causal link, the soda industry puts considerable 
effort into shaping norms and paradigms surrounding the consumption and governance of soda. 
Section 6.2 analyzes the ways in which the industry uses the playbook strategies and the 
types of power that underpins them to shape paradigms conducive to both its substantive policy 
interests and its long-game interests, including the establishment of the industry as a governance 
actor. The paradigms analyzed in Section 6.2 are: 1) individual responsibility, consumer choice, and 
caloric balance; 2) corporate social responsibility and trustworthiness through self-regulation and 
voluntary measures, and 3) industry legitimacy as a governance actor. These paradigms create an 
environment conducive to companies and their associations arguing against regulation and in favour 
of voluntary measures and representing themselves as legitimate partners in developing health-
related policy. Some of the types of strategies for encouraging these paradigms that are evident in 
the analysis include shaping the knowledge environment, perceptions and the political environment 
by framing issues and actors, undertaking self-regulation and other voluntary measures and 
participating in collaborative initiatives.  
 
6.1 Shaping substantive policy 
Due to the fact that sugar is a constituent ingredient in many soda products, the soda industry (as 
well as sugar industry associations) engages with the WHO on matters relating to sugar, such as the 
development in 2003 and 2014 of recommendations on sugar intake levels. Deploying playbook 
strategies to shape perceptions and preferences, the soda and sugar industries used their discursive 
power to manufacture doubt about soda’s contribution to the obesity epidemic. They also opposed 
“restrictive” recommendations by relying on the paradigms of individual responsibility and energy 
balance and by accessing the instrumental and structural power of allies in the US government. 
In February 2003, the WHO published online the draft report of an expert committee 
formed as part of the development of the Global Strategy on Diet Physical Activity and Health 
(Global Strategy on DPAH) (Norum, 2005). The report, Technical Report Series 916, Diet, Nutrition, and 
the Prevention of Chronic Diseases (TRS916), recommended limiting the intake of sugars to less than 
10% of daily energy intake (WHO/FAO, 2003). When the report was made available for 
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consultation prior to its official launch, the soda industry worked to shape the results to protect its 
position. Exercising their discursive power, soda and sugar business associations criticized the draft 
report, rejecting its conclusion that sweetened soft drinks contribute to the obesity pandemic. The 
National Soft Drink Association, based in Washington, said the recommended limit on added sugars 
intake was “too restrictive”, saying it supported instead a 25% limit (Boseley, 2003c). The Sugar 
Association, representing the US sugar industry, also opposed the report, saying it needed more 
external peer review and economic analysis. It wrote to then Director-General Gro Harlem 
Brundtland, calling for the cancellation of the report’s official launch on April 23, 2003 and vowing 
to use “every avenue available to expose the dubious nature” of the report (Boseley, 2003c; Brownell 
& Nestle, 2004; Brownell & Warner, 2009). 
Seven big food industry groups, including the US Council for International Business, to 
which Coca-Cola and PepsiCo belong, and the Sugar Association, also wrote to the US Secretary of 
Health and Human Services, Tommy Thompson, asking him to intervene to get the report 
withdrawn (Boseley, 2003c). Two US senators who co-chair the US Senate Sweetener Caucus urged 
the Secretary to use his “personal intervention” to block the report. A Department of Health and 
Human Services assistant secretary sent the WHO a 28-page, single-spaced critique of the report’s 
science, putting forward the same three points emphasized by the industry: personal responsibility, 
stronger focus on physical activity, and no good or bad foods (Brownell & Warner, 2009). These 
groups sought to have Congress withdraw the US’s $406 million contribution to the WHO (Boseley, 
2003c; Brownell & Warner, 2009; Madureira Lima & Galea, 2018; Norum, 2005). These tactics were 
available to the soda and sugar industry groups because of their structural power within the US 
economy and because of the US government’s instrumental and structural power as the largest 
financial contributor to the WHO (Sridhar et al., 2014; van de Pas & van Schaik, 2014).  
Meanwhile, the WHO was holding consultations to develop the Global Strategy on DPAH 
mentioned above, which was to be presented to the WHA in 2004. NGOs participating in the 
consultations made suggestions for controlling and collaborating with the private sector. The private 
sector, meanwhile, worked to shape perceptions and preferences using its discursive power to assert 
that NCDs were an individual’s problem; that there were no bad foods, only bad diets; and that diet 
is a matter of personal choice (Norum, 2005). Sugar associations continued to lobby against using 
the TRS916 as the basis for the intake levels recommend in the Global Strategy on DPAH. They 
argued that a reduction in recommended sugar intake levels would negatively impact the economies 
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of sugar producing countries. The latter used the same wording as the sugar industry had used in its 
letters to them in making their argument (Norum, 2005). 
WHO forwarded a draft Global Strategy on DPAH to Member States in November 2003 
for their feedback ahead of the January 2004 meeting of the Executive Board. Ahead of the 
Executive Board meeting, there was extensive lobbying from the Sugar Association. The US 
Department of Health and Human Services sent a letter signed by the senior adviser to Secretary 
Thompson, William Steiger, arguing against the TRS 916 in terms identical to those used by the 
Sugar Association. Delivered ahead of the Executive Board meeting, the letter seemed designed to 
derail discussion about the Global Strategy. Nevertheless, the Executive Board decided to forward 
the draft Global Strategy to the WHA in May 2004, after opening it to feedback from Member 
States until February 29, 2004 (Norum, 2005). By the time the Global Strategy on DPAH reached 
the WHA, however, it no longer included the TRS916’s recommendation that sugar intake be 
limited to less than 10% of daily energy intake, replaced instead with the non-specific 
recommendation to “limit the intake of free sugars” (WHO, 2004a). 
On March 5, 2014, the WHO released its “Draft Guideline: Sugars intake for adults and 
children” for public consultation (WHO, 2014d). Many associations that represent soda companies 
worldwide made submissions to the consultation, including the International Food and Beverage 
Alliance (IFBA), American Beverage Association (ABA), and the Canadian Beverage Association, as 
did sugar industry groups including World Sugar Research Organisation (WSRO) (of which Coca-
Cola is a member), The Sugar Association, Inc., Sugar Nutrition UK, and the Canadian Sugar 
Institute (WHO, n.d.b). Some groups, such as the Sugar Association, Inc., questioned the legitimacy 
of, and scientific basis for, the recommendations, pointing out weaknesses in the evidence and the 
conclusions drawn from it (Canadian Sugar Institute, 2014; Sugar Nutrition UK, 2014; The Sugar 
Association, Inc., 2014). Some groups, such as The Sugar Association, Inc., Sugar Nutrition and 
WSRO, challenged the recommendations for not meeting the standards of evidence required by the 
WHO’s own “Handbook for Guideline Development” (Sugar Nutrition UK, 2014; The Sugar 
Association, Inc., 2014; World Health Organization, 2012; WSRO, 2014). IFBA took the 
consultation as an opportunity to describe its voluntary initiatives – “doing [its] part” – in support of 
the WHO’s priorities for preventing and controlling NCDs (IFBA, 2014b, p. 1). IFBA also stressed 
that “it is essential that all stakeholders work together,” emphasizing “energy balance” between 
calories consumed and those expended through physical activity as “one of the most important 
factors in maintaining a healthy weight” (IFBA, 2014b, pp. 1–2). These tactics, using the soda and 
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sugar industries’ discursive power, rely on the broader paradigms these two industries promote to 
create an environment conducive to their interests, as will be discussed below. 
In March 2015, the WHO released its updated Guideline: sugars intake for adults and children 
(WHO, 2015b). The new guideline recommended that both adults and children reduce their intake 
of free sugars to less than 10% of total energy intake, or in other words, to less than six teaspoons. 
In a change from the previous guideline, it made a conditional recommendation for further reducing 
sugar consumption to below 5% of total energy intake for additional health benefits. 
Another relevant substantive policy area is with respect to the taxation of soda as a fiscal 
policy for addressing NCDs. A 2016 the WHO technical meeting on fiscal policies for diet and 
prevention of NCDs had concluded “there is reasonable and increasing evidence that appropriately 
designed taxes on sugar-sweetened beverages would result in proportional reductions in 
consumption levels” (Waqanivalu et al., 2016). It was therefore striking that, although the first report 
of the WHO Independent High-level Commission on Noncommunicable Diseases, which provides 
governments and policy-makers recommendations aimed at the prevention and control of NCD, 
included taxation as an appropriate fiscal policy for addressing NCDs, soda was not mentioned 
alongside tobacco and alcohol as a product recommended for taxation (WHO Independent High-
level Commission on Noncommunicable Diseases, 2018). While nutrition and public health experts 
and activists were disappointed in the Commission’s position, the IFBA applauded it as well as the 
Commission’s recommendation that governments increase engagement with the private sector to 
achieve public health goals. 
The report, launched on June 1, 2018, said: 
The Commissioners represented rich and diverse views and perspectives. There was broad 
agreement in most areas, but some views were conflicting and could not be resolved. As 
such, some recommendations, such as reducing sugar consumption through effective 
taxation on sugar-sweetened beverages and the accountability of the private sector, could not 
be reflected in this report, despite broad support from many Commissioners. (WHO 
Independent High-level Commission on Noncommunicable Diseases, 2018, p. 4) 
In fact, one Commissioner, US deputy secretary for health and human services Eric Hargan, 
had managed to block the inclusion of soda as an appropriate product for taxation, arguing that 
there was insufficient evidence that taxes on sugary drinks would improve public health (Keaton & 
Cheng, 2018). The US Commissioner’s position is not surprising given the significance of Coca-Cola 
and PepsiCo, both of which are based in the US. Their economic weight readily translates into 
instrumental and structural power. The influence of the US on the WHO deliberations in turn 
reflects its instrumental and structural powers. News of the US’s role in blocking the soda tax 
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recommendation in the Commission’s report came on the heels of the US delegation to the WHA 
blocking a resolution on infant feeding by threatening countries that supported it, as was discussed 
in Chapter 5. 
The analysis in this section has shown that the soda and sugar industries used strategies from 
the corporate playbook to influence substantive policy in the areas of recommended limits on sugar 
consumption and on the inclusion of soda as a product recommended for taxation as part of efforts 
to control NCDs. Some of the types of strategies evident in the analysis include shaping perceptions 
and preferences by lobbying and manufacturing doubt about soda’s contribution to the obesity 
epidemic and its appropriateness as a product recommended for taxation for addressing NCDs. To 
use these strategies, the soda industry relied heavily on its discursive power, but was also able to 
access the instrumental and structural power of allies in the US government and other countries with 
economies dependent on sugar. 
 
6.2 Shaping paradigms to create a conducive environment 
In addition to intervening on specific substantive policy areas, the soda industry uses the playbook 
strategies to shape paradigms conducive to both its substantive policy interests and its long-game 
interests, including the establishment of the industry as a governance actor. Business operates within 
an existing social system of certain norms and ideas – or, paradigms – and uses its discursive power 
to shape them. To shape an environment conducive to their long-game interests as well as their 
substantive policy interests, soda companies individually and collectively promote a paradigm 
centred on individual responsibility, consumer choice, and caloric balance; corporate social 
responsibility and trustworthiness through self-regulation and voluntary measures. The industry 
exercises its discursive and instrumental power to bolster its legitimacy as a governance actor, 
including by participating in multistakeholder initiatives, funding and forming groups that resemble 
civil society organizations and seeking Official Relations status with the WHO, and recruiting 
former senior the WHO employees through the so-called “revolving door”, giving the impression of 
their endorsement and lending their credibility, in addition to their insider information and 
connections. These arrangements create an environment conducive to companies and their 
associations arguing against regulation and in favour of voluntary measures and facilitate the 




While many of these efforts are directed at the WHO, much of this work is undertaken 
within the US by PepsiCo and Coca-Cola, exercising their instrumental power afforded by their 
status as industry heavyweights. Nevertheless, this exercise of discursive power by the soda industry 
in the US has a global impact on perceptions about soda consumption, the industry as a responsible 
and trustworthy corporate and political actor, and the individualization of choice and responsibility. 
 
6.2.1 Framing soda as a matter of individual consumer choice 
Like baby food companies, soda companies shape perceptions and preferences using their discursive 
power to frame soda consumption as being a matter of individual consumer choice and 
responsibility (ABA, 2014; AFBC, 2018; Brownell & Warner, 2009; Firth, 2012; Kwan, 2009; Nestlé, 
2019a; Nestle, 2015; Scott et al., 2017). This “freedom of choice” rhetoric has the effect of shifting 
responsibility – or, blame – for any resulting problem away from companies and onto consumers (L. 
C. Friedman et al., 2014). Additionally, the industry frames soda consumption as a question of 
balancing caloric intake with output (Freedhoff, 2014; Koplan & Brownell, 2010). Examples of this 
emphasis on choice, responsibility and balance will be discussed below.  
Using a playbook strategy common amongst Big Food corporations (Clapp & Scrinis, 2017), 
soda companies, their associations and front groups frame soda consumption as a question of 
balancing caloric intake (diet) with output (exercise), and thus try to deflect attention away from its 
consumption as a factor contributing to obesity and type 2 diabetes (Freedhoff, 2014; Koplan & 
Brownell, 2010). Health experts, however, say the message that exercise can balance caloric intake, 
regardless of the quality of the calorie, is misleading: exercise does little to affect weight (Cook & 
Schoeller, 2011; Dugas et al., 2011; A. Luke & Cooper, 2013; Wilks et al., 2011; Wing, 1999). Rather, 
obesity is linked more with energy intake than exercise (Slater et al., 2009; Swinburn et al., 2009), and 
physical activity is determined by energy balance, not the other way around (Klaas R. Westerterp, 
2015).  
During the development of the Global Action Plan for the Prevention and Control of 
NCDs 2013-2020, IFBA submissions emphasized the notion of balance between diet and physical 
activity. For example, its response to the discussion paper on the topic stressed the importance of 
balanced diets and healthy, active lifestyles and supported interventions to increase physical activity. 
The statement also individualized responsibility for diet, saying the industry aimed to “empower and 
support people to make informed, balanced choices” (IFBA, 2012b, p. 8) IFBA’s submission in 
response to the Zero Draft of the GAP made several references to balanced diet and suggested 
	 109	
	
changing language in the draft from “healthy food” to “balanced diets and healthy, active lifestyles” 
(IFBA, 2012c). Balanced diets, healthy, active lifestyles and empowered consumer choice all figure 
prominently in IFBA’s submissions in response to the revised drafts dated February 11, 2013 and 
March 15, 2013 (IFBA, 2013a, 2013c).  
The Global Energy Balance Network (GEBN) promoted the perspective that soda can be 
part of a lifestyle that balances diet with exercise. The GEBN was a non-profit organization founded 
at the University of Colorado and University of South Carolina in 2014, ostensibly created to fund 
research into the causes of obesity (Huehnergarth, 2015; O’Connor, 2015). The bulk of its funding – 
at least $1.5 million in 2015 – however, came from Coca-Cola, a point it did not initially make it 
evident. Exposure of GEBN as a front group for Coca-Cola only occurred following investigations 
published by the New York Times in August 2015 (Huehnergarth, 2015; O’Connor, 2015). This was 
prompted by the discovery that the group’s website was registered to the Coca-Cola headquarters in 
Atlanta57 (O’Connor, 2015). Further investigations revealing the extent of Coca-Cola’s role in 
shaping GEBN and its research agenda, led to the group being shut down on November 30, 2015 
(O’Connor, 2015). 
The GEBN illustrates two playbook tactics. The first tactic is “civil society capture” 
(Madureira Lima & Galea, 2018). As was seen in the baby food case, soda companies and the 
industry collectively form “front groups” and associations that resemble or represent themselves as 
civil society organizations but actually pursue business interests. Both industries use the tactic to 
coopt the increasing structural power accorded to civil society organizations as political actors and, 
by association, enhance the instrumental, structural and discursive power available to corporate 
actors.  
The second playbook tactic demonstrated by Coca-Cola’s creation and financial support of 
the GEBN is shaping the knowledge environment by controlling the research process and through 
the exercise of  discursive power. The GEBN initiative was intended to deflect attention away from 
diet – and specifically soda – as a contributor to obesity and type 2 diabetes, promoting instead 
exercise as the key to balancing energy intake and output in order to maintain a healthy weight. 
GEBN’s message was that “weight-conscious Americans are overly fixated on how much they eat 
and drink while not paying enough attention to exercise”. Instead, it emphasized getting more 
exercise (calories out) and worrying less about cutting calories (calories in) (Huehnergarth, 2015; 
	
57 GEBN president James O. Hill claimed that the website was registered to Coca-Cola’s headquarters 
because nobody within GEBN knew how to register a website (O’Connor, 2015). 
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O’Connor, 2015). Before GEBN, Coca-Cola had funded Exercise is Medicine, similarly blaming 
inactivity for many public health issues – although at least one study indicates we are not less active 
than we had been 30 years earlier (K. R. Westerterp & Speakman, 2008) – and promoting exercise 
(energy output) as a solution to obesity (Slater et al., 2009; Swinburn et al., 2009).  
Soda companies use their discursive power to detract attention from their products’ role in 
contributing to obesity and diabetes by framing soda consumption as a matter of personal choice 
and responsibility (Brownell & Warner, 2009; Firth, 2012; Ken, 2014; Kwan, 2009; Nestle, 2015; 
Nixon et al., 2015; Scott, Hawkins, & Knai, 2017). For example, combining the framings of energy 
balance (discussed above) and consumer responsibility, PepsiCo CEO Indra Nooyi said in a 2010 
interview that “If all consumers exercised, did what they had to do, the problem of obesity wouldn’t 
exist” (Huehnergarth, 2015). On the ABA website, for example, a blog post titled “In the grocery 
store, it’s your choice” argues: “Getting serious about obesity starts with education – not laws and 
regulation” (ABA, 2014). It provides a link to the website for a coalition called Americans for Food 
and Beverage Choice (AFBC) “for more information about how [consumers] can help prevent 
politicians from poking around in your grocery cart” (ABA, 2014). AFBC (2018) says it is working 
“to protect consumer choice by uniting against unfair taxes and regulations”. Throughout the IFBA 
website, the emphasis is on healthy food choices and active lifestyles and helping consumers to make 
better choices. The main webpage highlights in bold letters: “We innovate, empower and collaborate 
to help consumers eat balanced diets and live healthier lives” (IFBA, 2018b).58 Similarly, in its 2018 
CSR report, Nestlé presents itself as “offering tastier and healthier choices” (Nestlé, 2019a).  
Using their discursive power, soda companies frame their product modification and 
reformulation efforts as initiatives to contribute to the prevention and control of NCDs (Clapp & 
Scrinis, 2017; Nixon et al., 2015). These voluntary efforts are a response to increased political 
pressure on the industry aimed at pre-empting formal regulation by governments (Scott & Nixon, 
2017). By introducing smaller package sizes to aid in calorie control and pledging to remove calories 
from their product lines, soda companies frame obesity as a problem of caloric balance that can be 
corrected through healthier consumer choices paired with physical activity. For example, bringing 
together framings of consumer choice, balanced diet, healthy lifestyles and the company’s 
reformulation efforts, Coca-Cola wrote at the end of 2012: 
	
58 Note the evolution from “Collaborating, educating and innovating to help consumers achieve balanced 
diets and active healthy lifestyles” (cited by Clapp & Scrinis, 2017). “Innovate” (which presumably includes 
reformulation) has been moved to first priority. “Educating” has been replaced by “empower”; both terms 
indicate consumer choice but empower suggests more of a right to choose than simply the ability.  
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All of our beverages can be consumed as part of a balanced diet. Consumers who want to 
reduce the calories they consume from beverages can choose from our continuously 
expanding portfolio of more than 800 low- and no-calorie beverages, nearly 25 percent of 
our global portfolio, as well as our regular beverages in smaller portion sizes. We believe in 
the importance and power of “informed choice,” and we continue to support the fact-based 
nutrition labeling and education initiatives that encourage people to live active, healthy 
lifestyles. (The Coca-Cola Company, 2012) 
Clapp and Scrinis (2017) note that by emphasizing product differentiation, portion size and physical 
activity, food and beverage companies aim to influence public understanding about the causes of 
obesity while also stressing individual responsibility for food choices. This discursive framing places 
the onus on consumers to make healthy choices rather than on governments or corporations to limit 
the production, distribution, advertising, and availability of unhealthy and poor quality products 
(Clapp & Scrinis, 2017; Simon, 2006). Their use of discursive power in this way aims to shape 
preferences and protect the industry’s structural power. 
Soda companies’ exercise of discursive power to frame soda consumption as a question of 
balance and individual choice and responsibility works to protect their structural power by blocking 
regulation of the industry. In a survey in 2013, the WHO found that most Member States had 
introduced policies to reduce obesity and diet-related diseases, but only one-third had regulated the 
marketing of sodas to children, about half of which included restrictions on soda marketing in 
schools. Most countries considered obesity to be a problem of personal responsibility, rather than a 
public health of governmental concern, and therefore most policies were directed at helping 
individuals make healthy eating choices rather than regulating the food and beverage industries 
(WHO, 2013b).  
 
6.2.2 Corporate responsibility and trustworthiness 
Soda companies undertake self-regulation and other voluntary measures to send the message that 
the industry recognizes its role in addressing health concerns and it can be trusted to take 
responsible measures without government imposing legislation. Like the framings of energy balance 
and individual choice and responsibility, corporate social responsibility and voluntary initiatives 
serve to shape perceptions of the companies and their products. Engaging in self-regulation and 
voluntary measures is intended to help companies prevent or undermine calls for accountability and 
more stringent and effective formal regulation by public actors (Fuchs, 2005; Hawkes C., 2005; 
Sharma et al., 2010; Utting & Clapp, 2008). 
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Product reformulation or modification is one such voluntary measure aimed at pre-empting 
formal regulation. The aim is to maintain the companies’ market while also ostensibly addressing 
health concerns related to over-consumption of their products (Clapp & Scrinis, 2017). Companies 
prefer these types of voluntary initiatives, which they publicize as part of their corporate social 
responsibility initiatives (see, for example, Nestlé, 2019), overformal governmental regulation. 
Publicity of voluntary product reformulation and modification is an example of companies using 
their discursive power to protect their structural power. 
Soda companies have adopted several of the reformulation and product modification 
strategies typically applied by food and beverage industries, framing these as efforts to reduce their 
impact on chronic disease. These strategies include reducing added sugars, reducing total calories, 
making smaller-sized packing for portion control options, and providing nutritional information 
about their products (Acharya et al., 2011). Individual companies and their alliances, such as the 
IFBA, have pledged to reduce sugar levels in their products (IFBA, 2015). Product reformulation 
was the first of five “global public commitments” that the IFBA made in May 2008 as its 
contribution to efforts in connection with the Global Strategy on DPAH (Acharya et al., 2011). 
IFBA made repeated reference to these industry commitments in its various submissions as part of 
the development of the GAP on NCDs 2013-2020 (IFBA, 2012b, 2012c, 2013a, 2013c). By 
highlighting these initiatives, the industry intended to present itself as a responsible corporate citizen 
and thereby pre-empt moves toward formal regulation and promote a role for the industry in future 
collaborations. IFBA member companies reviewed these commitments and adopted a set of 
“enhanced commitments” in September 2014 (IFBA, 2015). PepsiCo revealed its own set of goals 
and commitments in March 2010, one of which was product reformulation, to encourage healthier 
lifestyles (Acharya et al., 2011).  
In 2012, the Healthy Weight Commitment Foundation, representing the largest food and 
beverage manufacturers, pledged to take 1.5 trillion calories out of the US food supply by 2015 
(Scrinis, 2016). An independent evaluation of the initiative by the Robert Wood Johnson 
Foundation in 2014 found that companies that were part of the initiative had reduced 6.4 trillion 
calories from the US market in 2012 compared to 2007. While PepsiCo claimed the achievement as 
evidence that business plays an important role in tackling obesity (PepsiCo, 2014), skeptics noted 
that decreasing soda consumption in the US was responsible for a good proportion of the reduction 
in sugar intake from these products. Furthermore, the focus on reducing overall caloric 
consumption was designed “to deflect attention from specific types of food products that are 
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particularly high in calories, especially sugary soft drinks (Clapp & Scrinis, 2017). Low-calorie, low-
sugar sodas were similarly central to Coca-Cola’s 2013 “Coming Together” anti-obesity advertising 
campaign. Directed at countering the growing perception that soda is a major contributor of obesity, 
this campaign suggests that physical activity is as important as diet in weight management, and that 
all calories are created equal (Nestle, 2015). Like the GEBN described above, the campaigns aim to 
deflect attention from the role of specifically sugar sweetened beverages in causing obesity and 
placing the onus of responsibility on the individual consumer by framing the Coming Together 
campaign and the Healthy Weight Commitment Foundation pledge as a matter of overall caloric 
intake (with all calories mattering equally, regardless of their food source) balanced with caloric 
output through exercise (Clapp & Scrinis, 2017; Nestle, 2015).  
On its “Transparency” webpage, Coca-Cola says: “We’ve been clear that we believe we 
can play an important role in helping consumers moderate their consumption of added sugar by 
evolving our portfolio of drinks to reduce sugar in existing recipes, introducing more low- and no-
sugar brands globally, investing in sugar alternatives and continuing to expand the availability of 
smaller packages like mini-cans across our markets” (Coca-Cola, 2018). Coca-Cola claimed that it 
had reduced sugar in more than 200 drinks globally in 2016 alone, and it was set to reduce sugar in 
more than 500 more in 2017 (Coca-Cola, 2018). PepsiCo reported in its 2013 Sustainability Report 
that it had removed 402,000 metric tons of added sugar from its total beverage portfolio in North 
America (US and Canada only) as compared to 2006 levels (PepsiCo 2014). This figure for “North 
America” notably excluded Mexico, where soda consumption had continued to increase until the 
introduction of a soda tax came into effect from January 1, 2014 (Colchero et al., 2016, 2017).59 
 
6.2.3 Industry legitimacy as a governance actor 
Soda companies pursue legitimacy as governance actors by collaborating in multistakeholder 
initiatives and public-private partnerships (PPPs) that resemble and often include civil society 
organizations, as well as government or intergovernmental organizations. As was discussed in 
Chapter 2, such collaborations have many proponents (Majestic, 2009; Sturchio & Goel, 2012; UN 
Global Compact, 2014). However, they also raise a number of concerns, including the risk that they 
blur distinctions between the aims, roles and obligations of different types of actors (Buse & Walt, 
	
59 During the first year of implementing the tax, 2014, sales volumes of taxed beverages were 6% lower than 
would have been expected without the tax (Colchero et al., 2016). In the second year, purchases of taxed 
beverages were 9.7 percent lower than would have been expected without the tax (Colchero et al., 2017). Sales 
of untaxed beverages increased over the same two years (Colchero et al., 2017). 
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2000; McKeon, 2017; Richter, 2004c) and negate power imbalances (McKeon, 2017). Collaborations 
with the private sector may jeopardize the “independence, integrity and reputation” of  WHO and 
other agencies (Richter, 2004c) or co-opt government actors and public-interest NGOs (Fuchs, 
2005). The multistakeholder approach poses challenges for the “the legitimacy of governance, the 
protection of common goods, and the defence of human rights” (McKeon, 2017, p. 380).  
One such initiative is the Pan American Forum for Action on NCDs (PAFNCD) (Moscetti 
& Taylor, 2015) – a multistakeholder forum on NCDs initiated by the WHO’s regional office for the 
Americas in the office’s capacity as the Pan American Health Organization (PAHO) (WHO, 2012g). 
In October 2012, Reuters reported: “… the WHO’s regional office [for the Americas] has turned to 
the very companies whose sugary drinks and salty foods are linked to many of the maladies it’s 
trying to prevent.” The story said: “The office, the Pan American Health Organization, not only is 
relying on the food and beverage industry for advice on how to fight obesity. For the first time in its 
110-year history, it has taken hundreds of thousands of dollars in money from the industry” (Wilson 
& Kerlin, 2012).  
The contributions to this initiative from food and beverage companies included $50,000 
from Coca-Cola, the world’s largest beverage company, and $150,000 from Nestlé (Wilson & Kerlin, 
2012),60 the world’s largest food company and baby food market leader. These two companies were 
able to make such a financial contribution because of their structural and instrumental power as 
market leaders, which they were able to leverage into further structural and instrumental power. 
PAHO said it spends more than $30 million each year combatting NCDs. Partnerships with the 
private sector fill a resource gap that exists because “the WHO has cut its own funding for chronic 
disease programs by 20 percent since 2010 – an even bigger decline than for the agency as a whole” 
and therefore PAHO is relying more heavily on public private partnerships (Wilson & Kerlin, 2012).  
However, the financial contributions posed a potential conflict of interest for PAHO, in that 
its ability to pursue activities to prevent and control NCDs, which might negatively impact the food 
and beverage industry, could be hampered by its sense of obligation toward these companies or by 
its interest in securing additional resources from them. Apart from the potential conflict of interest, 
the optics of accepting money from companies with competing interests – the manufacturers of 
products that contribute to NCDs – could undermine PAHO’s credibility as a health leader in the 
region and, by extension in the public’s perception, the WHO’s as lead global body for health. 
	
60 Unilever, a British-Dutch food conglomerate whose brands include Ben & Jerry’s ice cream and Popsicles, 
contributed $150,000 (Wilson & Kerlin, 2012). 
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The WHO issued a statement from Director-General Margaret Chan who said the media 
reports about the contribution were “creating misinformation and confusion” and that allegations 
about the WHO receiving funding from the food and beverage industry were “wrong” (WHO, 
2012g). Seeking to distance the WHO from the PAHO’s move, Chan’s statement said: “The WHO 
Global Strategy on [DPAH] commits the WHO to hold discussions with the private sector, but the 
Organization will not take money from private companies active in food and beverage production 
for work on NCD prevention and control as implied by the media articles” (WHO, 2012g). The 
WHO statement clarified that unlike other the WHO regional offices, PAHO contains two separate 
legal entities, the WHO Regional Office for the Americas (AMRO) and PAHO. In some areas their 
policies may differ. For example, while the WHO may engage with the private sector sometimes, in 
order to “protect its work from undue industry influence”, the agency is prohibited from accepting 
funding “from enterprises that have a commercial interest in the outcome of the project to which 
they would be contributing” (WHO, 2012g). In contrast, PAHO’s rules permit such funding, 
although only in February 2012 did it start accepting money from food and beverage companies.  
Although PAHO officials stress they maintain control of policy, one critic61 said “the WHO 
is getting hijacked” because it is are cash-strapped and that it is “very dangerous” (Wilson & Kerlin, 
2012). The World Public Health Nutrition Association said in a 2013 letter to the incoming Director 
of PAHO “The fact that PAHO received money from The Coca-Cola Company and other food and 
beverage corporations has damaged its reputation as the leading UN organization concerned with 
nutrition and public health in our Hemisphere” (WPHNA, 2013). 
A top official from Coca-Cola was part of the PAFNCD Interim Advisory Steering Group 
on behalf of IFBA (IFBA, 2012a; Wilson & Kerlin, 2012). Coca-Cola’s inclusion in the initiative’s 
governing body reflected an exercise of the industry’s structural and instrumental power. In turn its 
participation enabled the industry to use its discursive and instrumental power to further augment its 
future discursive, instrumental and structural power by influencing which policies and initiatives are 
pursued and what role the private sector will play in them. 
Although the PAFNCD was said to be intended for program implementation, not policy 
formation (and its inherent norm-setting), it gave food and beverage companies regular access to 
representatives from national governments from the region who would be directly involved in 
policy-making through the Pan American Sanitary Conference, PAHO’s governing body meeting. 
	
61 “Boyd Swinburn, an Australian professor and long-time member of the WHO’s nutrition advisory 
committees” (Wilson & Kerlin, 2012). 
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Indeed, in 2012, the same year PAHO increased its engagement with industry through the 
PAFNCD, it developed a new regional Plan of Action for the Prevention and Control of 
Noncommunicable Diseases in the Americas, 2013-2019, which was adopted at the 28th Pan 
American Sanitary Conference. The Plan of Action encourages governments to pursue multi-
sectoral partnerships, including with the private sector, and codifying these approaches as part of 
national NCD plans. The regional plan also mandates PAHO to monitor national progress by 
assessing the number of countries implementing national multi-sectoral plans (PAHO, 2014), 
thereby establishing the expectation that governments are to follow this approach (Moscetti & 
Taylor, 2015).  
In June 2012, the IFBA submission on the PAHO Strategy and Plan of Action for the 
Prevention and Control of NCDs and a Proposed Resolution recalled the 2011 Political 
Declaration’s call for the establishment of multistakeholder action and applauded the launch of the 
multistakeholder PAFNCD. The majority of the IFBA submission, however, outlined the voluntary 
measures that the Alliance and its members had undertaken through collaborative initiatives, self-
regulation and voluntary measures, suggesting that statutory regulation is therefore not necessary 
(IFBA, 2012a). However, using its discursive power to frame itself as a trustworthy partner that 
wants to be “part of the solution”, pre-empting formal regulation with voluntary measures, and 
promoting measures such as product reformulation as their contribution to the prevention and 
control of NCDs, are all strategies used by the soda industry and food and beverage industry more 
broadly to protect their structural power, increase their legitimacy and instrumental power as 
governance actors, protect their markets, and deflect attention from their contribution to the 
problem (see for example: (Clapp & Scrinis, 2017; Moscetti & Taylor, 2015; Nixon et al., 2015; Scott 
& Nixon, 2017). IFBA also suggested changes to the proposed resolution to include the term 
multistakeholder as it better reflected the inclusion of civil society and the private sector, and to add 
the private sector to a list of sectors across which dialogue and partnerships should be promoted 
(IFBA, 2012a). These suggested changes increase the structural, instrumental and discursive power 
of NSAs, including the private sector, by institutionalizing their inclusion and the multistakeholder 
approach to efforts relating to the prevention and control of NCDs, despite the potential for 
conflicts of interest and competing interests.  
As part of their pursuit of legitimacy as governance actors, soda companies capture civil 
society by forming or funding front groups that resemble civil society organizations, as in the case of 
the GEBN. In addition to coopting the structural power accorded to civil society organizations as 
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political actors and enhancing the instrumental, structural and discursive power available to 
corporate actors via their association, another advantage for corporations of such civil society 
formations and multistakeholder collaborations has been the ability to be granted Official Relations 
status with the WHO. As was discussed in Chapter 5 with respect to baby food manufacturers’ 
associations, Official Relations status granted to business associations, front groups and 
multistakeholder initiatives institutionalizes their power and lends credibility and legitimacy to their 
discursive power. Corporate members of  such groups are positioned to lobby and influence the 
WHO and its Member States, and to shape the political environment and preferences, perceptions 
and paradigms surrounding various issues.  
The International Life Sciences Institute (ILSI), for example, is a front group that represents 
itself as a non-profit organization with a mission to “provide science that improves public health”. It 
counts Coca-Cola and PepsiCo (and numerous baby food manufacturers62) among its members 
(ILSI, 2016, 2018). The WHO granted ILSI Official Relations status in 1988 but withdrew it in 2015, 
not because of the organization’s commercial ties, which were not permitted under the Principles 
governing relations between the WHO and NGOs (WHO, 1987a), but because of its link with a 
tobacco manufacturer (Hentges, 2015; WHO, 2014h, para. 8, 2015d, para. 9). 
Another such organization is the GAIN Business Alliance, which the Global Alliance for 
Improved Nutrition (GAIN) created in 2005. PepsiCo and Coca-Cola were among a number of Big 
Food companies included in its membership (Nagarajan, 2014a; Schuftan & Holla, 2012). GAIN is a 
PPP established in 2002 that seeks market solutions to micronutrient deficiencies in developing 
countries, especially through food fortification (GAIN, 2008). The WHO postponed consideration 
of GAIN’s 2013 application for Official Relations status due to questions about its links with the 
for-profit sector (WHO, 2013c). To address these concerns, GAIN dissolved the Business Alliance 
in December 2013 (Nagarajan, 2014a).  
Satisfied with the dissolution, the WHO granted GAIN Official Relations status in January 
2014 (WHO, 2014c). That same week, the Business Alliance’s replacement (Nagarajan, 2014a) – the 
Scaling Up Nutrition (SUN) movement’s new SUN Business Network (SBN), which GAIN and the 
World Food Programme co-convene (SBN, 2018b) – was launched at the World Economic Forum 
in Davos. The SBN was formed by industry participants in SUN as its private sector arm. PepsiCo is 
	
62 Abbott Nutrition, DSM Nutritional Products, Fonterra, FrieslandCampina, Mead Johnson, Nestlé, and 
Danone (ILSI, 2016, 2018). 
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one of 186 companies (45 multinational, 141 national) that have made commitments to improve 
nutrition and track their progress (SBN, 2018a).  
Despite these changes, some observers remained concerned about the group’s proximity to 
for-profit entities (the logos of PepsiCo, Coca-Cola, DSM and others remained at the time on 
GAIN’s website), its commercial goal (to create markets for products) and its activities to undermine 
efforts to regulate baby food marketing in Kenya63 (IBFAN, 2014a; Nagarajan, 2014a). Critics 
maintain that SUN has inadequate safeguards against conflicts of interest and permits the 
participation of the manufacturers of highly processed and packaged foods and baby food products 
included in the scope of the Code, discussed in Chapter 4. They argue that it allows the private 
sector too much influence over nutrition programming and relies too heavily on technical responses 
to nutrition issues. Naming itself a “movement” suggests a bottom-up, grassroots momentum and 
greater legitimacy, when it is actually an initiative driven by its partnerships with the private sector 
(Lhotska et al., 2012; Schuftan & Greiner, 2013). 
Another playbook tactic utilized by the soda industry is the so-called “revolving door” 
between the public and private sectors. Soda giant PepsiCo was able to recruit Derek Yach as a 
Senior Vice President for Global Health and Agriculture Policy in February 2007.64 Yach had been 
the WHO Executive Director for Chronic Disease and Mental Health between 1995 and 2004, a 
role that gave him considerable influence within the WHO and with health policy-makers around 
the world. In this capacity, Yach had spearheaded the development of the Global Strategy on 
DPAH and the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (Norum, 2008; The Vitality Group, 
2012). In line with then Director-General Gro Harlem Brundtland’s desire to increase the WHO’s 
engagement with the private sector, Yach had helped strengthen the organization’s relationship with 
	
63 GAIN had written to the Kenyan government with concerns about the proposed law, including that it 
could threaten the country’s ability to meet its commitments as a Scaling Up Nutrition (SUN) country 
(GAIN, 2012).  
64 Yach left PepsiCo in October 2012 to join The Vitality Group, an incentive-based wellness program, 
where he lead the new Vitality Institute, a multi-disciplinary thought leadership organization (The Vitality 
Group, 2012). From there, he went on to found in September 2017 the controversial Foundation for a 
Smoke-Free World (FSFW) with a pledge from tobacco company Philip Morris International of $80 million 
annually for 12 years, starting in 2018 (FSFW, 2017). While at the WHO, Yach had spearheaded the 
development, negotiation and ratification of the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC). A 
statement from the WHO in response to the FSFW noted that the FCTC expressly encourages governments 
to limit interactions with the tobacco industry and avoid partnership, and that governments should not accept 
financial or other contributions from the tobacco industry or those working to further its interests, such as 
FSFW (WHO, 2017b). 
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the food and beverage industries, including by helping arrange ongoing consultations with them 
while developing the new global strategy (Moscetti & Taylor, 2015).  
It was Yach who responded to media reports in 20013 that documented industry influence, 
claiming that “the food industry had infiltrated the WHO just as the tobacco industry did and 
succeeded in exerting ‘undue influence’ over policies intended to safeguard public health” (Boseley, 
2003b n.p. 2003a). Yach countered by noting that “[F]ood is not tobacco. The food and beverage 
industries are a part of the solution. They have an important role to play in achieving the best 
possible global strategy. We have been arranging a series of transparent discussions where all parties 
can discuss practical solutions for better diet, which do not in any way compromise the interests of 
public health” (WHO, 2003c).  
Although Yach may have believed he could effect more change from within PepsiCo 
(Norum, 2008; Uauy, 2008; Yach, 2008), during his tenure the company continued its activities to 
influence public policy and public opinion. The company’s tactics included emphasizing “self-
regulation, its participation in voluntary commitment organizations, and the positive contributions it 
could make in public-private partnerships” (Moscetti & Taylor, 2015). These tactics show the use of 
discursive power to increase the company’s – and, by extension, the entire private sector’s – 
structural and instrumental power by positioning it as a responsible corporate citizen and legitimate 
partner in governance. For example, PepsiCo gave Yach a prominent role at the 2011 High Level 
Meeting of the General Assembly on NCDs, a tactic designed to improve the company’s image and 
standing within global health circles (Moscetti & Taylor, 2015). His presence during the meeting 
included addressing the Pepsi Breakfast in the UN Dining Hall on September 19, 2011 (Baby Milk 
Action, 2012). 
As an example of the industry’s efforts to control the knowledge environment, Yach and 
five other senior PepsiCo employees co-authored an article about the important role of the private 
sector in collaborations to address chronic disease (Yach et al., 2010). The article notes that three of 
the authors had held positions in the public health sector: one co-author at the Center for Disease 
Control, another at the Mayo Clinic, and Yach at the WHO (Yach et al., 2010). Their experience in 
these positions bolsters the industry’s image as an authority on health issues, while also lending 
credibility to the authors’ scholarly writing. While the authors’ employment with PepsiCo is noted, 
the only conflict of interest identified is Yach’s earlier involvement in steering the consultative 
process for meetings with the CEOs of leading food companies and the WHO while he worked at 
the WHO under then Director-General Brundtland (Yach et al., (2010). While serving as a paid 
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advisory member of the PepsiCo Scientific Advisory Board Yach (2013) also argued in favour of 
industry-led efforts to improve population health, including tackling public health problems such as 
the obesity problem. 
In an invited editorial in Public Health Nutrition explaining his decision to join PepsiCo, 
Yach also revealed that Gro Harlem Brundtland, his former boss at the WHO, had also been 
recruited by the company to its Blue Ribbon Advisory Board (PepsiCo, 2008; Yach, 2008). 
Brundtland had served as Director-General of the WHO from 1998 to 2003 and championed the 
WHO Strategy on DPAH despite opposition from the food and beverage industries (Norum, 2008). 
This revelation was disturbing in terms of its implications with respect to the insider information 
that Brundtland brought to her new role, but perhaps not surprising given the fact that it was she 
who had shepherded the WHO toward a closer relationship with the private sector, especially the 
food and beverage industries. Like Yach, Brundtland had declared that “food is not tobacco” 
(Brundtland, 2003), but more like the pharmaceutical industry that works with the WHO to protect 
public health (Cannon, 2012). 
 Another example of the revolving door is Janet Voûte’s decision to join Nestlé in December 
2010 as Global Head of Public Affairs with no cooling off period following her position at the 
WHO as Partnership Advisor with responsibility for the UN Global Compact and the Global 
Network for Non-Communicable Diseases (NCDnet), which she masterminded (Baby Milk Action, 
2010). She has also served as Co-Chair of the International Food & Beverage Alliance (Voûte et al., 
2012) and Chair of the Nestlé Creating Shared Value Council (Nestlé, 2020).  
Another playbook strategy for influencing paradigms to create an environment conducive to 
the soda industry is shaping the knowledge environment by influencing (or controlling) research 
agendas and processes by funding studies and by positioning themselves as legitimate sources of 
scientific information. To use this strategy, the soda industry exercises its instrumental, structural 
and discursive power, thereby iteratively reinforcing all three dimensions of power. For instance, a 
2016 review of 60 studies examining the effects of soda consumption on obesity and diabetes-
related outcomes found that those funded by the soda industry were significantly more likely to find 
no associations than independently funded studies. Twenty-six of 26 negative association studies had 
funding ties to the soda industry, while only 1 of 34 positive association studies had industry funding 
(Schillinger et al., 2016). The researchers observed: “This industry seems to be manipulating 
contemporary scientific processes to create controversy and advance their business interests at the 
expense of the public's health” (Schillinger et al., 2016).  
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A 2013 systematic review found that industry-funded studies examining the relationship 
between sugar-sweetened beverages and weight gain or obesity were “five times more likely to 
present a conclusion of no positive association” (Bes-Rastrollo et al., 2013). An earlier study found 
“a strong association between the type of funding … and the conclusions that were drawn. Articles 
sponsored exclusively by food/drinks companies were four to eight times more likely to have 
conclusions favorable to the financial interests of the sponsoring company than articles which were 
not sponsored by food or drinks companies” (Lesser et al., 2007, p. 6).  
Studies that are funded entirely or in part by the soda industry, meanwhile, are more likely to 
reach conclusions that are favourable to soda consumption and to the soda industry (Bes-Rastrollo 
et al., 2013; Forshee et al., 2008; Lesser et al., 2007). The aim of these studies is to cast doubt about 
the contribution of soda consumption to obesity and diabetes, in an effort to counter calls for 
regulation and taxation intended to reduce soda consumption (see, for example, Forshee et al., 
2008). For example, a meta-analysis in 2008 funded by the ABA found “the relation between [sugar 
sweetened beverage] consumption and [body mass index] among children and adolescents is near 
zero” (Forshee et al., 2008). One of the authors accepted a position with ABA after the study had 
been accepted, and the research center with which the authors were affiliated had previously 
received funding from Coca-Cola (Forshee et al., 2008). As another example, six senior employees 
of PepsiCo published an article about the important role of the private sector in collaborations to 
address chronic disease (Yach et al., (2010). While serving as a paid advisory member of the PepsiCo 
Scientific Advisory Board, Yach (2013) also argued in favour of industry-led efforts to improve 
population health, including tackling public health problems such as the obesity problem. 
Another avenue to influencing the research process is sponsoring researchers in gatekeeper 
positions with academic journals. For example, the editorial board of the American Journal of 
Clinical Nutrition, the ASN’s flagship publication, in 2015 included David Allison, who had declared 
conflicts of interest involving PepsiCo, Dr. Pepper Snapple, The Sugar Association, World Sugar 
Research Organization, and other food and beverage companies65 (Simon, 2015).  
Employees of the soda companies and their associations themselves also publish articles in 
academic journals. Although their affiliations are listed, and conflicts of interest or competing 
interests are inconsistently declared66, the content of the articles remains to influence discourse 
	
65 Red Bull, Kellogg, Mars, Campbell (Simon, 2015). 
66 Goldberg (2018) maintains that disclosure of conflicts of interest are not only ineffective but may intensify 
partiality and should not continue to be treated as a primary remedy. 
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surrounding their subject matter. For example, Yach published several articles during his 
employment with PepsiCo. He co-authored an article with five of his senior colleagues at PepsiCo 
titled, “The role and challenges of the food industry in addressing chronic disease” (Yach et al., 
2010). The article advances several of the industry’s key framing messages, asserting that food 
companies play an important role in combatting nutrition related NCDs, and that there is a need for 
increased private-public67 collaboration – i.e. they are part of the solution. It reflects the company’s 
emphasis on consumer choice, support for physical activity programs (in line with its energy-balance 
message), and self-regulation (justified by describing the voluntary commitments – mostly with 
respect to product modification and reformulation – made by PepsiCo and by IFBA (Yach et al., 
2010). The only conflict of interest declared is the fact that Yach, while employed at the WHO, had 
played a role in steering the consultative process for meetings between the CEOs of leading food 
companies and the WHO under Brundtland (Yach et al., 2010). 
In another article titled “Major multinational food and beverage companies and informal 
sector contributions to global food consumption: Implications for nutrition policy”, Yach and 
another Pepsi employee and a consultant with the company argue that IFBA’s five “global public 
commitments” would not be met unless small and medium companies step up with the 
multinational companies to improve the health of the public, globally (Alexander et al., 2011). This 
article lists the authors’ affiliations with PepsiCo as competing interests, and includes a disclaimer 
stating that the statements and opinions expressed were those of the authors and did not necessarily 
represent the official position of PepsiCo Inc. (Alexander et al., 2011). As in the article described 
above, Yach and his colleagues promote paradigms about corporate responsibility and self-
regulation, which enables the industry to argue against formal regulation and to promote a role for 
the industry in future collaborations.  
The analysis in this section has shown that the soda industry uses playbook strategies to 
shape paradigms that emphasize individual responsibility, consumer choice, and caloric balance; 
corporate social responsibility and trustworthiness through self-regulation and voluntary measures; 
and industry legitimacy as a governance actor. Some of the types of strategies for encouraging these 
paradigms evident in the analysis include shaping the knowledge environment, perceptions and the 
political environment by framing issues and actors, undertaking self-regulation and other voluntary 
	
67 This word order – “private-public” – eschews the usual descriptions of such initiatives as “public-private,” 
denoting public leadership.  
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measures, and participating in collaborative initiatives, taking advantage of the revolving door 
between the public and private sectors, and controlling the research process and scholarly writing.  
 
6.3 Conclusion 
This chapter has analyzed the ways in which soda companies and their associations have used the 
strategies from the corporate playbook to influence global health policy-making at the WHO. The 
soda industry seeks to influence substantive recommendations by the WHO related to its products 
that can have both immediate and long-term impacts on profitability, for example in connection 
with the WHO’s guidelines on sugar intake levels, because sugar is a constituent ingredient in many 
soda products, and the taxation of soda products as a part of efforts to prevent and control NCDs. 
In these instances, the soda industry, supported by the sugar industry trade associations that include 
soda companies as their members, used its discursive power to manufacture doubt about soda’s 
contribution to the obesity epidemic and opposed “restrictive” recommendations by relying on the 
paradigms of individual responsibility and energy balance. It also drew on the instrumental and 
structural power of allies in the US government, as well as other sugar dependent countries. 
Similarly, when the WHO Independent High-level Commission on Noncommunicable Diseases 
recommended taxation as an appropriate fiscal policy for addressing NCDs, soda was not 
mentioned alongside tobacco and alcohol as a product recommended for taxation. Soda’s inclusion 
as a suitable product for taxation was successfully blocked by the Commissioner from the US, home 
to Coca-Cola and PepsiCo. 
The soda industry also uses playbook strategies to shape paradigms that determine which 
policies are pursued and what role private actors are able to play in developing them. Paradigms can 
determine the success of industry influence on substantive matters and also form part of a long-
game with the aim of protecting or even increasing industry ability to influence substantive policy 
and seeking a greater governance role. In this regard, the soda industry works to promote paradigms 
emphasizing individual responsibility regarding diet choices and corporate responsibility, 
trustworthiness and legitimacy as a governance actor. These paradigms create an environment 
conducive to companies and their associations arguing against regulation and in favour of voluntary 
measures and representing themselves as legitimate partners in developing health-related policy. The 
ultimate objective is to have greater influence over policy-making with the aim of protecting or 
increasing their ability to make a profit. Some of the types of strategies for encouraging these 
paradigms evident in the analysis include shaping the knowledge environment, perceptions and the 
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political environment by framing issues and actors, undertaking self-regulation and other voluntary 
measures, and participating in collaborative initiatives, taking advantage of the revolving door 
between the public and private sectors, and controlling the research process and scholarly writing.  
The soda industry’s track-record of using the corporate playbook to influence substantive 
policy, as analyzed above, and concerns relating to NSA participation in global health governance 
and policy-making, as discussed in Chapter 2, raise questions as the WHO seeks to increase its 
engagement with such actors, especially for-profit entities, which will be the focus of Chapter 7.  
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Chapter 7 – Framework of engagement with non-State actors (FENSA) 
 
“I am deeply concerned by … efforts by industry to shape the public health policies and strategies that affect their 
products. When industry is involved in policy-making, rest assured that  
the most effective control measures will be downplayed or left out entirely.… In the view of  the WHO,  
the formulation of  all policies must be protected from distortion by commercial or vested interests.” 
Dr. Margaret Chan, Former Director-General, the WHO68 
 
7.0  Introduction 
This chapter analyzes the WHO’s policies concerning its engagement with non-State actors (NSAs), 
and specifically the profit-oriented sector, which culminated in the agency’s adoption of the 
“Framework of engagement with non-state actors” (FENSA). FENSA was adopted on May 28, 
2016 (WHO, 2016f), after four contentious years of development, which suggests just how much 
was at stake in the new policy for both the WHO and the private sector. It was developed in the 
context of the agency’s increasing reliance on voluntary contributions and multistakeholder 
collaborative initiatives such as public-private partnerships (PPPs) for funding and carrying out its 
programs (Lhotska & Gupta, 2016). It was initiated as part of  reforms led by former Director-
General Margaret Chan and presented in documentation associated with its development process69 
as necessary for overcoming existing constraints affecting engagement with NGOs. 
The chapter analyzes the development and adoption of FENSA and its implications for the 
WHO’s integrity and independence, given the private sector’s well-documented efforts to influence 
policy at the WHO analyzed in Chapters 5 and 6. It considers FENSA’s potential for increasing 
industry influence on substantive policy and paradigms and the implications for global health 
governance of the WHO’s legitimation of a prominent role for actors with for-profit interests. The 
chapter makes the case that through FENSA, the WHO is potentially setting itself up for greater 
dependence on for-profit entities, which can lead to further conflicts of interest and undermine the 
WHO’s role as lead global health body. Although FENSA is ostensibly intended to safeguard the 
WHO against potential conflicts of interest, faulty understanding of this term has resulted in a policy 
that can lead the agency to greater, not less, influence from profit-based actors, like the baby food 
	
68 Opening comments at Global Conference on Health Promotion, Helsinki, Finland in June 2013 (Chan, 
2013). 
69 See, for example, “Issues to consider in the formulation of a policy” (WHO, 2012f). 
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and soda industries. FENSA institutionalizes the influence of private authority, especially profit-
motivated entities, by, for example, making business associations eligible for Official Relations status 
and the privileges and increased access that this confers.  
The chapter begins with an overview of the global shift toward multistakeholder approaches 
and public private partnerships across the UN system in general and by the WHO in particular. It 
then turns to a discussion of the often-conflated but distinct concepts of conflicts of interest and 
conflicting interests, both of which are central to discussions of the WHO’s engagement with NSAs. 
The chapter continues with a review of the WHO policies and proposals relating to the agency’s 
engagement with NSAs, including those policies that FENSA replaces or complements. It then 
examines the WHO’s development and adoption of FENSA, and the main concerns highlighted by 
the private sector and by critical NGOs, including inadequate protection against conflicts of interest, 
and (initially) no distinction made between public-interest and private-interest actors or between 
different types of engagement. The conclusion highlights the significance of FENSA in terms of its 
implications for the WHO and for global health governance more broadly.  
 
7.1 Global shift toward multistakeholder approach and engaging with NSAs 
As discussed in Chapter 2, multistakeholder approaches and PPPs are increasingly seen as not only 
legitimate but also the preferred modes of operations across the UN system, including at the WHO. 
While the WHO prohibits any collaboration with the tobacco and arms industries, its normative 
guidelines have not excluded food and beverage industries, including baby food (provided they abide 
by the Code) and soda manufacturers and their associations, from active participation in 
multistakeholder initiatives. Instead, multistakeholder engagement and collaboration with the private 
sector is enshrined, for example, in the Global Strategy for the Prevention and Control of  
Noncommunicable Diseases (NCDs) (WHO, 2000b) and its 2008-2013 and 2013-2020 Action Plans 
(WHO, 2008, 2013a), the Global Strategy on Diet, Physical Activity and Health (WHO, 2004a), and 
the Political Declaration on NCDs (2011) (Moscetti & Taylor, 2015).  
For example, in addition to the primary role and responsibility of Governments and the 
leadership and coordinating role of the WHO with respect to actions against NCDs, the Political 
Declaration adopted by the UNGA High-Level Meeting on the Prevention and Control of NCDs in 
September 2011 recognizes “the essential need for the efforts and engagement of all sectors of 
society” (UNGA, 2011, para. 3). It acknowledges “the contribution of and important role played by 
all relevant stakeholders,” including, “where and as appropriate, the private sector and industry” in 
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efforts to prevent and control NCDs (UNGA, 2011, para. 37). It makes repeated references to a 
multi-sector approach and multi-sector initiatives, including with the private sector, as well as one 
reference specifically to multistakeholder engagement (UNGA, 2011).70 The private sector has also 
been included in some capacity in the governing boards of many of the new global health PPPs, 
such as the Global Fund (formerly the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria), the 
Global Alliance for Improved Nutrition (GAIN), and GAVI (formerly the GAVI Alliance) 
(Bezanson & Isenman, 2012; Sridhar, 2012). 
This global shift toward increased engagement with the private sector has implications for 
global health governance and for the WHO in several ways. First, it increases the instrumental power 
of  profit-oriented entities, which the private sector exploits to further its own interests at the 
expense of  public health interests. Second, such collaborations can expose the WHO to the risk of  
conflicts of  interest, damage the agency’s independence, integrity, credibility, and reputation and its 
capacity to protect and promote health in the public interest and perform its normative functions. 
Third, the trend increases not only the instrumental power but also the structural power of  
corporations and their business associations and foundations by contributing to the entrenchment 
of  the multistakeholder approach to global health programs, policies, and governance. The increased 
entrenchment of  the multistakeholder approach predetermines the types of  program, policy and 
governance alternatives that are considered both feasible and acceptable, and reduces the prospects 
for more wholistic, horizontal programing and governance in the public interest, financed through 
assessed contributions by Member States.  
 
7.2 Conflicts of interest and conflicting interests 
The increased role of  the private sector as governance actors, the WHO’s financing challenges, and 
the global shift toward a multistakeholder approach expose the organization to the risk of  potential 
conflicts of  interest. Perhaps surprisingly, the WHO does not have an overarching policy on 
conflicts of  interest. This is a matter that should form a cornerstone of  the organization’s 
functioning and policy-making if  it is to maintain its independence, integrity, credibility and 
reputation in pursuit of  its constitutional mandate. Instead, in order to address its financing 
	
70 In remarks in response to the Political Declaration, IBFA Co-Chair Donna J. Hrinak appreciated that the 
Political Declaration recognized contribution the food and beverage industry can make. She stressed that, 
since its inception, the UN had worked with the private sector, and encouraged Member States to look to the 
private sector as a willing and effective partner in implementing the Political Declaration in their respective 
countries (IFBA, 2011). 
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challenges, the organization has embraced a multistakeholder approach wholeheartedly, and with a 
principle of  “inclusiveness” (CSOs at WHA 69, 2016), without a clear conceptualization of  what the 
term conflicts of  interest refers to or how to manage them.  
Conflicts of  interest and conflicting interests are different, though related, concepts. A conflict of  
interest is “a set of  conditions in which professional judgment concerning a primary interest (such 
as a patient’s welfare or the validity of  research) tends to be unduly influenced by a secondary 
interest (such as financial gain)” (Thompson, 1993, p. 573). “Conflict of  interest” refers to conflicts 
within an individual or organization whereby a secondary interest raises the possibility that the 
individual or organization would be unable to pursue its primary interest. This is not to be confused 
with “conflicting interests” (or diverging or competing interests) between actors (Peters & Handschin, 
2012, pp. 5–6, incl. fn 3; 363; Richter, 2014). Yet these two concepts are often conflated, including 
among intergovernmental organizations such as the WHO and the UN system more broadly71 as 
well as by various NSAs, with the result that neither risk is appropriately addressed.  
Throughout the development of  FENSA, which deals with situations rife with the potential 
for conflicts of  interest, there was a lack of  conceptual clarity about what constitutes conflicts of  
interest within an actor, as opposed to conflicting interests between actors. These two separate but 
related concepts were repeatedly conflated throughout in the documents produced by the WHO 
Secretariat, as well as by NSAs in their interventions at governing body meetings and submissions to 
various consultations. For example, conflating conflicting interests between actors with conflicts of  
interest within an actor, IFBA said in its submission to the public, web-based consultation in March 
2013: “The argument is often made that there is a fundamental conflict of  interest between the public health 
and private sectors” (emphasis added) (IFBA, 2013b). This common, colloquial use of the term 
“conflict of interest” conflates two related but different concepts and has had negative implications 
for the development of a clear and effective policy. 
In addition to conflicts of interest, in evaluating potential engagement with NSAs, the WHO 
needs also to consider conflicting interests. Indeed, the potential for harm due to a conflict of interests 
is arguably greater when there also exist conflicting interests. Namely, it is necessary for the WHO to 
consider the extent to which each type of NSAs’ (and each individual NSAs’) interests align with 
public health interests and how much they are oriented toward profit-making. It is also necessary to 
	
71 For example, the Political Declaration on NCDs (UNGA, 2011) includes only one mention of conflicts of 
interest: in paragraph 38 where it recognizes “the fundamental conflict of interest between the tobacco 
industry and public health.” However, these are conflicting (or competing) interests between these two sectors, 
not a conflict of interest (within one actor). 
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consider how much the NSAs’ interests are aligned with maintaining the independence, integrity and 
credibility of the WHO as a global health leader. This is based on the principle that public health 
interests, and not profit-making interests, are fundamental in determining global health policy, and 
also the legitimacy and influence of NSAs in the policy-making process. The corporate sector’s 
interests are profit-driven, not public health-driven. They do not align with either public health 
interests or with maintaining the independence, integrity and credibility of the WHO as a global 
health leader and, therefore, measures must be taken to protect substantive policy and global health 
policy-making against its influence. Some corporations may be necessary and even important global 
health actors, but this does not grant them a role as global health policy-makers. Corporations may 
contribute to the common good but, as Marks (2019, p. 51) stresses, “they cannot and should not be 
considered [its] guardians,” which is the responsibility of public officials, government bodies, and 
intergovernmental organizations, such as the WHO. 
 
7.3 The WHO policies and proposals relating to engagement with NSAs 
Although the trend toward multistakeholderism is relatively new, since its inception the WHO has 
recognized the need for engaging with a wide variety of organizations and has had numerous policies 
in place to govern such engagement. The WHO’s Constitution, which came into force on April 7, 
1948 (K. Lee, 2009; WHO, 1958), mandates the agency to engage with NSAs. Article 2(b) states 
that, in order to achieve its objective, the agency is to collaborate with a variety of organizations as 
may deemed appropriate, and Article 18(h) authorizes WHA to invite “any organization, 
international or national, governmental or non-governmental” to participate, without voting rights, 
in any meeting under its authority, with national government consent in the case of national 
organizations. Article 71 allows for making suitable arrangements for consultation and cooperation 
with international NGOs, and with national Government consent, national organizations whether 
governmental or non-governmental (WHO, 2006b).  
Subsequent policies included the “Principles governing relations between the WHO and 
NGOs,” which was adopted (WHA40.25) by the Fortieth World Health Assembly (WHO, 1987a),72 
and the “Guidelines on working with the private sector to achieve health outcomes” (EB107/20) 
(WHO, 2000a). The Principles were subsequently deemed “inadequate”, eventually to be replaced by 
FENSA. In the meantime, however, a number of approaches were proposed that failed to get any 
	
72These Principles replaced the Principles adopted by the First and Third World Health Assemblies. 
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traction. The progression of ideas for handling the relationship suggests that the WHO has struggled 
with finding appropriate ways of engaging with NSAs in ways that advance its interests – both 
programmatic and financial – without compromising its independence, integrity, credibility and 
reputation in pursuit of  its constitutional mandate as “the directing and coordinating authority on 
international health work” (WHO, 2006b). 
The first WHA in 1948 adopted a set of working principles that governed Official Relations 
between NGOs and the WHO. These principles served as a policy for accreditation but did not 
provide guidance for consultative and collaborative processes (WHO, 2012f, p. 2). The principles 
were amended and expanded at several later WHAs73 (Civil Society Initiative, 2002), most recently in 
1987 with the adoption of  the current “Principles Governing Relations between the WHO and 
[NGOs]” (WHA40.25) (WHO, 1987a). These Principles constitute the legal basis for all aspects of  
relations between the WHO and NGOs. According to the Principles, NGOs that meet the 
prescribed criteria are able to enter into Official Relations with the WHO, at the discretion of  the 
Executive Board. 
Certain privileges are conferred on NGOs with Official Relations status, including “the right 
to appoint a representative to participate, without right of  vote, in the WHO’s meetings or in those 
of  the committees and conferences convened under its authority” and to make a statement at the 
invitation of  the chairman (WHO, 1987a, para. 6.1). These statements are part of  the official record 
but, coming after statements and discussion by Member States, they are not likely to persuade 
decisions. Instead, ahead of  the agenda item of  their interest, these organizations lobby Member 
States that may be receptive to their position and looking for technical advice. As of  January 2016, 
the last review before FENSA changed the criteria, there were 207 NGOs in Official Relations with 
the WHO (WHO, 2016a).  
One of  the criteria for admission into Official Relations status specified in the Principles was 
that organizations must be “free from concerns which are primarily of  a commercial or profit-
making nature” (WHO, 1987a, para. 3.1). Nevertheless, several NSAs that represent commercial 
entities have been granted Official Relations status by emphasizing their non-profit nature (Lhotska 
& Gupta, 2016). In these cases, the NGO Standing Committee had simply endorsed the Secretariat’s 
recommendations (Consumers International, 2011). Industry associations that have been granted 
Official Relations status include: CropLife International (representing Monsanto, Syngenta, Bayer, 
	
73 WHA resolutions WHA1.130, WHA3.113, WHA11.14 and WHA 21.28. 
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CropScience, Dow Agrosciences, DuPont and other companies promoting GMO technologies), the 
International Federation of  Pharmaceutical Manufacturers and Associations (WHO, 2019f).  
The International Life Sciences Institute (representing Nestlé, Coca Cola, Kellogg, Pepsi, 
Monsanto, Ajinomoto, Danone, General Mills and others), the International Special Dietary Foods 
Industries Federation (ISDI, representing the global specialized nutrition industry, including Nestlé 
and Danone) and the Industry Council for Development (representing Nestlé, Mars, Unilever and 
Ajinomoto) have also previously been in Official Relations with the WHO (IBFAN, 2014, Notes for 
editors), but have had this status withdrawn. As noted in Chapter 5, ISDI, lost its Official Relations 
status in 2014, not due its close connection with commercial entities, but because “the WHO had 
not received the deliverables expected during the collaboration period” (WHO, 2014c, para. 20). 
Similarly, ILSI lost its status in January 2015 only because of ILSI’s link with tobacco, one of two 
industries with which the WHO explicitly refuses to work. 
The criterion requiring that organizations in Official Relations with the WHO must be “free 
from concerns which are primarily of  a commercial or profit-making nature” was complicated by 
the blurred lines between public interest and profit-making entities through the formation of  PPPs 
and hybrid organizations that partner corporations with NGOs, coalitions and associations, often 
while ostensibly remaining at arm’s length from their business interests. One benefit for 
corporations of such initiatives and collaborations has been the ability to get Official Relations status 
with the WHO. GAIN, for example, is a hybrid NGO that was granted Official Relations status in 
January 2014 (Nagarajan, 2014a; WHO, 2014c). 
According to the International Baby Food Action Network (IBFAN), such hybrid NGOs 
and business-interest NGOs (sometimes called “BINGOs”) are “driven by market profit-making 
logic” and “their primary interest clashes with that of  the WHO” (IBFAN, 2014, Notes for editors). 
It should be noted that, although IBFAN has been vocal elsewhere with its concerns about conflicts 
of interest, what the group has described here is not a conflict of interest (within the WHO), but 
conflicting interests (between the WHO and hybrid NGOs/BINGOs). While conflicting interests 
are also important for the WHO to consider, civil society statements of concern about them, like 
this one from IBFAN, may have contributed to existing conflations of these two concepts. 
With the adoption of  FENSA in May 2016, the criteria for being admitted Official Relations 
changed. The status can now be granted to NGOs, international business associations and 
philanthropic foundations.  
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The other key document that FENSA replaced was the “Guidelines on working with the 
private sector to achieve health outcomes” (EB107/20), which were presented to the Executive 
Board in January 2001 as a Report by the Secretariat (WHO, 2000a). Draft guidelines on interaction 
with commercial enterprises, defined as the for-profit part of  the private sector, had been written in 
mid-1999 and sent for comment to Member States and NGOs in Official Relations with the WHO, 
among others. Having also been tested in practice during 2000, the draft guidelines were revised in 
light of  feedback received (WHO, 2000a, para. 3). 
The Guidelines’ intended purpose was stated as “primarily to help the WHO staff  interact 
appropriately with commercial enterprises in order to achieve positive outcomes for health” (WHO, 
2000a, para. 1). In addition to for-profit businesses, “Some or all of  these guidelines can also apply 
to a variety of  other institutions, including State-run enterprises, associations representing 
commercial enterprises, foundations not at arm’s length from their sponsors, and other not-for-
profit organizations such as academic institutions” (WHO, 2000a, para. 3). The Guidelines note that 
the WHO not only serves its membership (which is Member States only), but also collaborates in 
various ways “with other public bodies, civil society and commercial enterprises” with the objective 
“to further the WHO’s mission and policies” (WHO, 2000a, para. 4).  
The Guidelines note:  
In developing relationships with commercial enterprises, the WHO’s reputation and values 
must be ensured. Scientific validity must not be compromised. Staff  should thus always 
consider whether a proposed relationship might involve a real or perceived conflict of  interest, 
either for the staff  member or for the work of  the Organization. The Staff  Rules and Staff  
Regulations (and the forthcoming ethical framework) should guide decisions on conflict of  
interest relating to the personal situation of  staff. The present guidelines contain provisions 
relating to conflict of  interest for the Organization. (WHO, 2000a)  
 
However, one provision of  the Guidelines tempers that statement by drawing attention to 
the impact the agency’s work might have on market demand or profitability of  specific goods and 
services. According to the Guidelines: “In establishing such relationships it should be borne in mind 
that the WHO’s activities affect the commercial sector in broader ways, through for example its 
public health guidance, its recommendations on regulatory standards, or other work that might 
influence product costs, market demand, or profitability of  specific goods and services” (WHO, 
2000a). This expression can be construed as indicating a potential conflict of  interest, in that the 
market demand and profitability of  specific goods and services – while no doubt an interest of  
certain Member States – is of  only secondary interest to the WHO and must not interfere with the 
pursuit of  its mandated mission. The WHO’s primary interest is to serve as “the directing and 
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coordinating authority on international health work” (WHO, 2006b Article 2(a)) towards fulfilling its 
objective of “the attainment by all peoples of the highest possible level of health” (WHO, 2006b 
Article 1).  
The Guidelines similarly conflated conflicts of  interest with conflicting interests. The conflation in 
the Guidelines of  these two separate (although related) concepts undermined their efficacy and 
shaped the conceptualization of  the term “conflicts of  interest” during the development of  
subsequent policies, such as FENSA. For example, in a provision about identifying potential areas 
of  conflict of  interest, the Guidelines stated that in assessing potential partnerships with commercial 
enterprises, “the public image, and financial stability and integrity of  the company” are to be taken 
into consideration and that “relationships should be avoided with commercial enterprises whose 
activities are incompatible with the WHO’s work, such as the tobacco or arms industries” (WHO, 
2000a). However, the nature of  the commercial enterprise does not inherently create a conflict of  
interest for the WHO but may present conflicting (or competing) interests that could contribute to a 
potential conflict of  interest. While the WHO has determined that the tobacco and arms industries have 
prohibitively conflicting interests, they do not because of  their nature inherently pose more of  a 
conflict of  interest (which would be within the WHO, not between the WHO and these industries) 
than, for example, a philanthropic organization whose approach and operations are contrary to the 
WHO’s Member State-led mandate and systems-approach.  
Donations are an important type of  collaboration where it is especially important to avoid 
conflicts of  interest. However, here again the Guidelines conflated conflicting interests (which relate to 
the nature of  the commercial enterprise making the donation) with conflicts of  interest (which relates to 
the WHO’s ability pursue its primary interest): “Funds may be accepted from commercial 
enterprises whose business is unrelated to that of  the WHO, provided they are not engaged in any 
activity that is incompatible with the WHO’s work” (WHO, 2000a, para. 14). Funds from a 
commercial enterprise (or other source) can raise the potential for conflict of  interest irrespective of  
whether or not its activities are incompatible with the WHO’s work. The determining factor is 
whether the secondary financial interest interferes with the WHO carrying out its mandate, 
regardless of  whether the source of  the donation is a commercial enterprise whose business is 
related or unrelated to that of  the WHO, whether its activities are compatible or incompatible with 
the WHO’s work, or whether it is from a philanthropic organization whose activities are compatible 
or incompatible with the WHO’s work.  
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Although providing an exception for clinical trials or product development, the Guidelines 
here correctly identified and prohibited conflicts of  interest: “Funds may not be sought or accepted 
from enterprises that have a direct commercial interest in the outcome of  the project toward which 
they would be contributing.” Furthermore, the guidelines said “caution should be exercised in 
accepting financing from commercial enterprises that have even an indirect interest in the outcome 
of  the project (i.e. the activity is related to the enterprise’s field of  interest, without there being a 
conflict as referred to above)” (WHO, 2000a, para. 16).  
That the efficacy of  the Guidelines had been compromised was indicated by the intervention 
by the International Federation of Pharmaceutical Manufacturers’ Associations (IFPMA) at the 107th 
Executive Board meeting in January 2001 where the draft Guidelines were considered. The IFPMA 
is a business association representing pharmaceutical manufacturers that has been granted Official 
Relations status. In its intervention, the IFPMA, highlighted various partnerships between the 
private sector and the WHO, adding that such partnerships “[play] an important role in the WHO 
achieving its aim of  improving health for all” (IFPMA, 2001). IFPMA said “guidelines concerning 
cooperation, such as those being discussed today, need to support and foster cooperation, not 
discourage it,” and “should enhance efforts towards our common goal of  improving health, while 
obviously avoiding conflicts of  interest that would compromise all parties’ objectives” (IFPMA, 
2001). Significantly, IFPMA said it had “no difficulties with the content of  the current draft 
guidelines” (IFPMA, 2001), indicating that the Guidelines would not interfere with the Association’s 
pursuit of  its interests on behalf  of  its corporate members. 
However, conflicts of  interest featured prominently in the intervention that civil society 
organizations Consumers International (CI), Health Action International (HAI) and IBFAN made at 
the same Executive Board meeting. They said in their intervention that transparency and 
accountability should be the “cardinal principle” of  the Guidelines, but that they fall short in several 
key areas. The Guidelines “fail to give a clear definition of  conflict of  interest” (Consumers 
International, 2001, p. 1). As a consequence, according to these three civil society organizations, 
“secondment of  staff  from the private sector [was] not perceived as a conflict of  interest” and “the 
risks related to involving the commercial sector in research” were not addressed (Consumers 
International, 2001, p. 2). These organizations said that the proposed in-house assessment and 
approval of  partnerships was “inherently flawed because of  potential conflicts of  interest” 
(Consumers International, 2001, p. 2).  
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In the statement CI, HAI and IBFAN requested the Executive Board ensure that the 
Guidelines include: “a clear definition of  conflict of  interest; complete transparency on contractual 
agreements with all commercial enterprises; assessment of  potential donor companies according to 
recognized the WHO and other international standards; regular monitoring and evaluation of  all 
private sector interactions by an external body including representatives of  governments and civil 
society; a ‘whistle-blowing’ mechanism so that people can report problems without damage to their 
professional position or reputation; annual reports to the Executive Board on contractual 
agreements made, their implementation and the public health outcomes” (Consumers International, 
2001). These concerns were borne of  their experiences with the activities of  health-impacting 
industries, including the pharmaceutical industry, the food and beverage industry and, in the case of  
IBFAN, the baby food industry analyzed in Chapter 5. As will be discussed below, Member States 
and civil society organizations continued to raise many of  these concerns, including with respect to a 
clear definition of  conflict of  interest and measures for dealing with them, throughout the 
development of  FENSA. 
In 2001, the same year that the Guidelines on working with the private sector were 
introduced, then Director-General Brundtland established the Civil Society Initiative (CSI) to 
“Establish a programme of evidence collection, consultation with a broad range of actors and 
analysis – within and outside the WHO – to identify and develop propositions for more effective 
and useful interfaces and relationships between civil society and the WHO” (Civil Society Initiative, 
2002, p. 2). The CSI conducted a review of the WHO’s current policy and practice regarding 
interactions with civil society and NGOs, including through consultations with the WHO 
headquarters, regional and some country offices, as well as other UN agencies and NGOs/civil 
society organizations (CSOs) (Civil Society Initiative, 2002).  
The CSI review reported “an overall consensus that the current Principles are inadequate and 
less relevant to the realities of the WHO and to the needs and aspirations of civil society” (WHO 
Civil Society Initiative, 2002, p. 18). The report said there was “a lack of distinction between … 
public interest NGOs and those linked with commercial interests”, “a lack of systematically 
accumulated knowledge about the sponsors and the interest groups behind individual NGOs” and 
“insufficient safeguards” against conflict of interest (WHO Civil Society Initiative, 2002, pp. 14, 16). 
It recommended that the Principles be replaced by a new, twofold policy addressing 
accreditation and collaboration. Accreditation would no longer be dependent, as the “Official 
Relations” system is, on the NGO’s working relationship with the WHO. The collaboration policy 
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would, among other things, provide clarity on differentiating between organizations. The review 
report said the new policy “would continue to use the term NGOs defined as non-state, not-for-
profit, voluntary organizations” but would “establish principles to distinguish between different 
kinds of NGOs and their related interests” (WHO Civil Society Initiative, 2002, p. 18). In other 
words, the review acknowledged that within this classification, there may be actors with different 
types of interests, but emphasized the not-for-profit nature of NGOs. 
The review report also noted the newly introduced Guidelines and cited their indication that 
they can apply not only to commercial enterprises but also to other entities, including “associations 
representing commercial enterprises, foundations and other not-for-profit organizations …” (WHO, 
2000a; WHO Civil Society Initiative, 2002). The report noted: “These guidelines, therefore, have a 
hitherto untapped potential in guiding the WHO interactions with NGOs linked to private (for-
profit) sector interests as well” (Civil Society Initiative, 2002, p. 9). In making this statement, the 
review report indicated that NGOs linked with private (for-profit) sector interests would fall within 
the scope of the Guidelines for engaging with the private sector rather than under the proposed 
twofold policy addressing accreditation of and collaboration with NGOs. It was not, however, 
within the purview of this 2001 CSI review of the WHO’s relations with NGOs to assess the 
adequacy of the Guidelines. 
A draft policy to replace the 1987 Principles was discussed at the 57th WHA in May 2004 
(WHO, 2004b). The draft resolution to which the proposed policy was annexed included a request 
for the Director-General to “institute [an external, independent review of] mechanisms to safeguard 
the WHO’s integrity and independence, including the WHO Guidelines for Interactions with 
Commercial Enterprises]” (sic).74 The draft policy addressed two elements of  the WHO relations 
with NGOs, as the 2002 CSI Review Report had recommended: accreditation and collaboration. 
Among the requirements for accreditation, the draft policy specifies that NGOs in collaboration 
with the WHO must “be non-profit in nature”, must have existed for three years before their 
application, and must be transparent about their operations, governance and financing. 
Collaboration, the policy says, must “not compromise the independence and objectivity of  the 
WHO” and be “designed to avoid any conflicts of  interests” (WHO, 2004b). However, the draft 
policy’s definition of  NGO included “not-for-profit organizations that represent or are closely 
	
74 The square brackets indicate points lacking consensus in the consultations held over three days in February 
2004. Note that an opening bracket is missing, making it unclear where the lack of  consensus begins, but 
logically it would go before “including”. 
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linked with commercial interests” (WHO, 2004b Annex, para 4). This definition would allow any of  
the business associations and front groups described in previous chapters to collaborate with the 
WHO on the same terms as public-interest NGOs and thus provide them influence over policy-
making.  
The 57th WHA (2004) did not adopt the draft resolution and the attached proposed policy 
but decided instead to postpone discussion of  the proposed policy “to a subsequent Health 
Assembly” to allow time for consultations and reaching a consensus (WHO, 2004d). Typically, when 
the WHA defers any matter, it is specified precisely when the matter will be taken up for further 
consideration and what steps are to be taken in the meantime. That the WHA did not specify a 
meeting for resuming discussion of  the proposed policy on the WHO relations with NGOs 
suggests the lack of  support among Member States for the proposed policy. 
As previously noted, there has been an increase in recent years in global health partnerships 
and other forms of  collaboration. Examples include legally incorporated entities external to the 
WHO, such as the Global Fund, GAVI, the Medicines for Malaria Venture, as well as 
unincorporated partnerships within the WHO with their own governance, such as Stop TB 
Partnership, Partnership for Maternal, Newborn and Child Health, Roll-Back Malaria Partnership, 
UNITAID, the Global Heath Workforce Alliance, and the Health Metrics Network. In light of  the 
growth in such partnerships, the 63rd WHA in May 2010 endorsed a “Policy on the WHO 
engagement with global health partnerships and hosting arrangements” (WHO, 2010c). The policy 
spelled out criteria for the WHO’s engagement in partnerships, as well as considerations with respect 
to hosting arrangements and other aspects of  partnerships. The WHA requested the Director-
General to create an operational framework for the WHO’s hosting of  formal partnerships (WHO, 
2010c). FENSA does not replace this policy, although it applies to both hosted and external 
partnerships and the implementation of  the partnerships and hosting arrangements policy is to be 
coordinated and aligned with FENSA (WHO, 2016f, 2018c).  
One proposal that came from outside the WHO for facilitating NSA participation in global 
governance was the creation of  a Committee C of  the WHA (Clift & Royal Institute of  
International Affairs, 2014; Kickbusch et al., 2010; Silberschmidt et al., 2008). Currently, Committee 
A deals with programme matters and Committee B with budget and managerial matters. The 
proposed Committee C would provide a forum for NSAs to debate major health initiatives and 
share their plans and achievements, and for coordination. A limited number of  actors would be 
included in the proposed committee, including “international agencies, philanthropic organizations, 
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multinational health initiatives, and representatives from major civil-society groups, particularly those 
who legitimately represent the most vulnerable populations”. It would not replace but complement 
existing mechanisms for NGO participation in Committees A and B, which should be applied to 
Committee C as well (Silberschmidt et al., 2008). However, this proposal did not move beyond 
consideration in academic circles. 
 
7.4 Widening the WHO engagement with NSAs 
After the draft policy to replace the 1987 Principles was abandoned in 2004, the WHO did not take 
up the matter of  improving its engagement with NSAs until it came up during the reform process 
launched under then Director-General Margaret Chan in May 2011 under a banner of  “the future of  
financing the WHO”75. Rather than re-visiting the failed 2004 draft policy, the Director-General’s 
report that called for reforms proposed the creation of  a multistakeholder forum for global health 
convened by the WHO to increase engagement and trust among the growing number of  actors in 
global health. The envisioned Forum would “help shape decisions and agendas”, but “not usurp the 
decision-making prerogative of  the WHO’s own governance, which [would] remain 
intergovernmental” (WHO, 2011a, para. 86). Specifically, the proposal envisioned a World Health 
Forum to be held in the fourth quarter of  2012 and subsequently every two years. Participants 
would include Member States, civil society, private sector, academia and other international 
organizations (WHO, 2011a, para. 87). In the resolution giving the mandate for reform, the WHA 
requested a concept paper about holding a World Health Forum in November 2012, including its 
objectives, participants, format and costs, to be presented at the 130th Executive Board in January 
2012 (WHO, 2011b).  
According to the concept paper circulated in June 2011, “As an informal, multi-stakeholder 
body the World Health Forum will make it possible to capture a wide range of views and 
perspectives on major current and future issues in global health” (WHO, 2011c, p. 1). It said the 
Forum, the first of which was to be held over three days in November 2012 in Geneva, “will not 
take decisions affecting individual organizations, nor will it change the decision-making prerogative 
of the WHO’s own governing bodies” (WHO, 2011c, p. 1). In other words, the Forum’s decisions 
may not have had any bearing whatsoever on either participating organizations or the WHO. 
	
75 In May 2011 the 64th WHA gave the mandate for reform of  the WHO as described in the Director-
General’s report entitled: “The future of  financing the WHO - World Health Organization: Reforms for a 
healthy future” (WHO, 2011a). 
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The purpose of  the Forum was “to explore, in an informal and multi-stakeholder setting, 
ways in which the major actors in global health can work more effectively together – globally and at 
country level – to increase effectiveness, coherence and accountability and to reduce fragmentation 
and duplication of effort.” Its specific objectives were to “(a) identify the major obstacles and 
constraints to more collaborative work across all the partners engaged in global health; (b) to define 
principles and approaches that will promote policy coherence and more effective working 
relationships at global and country level; and (c) to outline the steps needed to translate principles 
into practice” (WHO, 2011c, pp. 1–2). The list of participants was expanded from the list in the 
initial resolution to include Member States, representatives of major global health organizations and 
partnerships, as well as CSOs (NGOs), academic institutions/think-tanks, professional associations, 
foundations and the private sector (WHO, 2011c, p. 2). 
NGOs and Member States raised many questions about the proposal, especially about the 
inclusion of not only not-for-profit NGOs but also the private (commercial) sector without what 
they considered to be adequate policies and mechanisms for avoiding conflicts of interest and for 
protecting the sovereignty and decision-making prerogative of existing governance bodies (Clift & 
Royal Institute of International Affairs, 2014; DGH, n.d.; van de Pas & van Schaik, 2014). 
By the time the Executive Board Special Session (EBSS) on the WHO Reform took place in 
Geneva on November 1-3, 2011, the World Health Forum had been abandoned due to lack of  
Member State support (MMI & DGH, 2011; van de Pas & van Schaik, 2014; WHO, 2011d). 
However, the Director-General’s report to the Special Session proposed three formats for widening 
engagement with stakeholders. These included multistakeholder forums on key global health issues, 
separate consultations with different groups of  stakeholders, and face-to-face meeting or web-based 
forums (WHO, 2011d). Although the Director-General’s report makes frequent reference to 
partners and partnership, neither the report nor the Executive Board’s decisions make reference to 
the existing Policy on the WHO engagement with global health partnerships and hosting 
arrangements (WHO, 2011d). The partnerships and hosting policy, adopted by the WHA in May 
2010, spells out criteria for the WHO’s engagement in partnerships, as well as considerations with 
respect to hosting arrangements and other aspects of  partnerships (WHO, 2010c). 
The EBSS decisions outlined principles to guide engagement with other stakeholders: 
“(i) the intergovernmental nature of  the WHO’s decision-making remains paramount;(ii) the 
development of  norms, standards, policies and strategies, which lies at the heart of  the 
WHO’s work, must continue to be based on the systematic use of  evidence and protected 
from influence by any form of  vested interest; (iii) the need for due consultation with all 
relevant parties keeping in mind the principles and guidelines laid down for the WHO’s 
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interactions with Member States and other parties; (iv) any new initiative must have clear 
benefits and add value in terms of  enriching policy or increasing national capacity from a 
public health perspective; (v) building on existing mechanisms should take precedence over 
creating new forums, meetings or structures, with a clear analysis provided of  how any 
additional costs can lead to better outcomes.” (WHO, 2011e) 
 
The EBSS decisions stated that “dialogue and collaboration with other stakeholders should be 
strengthened as appropriate, while taking into account the importance of full engagement of 
Member States and of managing conflicts of interest.” As a longer-term approach, while expressing 
the WHO’s role as a directing and coordinating authority) would be explored, it was agreed that 
options for a framework to guide stakeholder interactions (WHO, 2011e). The Executive Board 
requested the Director-General to submit to its next meeting, in January 2012, “further analysis of  
proposals to promote engagement with other stakeholders” and “further analysis on modalities to 
improve Member State involvement with and oversight of  partnerships including the possible 
expansion of  the mandate of  the Standing Committee on NGOs in this regard” (WHO, 2011e). 
NGOs raised concerns about the rationale for the proposed reform and said it failed to 
address what were fundamentally financial issues. They also were concerned about conflicts of  
interest, which would continue throughout the development of  policies to regulate its engagement 
with NSAs, including NGOs, commercial enterprises, and philanthropic organizations. They noted 
that the WHO needed to establish clear definitions of  and policies on both institutional and 
individual conflicts of  interest and highlighted the importance of  protecting the WHO’s norm-
setting and public health role (Consumers International, 2011; DGH, 2011; HAI, 2011; MMI & 
DGH, 2011; PHM & DGH, 2011). 
At the Executive Board meeting in January 2012, the Secretariat made two proposals with 
respect to engagement with stakeholders (i.e. NSAs). The first was to review and update the 
Principles governing the WHO’s engagement with NGOs, including “widening and improving” 
modalities for NGO participation in governing body meetings; seeking their views in the 
development of  new health policies and strategies; updating practices and criteria for accreditation 
(including considering ways of  differentiating between the different types of  NGOs that interact 
with the WHO) (WHO, 2011f, para. 14(a)).  
The second proposal was to develop comprehensive policy frameworks to guide interaction 
with the private, for-profit sector as well as not-for profit philanthropic organizations, which were 
expected to address the issue of  institutional conflicts of  interest (WHO, 2011f, para. 14(b)). Some 
countries – notably the United States and Switzerland, both home to market leaders in the baby food 
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and soda industries– as well as the International Pharmaceutical Federation urged caution about 
distinguishing between different types of  stakeholders (WHO, 2012b). Switzerland’s delegate argued 
against differentiation, “given the specific characteristics, roles and interests of nongovernmental, 
private-sector and other organizations” (WHO, 2012b), although this is precisely why such 
differentiation is desirable and even necessary. Significantly, Switzerland was represented by Dr. 
Gaudenz Silberschmidt, Head of International Affairs in the Swiss Office of Public Health, who 
went on to be seconded to the WHO as Director for Partnerships and NSAs, providing another 
example of the “revolving door” between industries and the WHO. Although Silberschmidt did not 
move between the private and public sectors, Switzerland is home to baby food and soda market 
leaders and the country has taken positions aligned with corporate interests, as in this example. 
Meanwhile, other countries – notably India, Chile, and Iran – expressed concern that the risk 
of  conflicts of  interest needed to be adequately addressed. The Executive Board agreed that further 
discussion on this matter was necessary, which could take place at the WHA in response to a report 
to be prepared by the Director-General (WHO, 2012b). In May 2012, the 65th WHA requested the 
Director-General to present a draft policy on engagement with NGOs to the Executive Board at its 
meeting in January 2013 (Decision 65(9), and one on relationships with private commercial entities 
at the Executive Board meeting in May 2013. A report was also to be presented at the January 2013 
meeting about the WHO’s hosting of  health partnerships including proposals for their 
harmonization (WHO, 2012c). The Director-General was to be guided in development of  these 
documents by the principles outlined by the EBSS, described above (WHO, 2012c). 
 
7.5 Development of the Framework of engagement with non-State actors (FENSA) 
The Issues Paper prepared by the Secretariat for a consultation with NGOs in October 2012 in 
response to the WHA request for a draft policy paper on the WHO’s engagement with NGOs 
stated that the purpose of such a policy was to provide clear guidance to the WHO staff, its Member 
States and to CSOs76 on how to encourage and secure meaningful participation and collaboration of 
CSOs with the WHO (WHO, 2012f).  
FENSA had two objectives: to widen the WHO’s engagement with NSAs and attract new 
voluntary funding, and to protect the WHO’s mandate and strengthen safeguards against conflicts of 
interest. A group of CSOs at the WHA in 2016, however, maintained in a collective statement that 
	
76 The report refers to “civil society at large and nongovernmental organizations in particular” but appears 
also to use “NGOs” and “CSOs” interchangeably (WHO, 2012f, para. 5). 
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the Framework aimed, contradictorily and irreconcilably, both to widen the WHO’s engagement 
with NSAs and attract new voluntary funding and simultaneously to protect the WHO’s mandate. 
They felt that the Framework offered inadequate protection against conflicts of interest (CSOs at 
WHA 69, 2016).  
That financing was the purpose of FENSA was indicated in the Secretariat’s Report to the 
Executive Board in January 2014 on the November 2013 Financing Dialogue, which said the overall 
objective of the WHO’s engagement with NSAs was to work towards fulfilling the agency’s mandate 
“by making better use of [NSAs] resources (including knowledge, expertise, commodities, personnel and 
finances)” (emphasis added) (WHO, 2013j). It further stressed “the imperative need to conclude the 
framework for engaging with [NSAs], in order to facilitate expansion of the contributor base beyond Member 
States…, particularly in light of the growing demands for international health-related financing” 
(emphasis added) (WHO, 2013j). Nevertheless, Dr. Gaudenz Silberschmidt, the WHO Director for 
Partnerships and NSAs,77 maintained in 2016 that “funding [was] the least of reasons” for increasing 
the WHO’s engagement with private entities, but rather “it’s all about partnerships and how we can 
work together” (Vogel, 2016). 
To develop the requested policy papers, the WHO held a series of  consultations, both in 
person and web-based, with NGOs, private commercial entities, and Member States. From the 
outset, NSAs contributed to the consultations and made interventions at meetings of  the WHO 
governing bodies to critique and influence the proposed Framework. From the promising, if  
imperfect, background paper prepared for a consultation with NGOs in October 2012 (WHO, 
2012f) to the fundamentally flawed proposed Framework ultimately adopted in May 2016, 
subsequent drafts of  the new policy – and the WHO itself  – came under scrutiny for inadequately 
protecting the organization against conflicts of  interest and for allowing private sector influence 
over global health policy-making – in effect, letting the fox build the chicken coop (Gupta & 
Lhotska, 2015; Richter, 2014). Some of  the areas that NGOs were particularly critical of  in various 
drafts included the reluctance to distinguish between different types of  NSAs, and failure to 
distinguish between different types of  engagement for different types of  NSAs, and failure to clearly 
define and guard against conflicts of  interest.  
With respect to distinguishing between different types of  NSAs, the Director-General had 
been requested from the outset – in Decision WHA65(9) – to draft separate policies for the WHO’s 
	
77 Formerly Head of International Affairs in the Swiss Federal Office of Public Health. 
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engagement with NGOs and for its relationships with private commercial entities (WHO, 2012c). 
The issues paper developed by the WHO in October 2012 to inform a consultation with NGOs 
held the same month noted that to date, the WHO had “made no differentiation between the 
organizations and entities interacting with it and all organizations [were] considered to be NGOs” 
… “despite the key criterion for admission of  NGOs into Official Relations is that the NGO “shall 
be free from concerns which are primarily of  a commercial or profit-making nature” (WHO, 2012f). 
It also said it was “imperative to differentiate between NGOs with commercial interests/links and 
those without such interests and links, as market interests/links can conflict with health outcomes” 
(WHO, 2012f). As described in Chapters 5 and 6, as part of  their playbook some corporations have 
formed their own NGOs – BINGOs or “astroturf” NGOs78 – and associations to protect and 
advance their business interests on their behalf, often while ostensibly remaining at arm’s length 
from their profit-making entities. They also participate in PPPs and hybrid organizations that partner 
corporations with NGOs, coalitions and associations, as mentioned above, again at arm’s length 
from their business interests. 
The Executive Board in January 2013 called for further work on engagement with NGOs 
and requested the Director-General to submit to the Board’s next session in May 2013 “overarching 
principles for the WHO’s engagement with NSAs, defining separate operational procedures for both 
NGOs and private commercial entities., and to harmonize the development of the policies on 
engagement with NGOs and the WHO’s relations with private commercial entities” (WHO, 2013d). 
The Executive Board also requested the Director-General to conduct public web-based 
consultations on the draft principles and policies, and convene one consultation with Member States 
and NGOs and one with Member States and the private commercial sector (WHO, 2013d). 
However, by the time a web consultation was held in March 2013, the issues and questions 
provided by the Secretariat appeared to aggregate all actors that are not governments or 
intergovernmental organizations under the umbrella of  NSAs (WHO, 2013e). This aggregation not 
only makes no distinction of  the fundamental differences between public interest NGOs and profit-
oriented corporations and the many types of  organizations in between, but also muddied the 
discussion of  the issues involved and possible ways forward. Framing the consultation in this way 
undermined the development of  separate policies for engagement with NGOs and relationships 
	
78NGOs that look like they grassroots organizations but were created and driven by the private sector. 
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with private commercial entities, as had been requested by the WHA in Decision 65(9) (WHO, 
2012c). 
Industry association and BINGOs took the position that the same rules should apply equally 
to all actors with which the WHO engages, with no differentiation between those with “public” 
interests (e.g. NGOs) versus those with “for profit” interests. For example, its submission to the 
web-based consultation in March 2013, IFBA said it believed it would be a “fundamental error” if  
the WHO were to “create a ‘hierarchy’ of  non-State entities, each with special roles and differing 
‘access’ to the organization based on a pre-determined view of the ‘value’ of an organization in 
relation to achieving certain goals” (IFBA, 2013b). IFBA suggested getting rid of the Official 
Relations system established under the 1987 Principles, perceiving it as “creating a hierarchy due to 
its exclusion of  for-profit enterprises”. It maintained that the WHO should have flexibility in which 
actors it can engage with so as not to miss out on opportunities, and mentioned emergency 
situations and argued that a multistakeholder partnership approach was the only way to address 
complex health problems (IFBA, 2013b). In comments on the Secretariat’s report on FENSA 
published on January 8, 2014, IFBA similarly argued: “(a)ttempts to arbitrarily categorize or classify 
or create a ‘hierarchy’ of NSAs, each with special roles and differing access to the WHO based on a 
pre-determined view of the value of an organization with the goal of exclusion, will inevitably work 
to the detriment of the organization (...)” (IFBA, 2014a). These submissions demonstrate that IFBA 
feared being excluded outright, and also the creation of a “hierarchy” with different actors having 
different access and influence. However, “differentiation” amongst NSAs under the proposed policy 
does not mean “exclusion” or “hierarchy”, and neither could the system of categorization or 
classification being developed be characterized as “arbitrary”. 
In contrast to the private sector’s position, public-interest NGOs (PINGOs) argued: “While 
overarching principles should govern all interaction with external actors, separate policies are needed 
to ensure clarity and transparency regarding the fundamental difference between NGOs and private 
commercial entities, including their philanthropic foundations, business associations and front 
groups, some of  them being currently registered by the WHO as NGOs in Official Relations” 
(DGH, 2013b). 
A discussion paper prepared for an informal consultation with Member States and NSAs in 
October 2013 listed the types of  interactions in which the WHO already engages with various types 
of  NSAs. These included 1. Attendance at the WHO governing body sessions; 2. More meaningful 
participation in the governing body sessions; 3. Participation in consultations in preparation of 
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intergovernmental meetings;4. Financial contributions; 5. Human resources; 6. In-kind 
contributions; 7. Evidence generation, information gathering and research; 7. Advocacy and 
awareness raising; 8. Provision of technical advice to countries; and 9. Collaboration with NGOs in 
Official Relations (WHO, 2013i). In contrast, NGOs emphasized the importance of  distinguishing 
the types of  engagement based on the types of  actor. Only after recognizing the fundamental 
different natures of  NGOs and the for-profit and philanthropic sectors could “a meaningful matrix 
of interactions with each category of actors be developed,” they maintained (DGH, 2013b). “The 
way the WHO engages with each category of external actors should be rooted in the consideration 
of whether that actor has a primary interest in line with the organization’s public interest mandate. 
The result will be that the WHO will need to engage differently with different types of actors” 
(DGH, 2013b).  
In the report to the Executive Board in January 2014, the types of  engagement were 
narrowed to five: participation, resources, evidence, advocacy and technical cooperation (WHO, 
2014b). However, no connection was made in terms of which of these five types of engagement 
might be appropriate, under what circumstances and terms, for each of four categories of NSAs 
(NGOs, private commercial entities, philanthropic foundations and academic institutions) (WHO, 
2014b). This absence of connection between types of engagement and categories of NSAs 
effectually makes both distinctions hollow. This gap remained in the final FENSA document 
adopted in May 2016 (WHO, 2016f), preventing the WHO from engaging differently with different 
types of actors in line with the agency’s public interest mandate. 
Most criticism of  the draft Framework, and of  the WHO itself  in relation to the 
development process, was with respect to its inadequate protection against conflicts of  interest 
(Gupta & Lhotska, 2015; Lhotska & Gupta, 2016; Richter, 2014, 2014). Several Member States – 
mainly developing countries, including India, Pakistan, Brazil, Bolivia and the Union of  South 
American Nations (UNASUR) – expressed concerns about the lack of  a conceptualization and 
policy on conflict of  interest in various drafts of  the proposed FENSA and repeatedly rejected it 
when it was put before the WHA for adoption (Gupta & Lhotska, 2015). 
The WHO Secretariat raised its own concerns about FENSA on October 14, 2015, when it 
published a so-called “non-paper” titled “Implications of  Implementing [FENSA]” (WHO 
Secretariat, 2015). The non-paper was intended for consideration at the informal meeting of  
Member States on FENSA that was held October 19-23, 2015. It cautioned that implementation of  
FENSA would have “detrimental consequences on the work of  the WHO” (WHO Secretariat, 
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2015). It listed a number of  risks associated with implementing the proposed new policy, FENSA, 
such as significantly increasing the workload due to the thousands of  NSAs with which the WHO 
engages and the tens of  thousands of  engagements each year. It says additional financial and human 
resources would be required (WHO Secretariat, 2015).  
Public interest groups and networks responded to the non-paper with a letter of  concern to 
Director-General Chan. In the letter, these groups questioned the motives behind such a paper, 
which provides no constructive contribution to the new Member State-led process, in the midst of  
negotiations. The public interest groups questioned the basis on which the non-paper was prepared, 
as there was no evidence of  any such decision by the WHA as the non-paper claimed. The letter said 
its signatories were “very concerned that the non-paper could “undermine further strengthening of  
a FENSA and prevent it becoming a truly robust framework,” noting that “the paper lists potential 
‘unintended consequences’ often in an exaggerated manner, as assumptions, without providing any 
empirical evidence to back up these claims” (CSOs, personal communication, October 22, 2015).  
An Open-Ended Intergovernmental Meeting on the draft Framework met April 25-27, 2016 
to resolve differences over the draft Framework and prepare a consensus text and draft resolution to 
be presented at the WHA the following month. An Audit Report developed with the assistance of 
an External Auditor prior to the meeting proposed that FENSA be finalized as a consensus text for 
adoption by the WHA in May 2016 because “it had been through a long arduous corridor” (WHO, 
2016c).  
Critics from IBFAN found this argument unacceptable, considering that “the WHO’s 
integrity, independence, credibility and reputation [were] at stake,” and the Audit Report itself had 
observed that “there is no price for a strong and solid framework” (Lhotska & Gupta, 2016). They 
found the recommendation that FENSA be adopted surprising given that the Audit Report noted 
important methodological problems in the data collection, due to, among other [reasons], ‘lack of 
documentation records’” (Lhotska & Gupta, 2016). It also mentioned “a lack of clarity of (or 
inconsistencies between) many of the terms and provisions” of FENSA (Lhotska & Gupta, 2016). 
These critics maintained that the Audit Report failed to propose correcting “the inaccurate 
conceptualization of the FENSA conflicts of interest section”. They maintained that “the April 
FENSA negotiations did little to address this and other key concerns of public interest advocates”, 
adding that “if conflicts of interest [were] not properly identified, resolved and managed, they 
[could] undermine the work and reputation of an entire institution” (Lhotska & Gupta, 2016). They 
urged Member States to “resist the pressure to adopt an ill-conceived consensus document which 
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risks increasing channels of undue influence,” such as expanding the types of actors who are able to 
apply for Official Relations status with the WHO (Lhotska & Gupta, 2016). 
The Times of India in May 2015 reported a leaked email from IFBA Secretary General 
Rocco Renaldi around March 2015 that showed that the group had lobbied developed countries 
ahead of the intergovernmental meeting about the draft FENSA on March 30-April 1, 2015 
(Nagarajan, 2015; Renaldi, 2015; Vogel, 2016). The email indicated that there was “full alignment” 
among the Western European and Others Group (WEOG) countries (Western Europe, Australia, 
Canada, Israel, New Zealand and the US) on “a position that is essentially equivalent” to IFBA’s. 
Importantly, WEOG had agreed not to accept any document that excludes the food and beverage 
industry from the Framework. Among other “outreach” listed in the email, Brazil’s Minister of 
Health had been contacted “to highlight the incongruity of the Brazilian suggestion to exclude 
private sector organizations from Official Relations with the WHO” (Nagarajan, 2015; Renaldi, 
2015; Vogel, 2016).  
A confidential draft of  the text of  the proposed FENSA as it appeared on the screen at 5:00 
pm on the last day of  the meeting indicates that consensus was not reached on numerous 
paragraphs (WHO, 2016d).79 A meeting document outlining the agreed next steps indicates that 
Member States at WHA69 were to finalize paragraphs where there is not yet agreement, “including 
paragraph 14 of  private sector policy” (WHO OEIGM, 2016).80 
The 69th WHA adopted the Framework on May 28, 2016 (WHO, 2016f). The final policy 
consists of an overarching framework and four specific policies on engagement with NGOs, private 
sector entities, philanthropic foundations and academic institutions (WHO, 2016f). The overarching 
framework outlines the rationale, principles, benefits and risks of the WHO engagement with NSAs. 
It identifies five types of interaction in which the WHO engages with NSAs. The five categories of 
interaction are: participation in the WHO meetings (e.g. Executive Board and WHA meetings, 
consultations and hearings, resources (financial or in-kind contributions; however, secondment from 
private sector entities, which includes companies and their business associations, are expressly 
prohibited), evidence (sharing of up-to-date information and knowledge on technical issues), 
advocacy (and awareness-raising on health issues), and technical consultation (product development, 
	
79 Available here: http://media.ip-watch.org/weblog/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/FENSA-document-
progress-April-2016.pdf?ecfb22. 




capacity-building, operational collaboration in emergencies, contributing to the implementation of 
the WHO’s policies).  
As mentioned above, under the Principles governing relations between the WHO and 
NGOs, one of the criteria for being eligible for Official Relations status was that groups were to be 
“free of commercial interests” (WHO, 1987a). Under FENSA, which replaces the Principles, 
Official Relations status may be granted to NGOs, business associations, and philanthropic 
foundations that meet additional criteria (WHO, 2016f). As was the case under the Principles, NSAs 
with Official Relations status are able to attend the meetings of  the WHO governing bodies, that is, 
the Executive Board and the World Health Assembly. FENSA’s inclusion of business associations in 
the list of types of organizations eligible for Official Relations status represents the formalization 
and entrenchment of what had been transpiring in a grey area of interpretation of the Principles, as 
was discussed above, and legitimizes lobbying by business associations and philanthropic 
foundations with business ties at the WHO governing bodies. Critics from IBFAN maintained that 
granting Official Relations status to business associations and philanthropic foundations under 
FENSA would “legitimize once and for all [their] lobbying at the WHO governing bodies” and 
“normalize the inclusion of  business agendas into public health decision-making” (Lhotska & 
Gupta, 2016). As of  February 2019, there were 217 NSAs in Official Relations with the WHO 
(WHO, 2019f). 
FENSA lays out a number of  steps for “managing, including by, where appropriate, 
avoiding,” conflict of  interest and other potential risks of  engagement. These steps include due 
diligence, risk assessment, a publicly available register of NSAs, and an electronic tool for the 
management of individual conflicts of interest (WHO, 2016f). Importantly, FENSA deals only with 
institutional engagement with NSAs, and therefore only institutional conflicts of  interest, while 
individual conflicts of  interest are to be dealt with in accordance with Staff  Regulations and Staff  
Rules (WHO, 2016f, para. 21, f.n. 1 & 49(c)).81  
The faulty conceptualization of conflict of interest observed throughout the development of 
FENSA remains in the adopted policy, intermixing the notion of conflicting interests, with the result 
	
81 Individual conflicts of  interest are defined as “circumstances that create a risk that professional judgments 
or actions regarding a primary interest will be unduly influenced by a secondary interest” (Institute of 
Medicine (US) Committee on Conflict of Interest in Medical Research, Education, and Practice, 2009, p. 6). 
Institutional conflicts of  interest, on the other hand, “arise when an institution’s own financial interest or 
those of  its senior officials pose risks of  undue influence on decisions involving the institution’s primary 
interests” (Institute of Medicine (US) Committee on Conflict of Interest in Medical Research, Education, and 
Practice, 2009, p. 218). 
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that neither risk is appropriately addressed. FENSA’s conceptualization of conflict of interest rightly 
recognizes the risk of having the independence or objectivity of professional judgement or actions 
regarding the WHO’s primary interest unduly influenced, or perceived to be unduly influenced, by a 
secondary interest (WHO, 2016f). However, it gives an inaccurate indication of what constitutes a 
secondary interest – “a vested interest in the outcome of the WHO’s work in a given area” (WHO, 
2016f, para. 22) – that suggests the secondary interest is, or belongs to, an actor other than the 
WHO. This interpretation is confirmed several paragraphs later when an institutional conflict of 
interest is defined as: “a situation where the WHO’s primary interest as reflected in its Constitution 
may be unduly influenced by the conflicting interest of [an NSA] in a way that affects, or may reasonably 
be perceived to affect, the independence and objectivity of the WHO’s work” (emphasis added) 
(WHO, 2016f, para. 24). The Handbook for NSAs on engagement with the WHO (discussed below) 
similarly describes conflict of interest as “improper influence exercised by [an NSA] on the WHO’s 
work, especially in policy setting, norms and standards; and an engagement that would negatively 
affect the WHO’s integrity, independence, credibility and reputation, and public health mandate” 
(emphasis added) (WHO, 2018d).  
Instead, FENSA’s conceptualization of conflicts of interest would be correct if it specified 
that these occur when the WHO’s primary interest (the WHO’s work, and as has been argued in this 
dissertation and elsewhere,82 to this end, its independence, integrity, and credibility) may be unduly 
influenced, or perceived to be unduly influenced, by (one of) the WHO’s secondary interest(s) (such 
as securing financial resources).83 As has been repeated throughout this dissertation, a conflict of 
interest occurs within an actor, and conflicting interests occur between actors, and the confusion, 
conflation and intermixing of these two separate but related concepts has the result that neither risk 
is appropriately addressed. 
As argued above, in addition to conflict of interest, it is important for the WHO to consider 
conflicting (or, competing) interests. While the nature of  the commercial enterprise does not 
inherently create a conflict of  interest for the WHO, it may present conflicting (or competing) interests that 
could contribute to the harm caused by a conflict of  interest, as was discussed above in connection with 
the 2001 Guidelines on working with the private sector. FENSA rightly acknowledges: “For the 
	
82 Including in the Handbook for NSAs on engagement with the WHO (WHO, 2018d). 
83 Although other actors engaging with the WHO may also experience conflicts of interest – that is, 
secondary interests that unduly influence (or conflict with) those actors’ primary interests – it is the 
responsibility of those actors (not the WHO) to determine and prevent or manage those internal matters. 
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WHO, the potential risk of  institutional conflicts of  interest could be the highest in situations where 
the interest of  non-State actors, in particular economic, commercial or financial, are in conflict with 
the WHO’s public health policies, constitutional mandate and interests, in particular the 
Organization’s independence and impartiality in setting policies, norms and standards” (WHO, 
2016f, para. 26).  
However, having intermixed the notion of  conflicting interests within its definition of  
institutional conflicts of  interest, as mentioned above, FENSA gives the impression that conflicts of  
interest depend on the nature of  the NSA. This is reinforced by the paragraph that reads: “In actively 
managing institutional conflict of interest and the other risks of engagement …, the WHO aims to 
avoid allowing the conflicting interests of [an NSA] to exert, or be reasonably perceived to exert, 
undue influence over the Organization’s decision-making process or to prevail over its interests” 
(WHO, 2016f, para. 25).  
NSAs with interests that conflict with those of  the WHO – for example, the tobacco and 
arms industries – do not because of  their profit-oriented nature inherently pose more of  a conflict 
of  interest (which would be within the WHO, not between the WHO and those industries) than, for 
example, a philanthropic organization whose approach and operations are contrary to the WHO’s 
Member State-led mandate and systems-approach. Nevertheless, the WHO explicitly does not 
engage with the tobacco and arms industries, which is reiterated in the “Specific Provisions” section 
of FENSA. However, no other industries were added to the list of prohibited industries although 
their products do not align with the WHO’s mandate, such as fast food or alcohol. Instead, FENSA 
includes a paragraph on “Engagement where particular caution should be exercised”. It states:  
The WHO will exercise particular caution, especially while conducting due diligence, risk 
assessment and risk management, when engaging with private sector entities and other 
[NSAs] whose policies or activities are negatively affecting human health and are not in line 
with the WHO’s policies, norms and standards, in particular those related to [NCDs] and 
their determinants. (WHO, 2016f, para. 45) 
 
7.6 Developments since adoption of FENSA 
As stipulated in FENSA, the WHO developed a Handbook to guide NSAs in engaging with the 
agency in line with the Framework (WHO, 2018d) and a Guide for staff  on implementation of  the 
Framework (WHO, 2018c). The Handbook is intended to guide NSAs in “engaging in a systematic 
way” with the WHO “by walking them through” FENSA’s principles and processes to ensure 
smooth implementation of  the Framework. The Handbook is considered a living document to be 
updated based on the experience with FENSA’s implementation (WHO, 2018d). The Guide for 
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staff  is meant to help the WHO staff  at all three levels of  the organization understand and apply the 
FENSA’s provisions and offer guidance on how to encage with NSAs and the process to be 
followed (WHO, 2018c). 
Resolution WHA65.6, endorsing the 2012 Comprehensive implementation plan on maternal, 
infant and young child nutrition, which was described in Chapter 4, also requested the Director-
General to “develop risk assessment, disclosure and management tools to safeguard against possible 
conflicts of interest in policy development and implementation of nutrition programmes consistent 
with the WHO’s overall policy and practice” (WHO, 2012e). In 2014, decision WHA67(9) requested 
the Director-General to convene informal consultations to develop these assessment and 
management tools for conflicts of interest in nutrition for consideration by the Assembly in 2016 
(WHO, 2014f).  
A technical consultation was held in Geneva on October 8 and 9, 2015, bringing together 
experts from various fields and diverse stakeholders, as well as Member States as observers. 
According to the WHO’s report of the meeting, some of these experts emphasized the need to 
explain clearly the difference between “conflicts of interest” and “conflicting” or “diverging” 
interests or fiduciary duties (which occur between actors) (WHO, 2015c). Following the technical 
consultation, the Secretariat prepared a draft approach taking into consideration the WHO’s overall 
policies and practices, including FENSA, which was adopted in May 2016. 
It bears noting that it was WHA67 in May 2012 that requested both these tools to safeguard 
against possible conflicts of interest in a specific context (national nutrition programs) and a set of 
policies to improve the WHO engagement with NSAs, a broad subject wherein the prevention of 
conflicts of interest is fundamental. Yet, technical consultation of experts on conflicts of interest was 
never conducted in connection with the development of FENSA, despite having been suggested by 
several NGOs and networks (DGH, 2013a; WHO, 2014a, 2015a). However, a technical consultation 
on conflicts of interest in nutrition programs was held in October 2015, months before FENSA – 
by then plagued by four years of criticism about its conceptualization of conflicts of interest – was 
adopted in May 2016, and could have been used to develop an approach on preventing and 
managing them across all of the WHO’s activities and at all levels of activity, and to correct the 
Framework and inform its further development. Instead, the Framework that was adopted is based 
on a faulty conceptualization which has become the reference point for future policies, such as the 
approach on preventing and managing conflicts of interest in national nutrition programs. 
A draft approach to preventing and managing conflicts of interest in nutrition programs was 
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made available for public consultation from September 11-29, 2017. Several submissions by civil 
society groups and technical experts who had participated in the October 2015 consultation noted 
that the draft, particularly its conceptualization of conflict of interest, did not reflect the guidance 
that had been provided by the experts at the technical consultation held in this connection in 
October 2015 (GIFA, 2017; IBFAN, 2017; Richter, 2017). Civil society groups such as IBFAN and 
the Geneva Infant Feeding Alliance were concerned that the approach was designed to align with 
FENSA and had adopted the Framework’s same faulty conceptualization (GIFA, 2017; IBFAN, 
2017). Marc A. Rodwin,84 one of the expert participants in the technical consultation, noted that 
instead of “definitions of conflicts of interests that follow the traditional way the term is used” in 
law, government regulations and public policy and by the Organisation for Economic Cooperation 
and Development, the World Bank and most corporations, the proposed approach uses “variations 
of more popular definitions used in medical journals recently” (Rodwin, 2017, p. 1). The use of such 
variations “causes conceptual confusion and muddies the water,” he wrote, and “it would be better 
to employ the more traditional definition to remain faithful to the concept” (Rodwin, 2017, p. 1). He 
takes issue with the suggestion that nations should just conduct a cost-benefit analysis of proposed 
partnerships and that conflicts of interest are one part of that analysis. “Conflicts of interest is a 
distinct concept,” he asserts, “and [this approach] confuses matters” (Rodwin, 2017, pp. 1–2). 
Another expert from the technical consultation, Jonathan H. Marks,85 emphasized that “the 
guidance [in the draft approach was] significantly more permissive than the approach [he] proposes” 
(Marks, 2017, p. 1). In his work on “the ethical hazards that arise when public health agencies enter 
into close relations with the private sector actors,” he argues for “a presumption against close 
relations with such actors” and contends that “arm’s length relations should be the default” (Marks, 
2017, p. 1). “Where a proposed relationship would undermine the integrity of a public health 
agency,” he wrote, “the agency should be advised not to enter into that relationship at all” (Marks, 
2017, p. 1). He opposed folding integrity into a cost-benefit analysis, as the proposed approach 
suggests, and said public health agencies should be “advised to develop strategies to counter industry 
influence—strategies that include but are not limited to conflicts of interest policies” (Marks, 2017, 
p. 1).  
	
84 Professor of Law, Suffolk University Law School, Boston, MA and Senior Research Fellow, IMéRA 
Institute for Advanced Study, University of Aix-Marseille, Marseille, France (2017-18). 
85 Director of Bioethics Program at Penn State University, USA. 
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Judith Richter,86 who also participated in the technical consultation, noted the struggle 
during the development of FENSA to have its problematic conflict of interest definitions and 
conceptualization debated and corrected. She expressed her disappointment that the consultant 
hired to develop the background paper for the discussion had been asked to align the approach with 
FENSA and to supplement it were necessary with definitions from the Scaling-Up Nutrition (SUN) 
movement. She noted that the Draft Approach disregards the input by the experts at the technical 
consultation. She concluded that the advice and tools building on the draft approach’s 
conceptualization of conflicts of interest “will lead to undermining rather than supporting national 
efforts” in this respect (Richter, 2017).  
Despite these concerns, the Director-General brought the proposed Approach on 
preventing and managing conflicts of interest in nutrition programing at country level to the notice 
of the Executive Board and the Assembly in January and May 2018, respectively, noting that “the 
Secretariat [would] pilot the approach at country level in the six the WHO regions to test its 
applicability and practical value” (WHO, 2017c, 2018i).  
Early indications after FENSA’s adoption suggested that its purported objective of 
safeguarding against conflicts of interest had been sidelined in favour of fundraising objectives. For 
example, and perhaps most notably, when the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, a top financial 
contributor to the WHO, was admitted in January 2017 into Official Relations status with the 
organization, there was no disclosure of its ties to the profit-making sector. The BMGF receives its 
revenue from the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation Trust endowment, which is heavily invested in 
many of the food and beverage companies and stores that contribute to, or profit from the 
treatment of, NCDs. For example, the Trust has invested directly in a Coca-Cola regional company 
(Americas south of the US) ($466 million), Walmart ($837 million), Walgreen-Boots Alliance ($280 
million), and indirectly in Coca-Cola and Kraft Heinz Inc (40 CSOs, 2017).  
This situation creates a conflict of interest for the WHO, in that its secondary interest of 
securing its large financial contributions from BMGF may interfere in its ability to fulfil its primary 
interest – its mandate of protecting and promoting public health with respect to nutrition and NCDs 
– due to the fact that BMGF benefits from the sale of products that are subject to the WHO 
standards and advice to governments and whose interests conflict with those of the WHO by 
contributing to poor nutrition and communicable diseases have conflicting interests. 
	
86 Independent Researcher. 
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FENSA was to be fully operational within two years of adoption and its implementation and 
impact on the WHO’s work were to be evaluated by 2019. The results of the evaluation and any 
proposals for revision are to be submitted to the Executive Board meeting in January 2020 (Seitz, 
2016). However, several significant concerns about the operationalization and implementation have 
already been raised. The first is that the department in charge of implementing FENSA is Health 
and Multilateral Partnerships, known prior to the March 2019 restructuring as Partnerships and 
Non-State Actors. Some observers had expected that responsibility for FENSA implementation 
would be shifted to either the Office of the Legal Counsel or Office of Compliance, Risk 
Management and Ethics as part of the restructuring process. 
The department is responsible for both implementing FENSA and promoting and entering 
into partnerships with NSAs. These two functions create potential risk of conflict of interest for the 
department. India raised this matter at the Executive Board meeting in January 2018, and argued that 
implementation of FENSA should be the responsibility of the Office of the Legal Counsel, not the 
department also in charge of resource mobilization (WHO, 2018a). The Geneva Global Health Hub 
(G2H2), a civil society platform, in November 2017 raised the same concern and added: 
Independent of the skills and integrity of this official, the institutional arrangement of combining 
responsibilities for both tasks in one person risks compromising the WHO’s stand on FENSA. The 
responsibility of FENSA implementation should be rather moved to the Office of Legal Counsel” 
(G2H2, 2017). 
G2H2 also highlighted the fact that “although the term conflict of interest is mentioned 
multiple times in FENSA … there is still no consistent conflict of interest policy in the WHO 
regulating institutional conflicts of interest” (G2H2, 2017). Instead of first developing and finalizing 
a conflict of interest policy and having it form the cornerstone of the WHO’s policy on engagement 
with NSAs and other policies, subsequent policies are now being aligned with FENSA’s faulty 
conceptualization of the term. 
Another concern has been that implementation of FENSA has been slow. For example, 
FENSA requires determination of whether an NSA is subject to the influence of private sector 
entities to the extent that it needs to be considered itself a private sector entity. This is essential for 
determining the nature of the WHO’s engagement with the NSA, whether it is eligible for Official 
Relations status, and in finalizing a collaborative work plan. As of April 2019, no such determination 





Against the backdrop of a global shift toward multistakeholder approaches across the UN system 
and by the World Health Organization (WHO) in particular, this chapter has analyzed the 
WHO’s policies regarding its engagement with non-State actors (NSAs), and specifically the for-
profit sector. The progression of policies and proposals, culminating in the agency’s adoption of 
FENSA, suggests that the WHO has struggled with finding appropriate ways of engaging with 
NSAs, including NGOs and profit-oriented entities, in ways that advance its interests – both 
programmatic and financial – without compromising its independence, integrity, credibility and 
reputation in pursuit of  its constitutional mandate as “the directing and coordinating authority on 
international health work” (WHO, 2006b Article 2(a)), including through conflicts of interest.  
The chapter analyzed the development and adoption of FENSA and its implications for the 
WHO in terms of its integrity and independence and for global health governance and its 
legitimization of actors with for-profit interests in capacities that influence global health standards, 
norm-setting and policy-making. Without adequate safeguards, the private sector’s influence on 
governance and policy-making can result in conflicts of interest as well as policy outcomes and 
practices that prioritize profits over public interest and health ideals. However, throughout FENSA’s 
development, there was a lack of  conceptual clarity about what constitutes conflicts of  interest 
within an actor, as opposed to conflicting interests between actors, and these two separate but related 
concepts were repeatedly conflated. 
The question of conflicts of interest remained a contentious point throughout the development 
process and was one of the reasons the FENSA was not adopted earlier. Although the Framework 
was expected by many to be adopted, weaknesses and flaws intact, at the WHA in both 2014 and 
2015, several Member States expressed enough concern, especially about the lack of clarity on 
conflicts of interest, as discussed above, that the draft was sent for further consultation and revision. 
That concerns about conflicts of  interest and corporate influence could still not be resolved in the 
final version of  FENSA after many consultations and drafts shows how much is at stake for the 
corporate sector and their allies and how much influence they possess. To this extent, the WHO’s 
difficulty in developing and having FENSA adopted are emblematic of  the very institutional 
conflicts of  interest against which the WHO must guard itself  if  it is to engage with these actors in 
ways that do not undermine its core values and mandate. That the Framework could not be pushed 
through to adoption until 2016 despite this influence reveals that corporations and their powerful 
home and ally countries – such as Switzerland and the WEOG group (Western Europe, Australia, 
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Canada, Israel, New Zealand and the US) singled out in this chapter – do not possess all the power. 
Member States that shared NGO concerns about conflicts of  interest (and conflicting interests), as 
mentioned above, had sufficient power to keep the Framework under revision, for better or worse 
(Gupta & Lhotska, 2015) until its adoption in May 2016.  
As evidenced by the analysis in this dissertation, it is necessary that global health actors 
mandated to protect and promote health in the public interest, such as the WHO, exercise caution 
when engaging with the private sector in any capacity, but especially as part of multistakeholder 
initiatives and PPPs. This caution is especially necessary at a time when many global health actors, 
including the WHO, governments and NGOs, increasingly look to collaborate with the private 
sector as part of the global trend toward multistakeholder approaches and PPPs in order to bridge 
resource gaps. Although FENSA is ostensibly intended to safeguard against potential conflicts of 
interest, faulty conceptualization of this term has resulted in a policy that can lead the agency to 
greater openness to influence from profit-based actors, not less. Furthermore, in FENSA, the WHO 
is potentially setting itself up for greater dependence on for-profit entities, which can lead to further 
conflicts of interest and undermine the agency’s role as lead global health body. Its (secondary) 
interest of  bridging budgetary gaps must not be allowed to jeopardize its Constitutional mandate as 




Chapter 8 – Conclusion 
8.0  Introduction 
As in other areas of global governance, global health governance has experienced a shift away from 
state-centered governance and institutions. This has opened spaces for non-state actors (NSAs) such 
as transnational corporations and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to influence health 
policy and policy-making at both global and national levels, resulting in the growing involvement of 
NSAs in global health governance, including as part of a global shift toward multistakeholder 
approaches and public-private partnerships (PPPs).  
At the same time, as described in Chapter 3, in the decades since the WHO was established 
in 1948, it has become increasingly resource-constrained as some Member States have refused to 
increase assessed contributions to regular budget funds that could provide a stable source of 
financing for the WHO’s core functions. In order to bridge its budgetary gap, the WHO relies more 
and more on Member States and private donors providing voluntary contributions and has adopted 
a multistakeholder approach, turning to the private sector and philanthropies for support. Such 
voluntary funding is typically earmarked for specific, vertical programs that are not under the 
WHO’s direct control. This development further compromises the WHO’s ability to fulfil its 
mandated role as lead coordinating agency for health as new private and hybrid public-private actors 
are created. 
Faced with this financial reality and responding to the changing global health architecture, 
several Directors-General of the WHO have undertaken reform processes. Reform initiatives have 
included the introduction of new policies intended to facilitate engagement with NSAs, such as the 
Framework of engagement with non-State actors (FENSA), which was discussed in Chapter 7. As 
this dissertation has argued, increased engagement by the WHO with the private sector is not 
without risks.  
This chapter proceeds as follows: it begins by summarizing the findings of this dissertation 
in response to the following questions: 1) In what ways have profit-oriented NSAs engaged with the 
WHO as a site of global health governance on substantive policies and paradigms that shape policy-
making? 2) What are the implications for the WHO and for global health governance of the agency’s 
enhanced engagement with the private sector? The chapter outlines the dissertation’s two empirical 
contributions and its theoretical contributions. The chapter then identifies three possible directions 
for future research: drawing on new sources of food industry documents to shed additional light on 
that industry’s tactics, further analysis of FENSA itself such as the WHO’s engagement with the 
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three other types of NSAs addressed by the policy, and finally FENSA’s operationalization since 
adoption and its effectiveness with respect to conflicts of interest and undue influence by corporate 
actors. 
 
8.1 Summary of findings and contributions 
In order to answer in what ways profit-oriented NSAs have engaged with the WHO as a site of 
global health governance, Chapters 5 and 6 analyzed how the baby food and soda industries have 
worked to influence the WHO initiatives related to the sale and consumption of their products. 
Chapter 5 analyzed the baby food industry’s activities in connection with five key substantive 
policies and policy areas: 1) the International Code of Marketing of Breast-Milk Substitutes, 2) 
product differentiation and reformulation, 3) the optimal duration of exclusive breastfeeding 4) 
Guidance on ending inappropriate promotions of foods for infants and young children, and 5) the 
2018 World Health Assembly (WHA) Resolution on Infant and Young Child Nutrition. In order to 
influence these policies and policy areas, baby food companies and their business associations 
lobbied the WHO and Member States, finding allies in milk-exporting countries such as the US, 
which rejected early drafts of the Code and lobbied on the industry’s behalf. To circumvent the 
Code and national legislation and to extend their product line, baby food companies invented 
differentiated products – so-called “follow-up (or follow-on) milk” for older infants and later 
“growing-up (or toddler) milks” for one-, two-, or three-year-old children. They shaped perceptions 
of such products, thereby manufacturing demand for them and arguing that they were not included 
within the scope of the Code. The baby food industry has also created doubt about the scope of the 
Code by using its discursive power to manufacture doubt about the optimal duration of exclusive 
breastfeeding, which it has lobbied to keep as low as possible. 
The baby food industry lobbied intensely in connection with a substantive policy that brings 
together marketing, product differentiation and the optimal duration of breastfeeding: the 2016 
Guidance on ending inappropriate promotion of baby foods. Business associations representing the 
baby food industry intervened to shape the parameters of the debate during the development of the 
Guidance.  
Chapter 6 analyzed the soda industry’s activities in connection with the WHO’s guidelines 
on sugar intake levels, because sugar is a constituent ingredient in many soda products, and the 
taxation of soda products as a part of efforts to prevent and control NCDs. In these instances, the 
soda industry, supported by the sugar industry trade associations that include soda companies as 
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their members, used its discursive power to manufacture doubt about soda’s contribution to the 
obesity epidemic and opposed “restrictive” recommendations by relying on the paradigms of 
individual responsibility and energy balance. It also drew on the instrumental and structural power of 
allies in the US government, as well as other sugar dependent countries. Similarly, when the WHO 
Independent High-level Commission on Noncommunicable Diseases recommended taxation as an 
appropriate fiscal policy for addressing NCDs, soda was not mentioned alongside tobacco and 
alcohol as a product recommended for taxation. Soda’s inclusion as a suitable product for taxation 
was successfully blocked by the Commissioner from the US, home to Coca-Cola and PepsiCo. 
Chapters 5 and 6 also analyzed the ways in which private sector actors have also engaged in a 
long-game to shape the paradigms that determine which policies are pursued and what role private 
actors are able to play in developing them. Both the baby food and soda industries promote 
paradigms emphasizing individual choice and responsibility. They also emphasize corporate 
responsibility, trustworthiness and the private sector as a partner in developing health-related policy, 
aiming to gain legitimacy as governance actors and a more direct influence on substantive policies 
that affect their profitability.  
This dissertation has shown that the baby food and soda industries, like other industries, 
have pursued their substantive and long-term interests, by drawing on a “playbook” of strategies to 
access and impact upon global health policy-making at the WHO. In deploying these strategies and 
tactics, companies in these industries, their associations and front groups draw on different types of 
power, including instrumental, structural and discursive power. The strategies and the power they 
rely on are iterative and reinforce one another. The baby food and soda industries’ well-documented 
track-records of using the playbook strategies, and the corporate power that underpins them, to 
influence substantive policy, as analyzed in Chapters 5 and 6, expose the WHO to influence. Such 
corporate influence raises questions as the WHO seeks to increase its engagement with such actors, 
especially for-profit entities, as was analyzed in Chapter 7. 
Beyond substantive policy and the paradigms that shape it, there are other implications for 
the WHO and for global health governance of the agency’s enhanced engagement with the private 
sector. As mentioned above, to supplement lagging core funding, the WHO increasingly relies on 
voluntary contributions, including from the private sector and philanthropic organizations. 
However, by opening its doors to fuller engagement through multistakeholder arrangements and 
PPPs, the WHO has potentially set itself up for even more in-depth corporate influence and deeper 
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reliance on private funding, in ways that undermine its core mandate and erode its role as lead global 
health body.  
As a site for understanding the implications for the WHO and for global health governance 
of the agency’s enhanced engagement with the private sector, Chapter 7 examined the adoption of 
FENSA, which formalized this fuller engagement, and assessed its implications for the WHO’s 
independence, integrity and credibility. That FENSA was adopted in May 2016 after four 
contentious years of development, suggests just how much was at stake in the new policy. The 
debates are indicative of the types of issues against which the WHO must guard itself  if  it is to 
engage with these actors in ways that do not undermine the agency’s core values and mandate.  
The WHO presented the Framework as necessary to facilitate engagements with NSAs. 
Some observers interpreted this as referring primarily to the private sector and philanthropies as the 
agency looked to multistakeholder partnerships to supplement its lagging core funding. While 
FENSA has been termed “a necessary but insufficient response to the part the private sector plays in 
determining population level health outcomes” (Buse & Hawkes, 2016), its adoption further 
institutionalizes the influence of private authority, especially profit-motivated entities, by, for 
example, making business associations eligible for Official Relations status and the privileges and 
increased access that this confers.  
Although FENSA is ostensibly intended to safeguard the WHO against potential conflicts of 
interest, confusion over the conceptualization of this term has resulted in a policy that can lead the 
agency to greater openness to influence from profit-based actors, not less. The development process 
revealed that the WHO, as well as many Member States and NSAs participating in various 
consultations, did not understand what is meant by a “conflict of interest”, how it is different from 
“conflicting interests” (perhaps better referred to as “competing” or “diverging interests”), and each 
one’s potential for harm. Unfortunately, the conflation of these two different but related concepts 
plagued the development of FENSA and remains in the final policy as adopted by the WHA in May 
2016. FENSA entrenches a faulty conceptualization of conflicts of interest into the WHO’s 
operations and future discussions and policies and has since been taken as the basis on which to 
frame subsequent policies.  
Additionally, FENSA further institutionalizes of the WHO’s multistakeholder approach and 
entrenches its reliance on voluntary contributions, described in Chapter 3, whereby programs are 
increasingly donor-driven instead of Member State-driven. It facilitates Member States and private 
organizations opting for vertical programs or PPPs instead of increasing assessed contributions 
	 161	
	
toward the WHO’s core budget. As a result, the WHO’s capacity to perform its core functions is 
gutted, and its role as a global health leader further compromised. The WHO is being decentered or 
bypassed altogether with the creation of new institutions and partnerships within the changing 
global health architecture. Lost in this process is the WHO’s social view of health and its affirmation 
of health as a human right. The WHO can only recover its independence and effectiveness if 
Member States enhance their political and financial support of the WHO and increase their assessed 
contributions substantially (Seitz, 2016).  
These findings contribute to the literature in several ways. Empirically, they provide in-depth 
case studies of the baby food and soda industries that contribute to understandings of how private 
actors engage with the WHO deploying strategies and tactics from the corporate playbook and 
drawing on the different types of power that underpin them. For example, despite framing 
themselves as trustworthy partners in addressing health issues – “part of the solution” (Nixon et al., 
2015) – corporate actors seek to influence substantive policy that can have negative impacts on 
health outcomes and global health governance and policy-making more broadly as they shape 
paradigms that that determine which policies are pursued and the role private actors play in 
developing them. Although the dissertation focused on the global health sector, the findings 
contribute to the understanding of similar developments in other fields where the corporate 
playbook is used to influence policy and promote the legitimacy of corporate actors as governance 
actors. 
The dissertation’s second empirical contribution is an analysis of the development and 
adoption of FENSA and its implications for the WHO in terms of its integrity and independence, 
given the private sector’s well-documented efforts to influence policy at the WHO, as described in 
Chapters 5 and 6 in relation to policies and paradigms regarding the baby food and soda industries. 
FENSA represents a shift toward private authority, giving transnational corporations and some civil 
society actors a greater voice in determining global health policy. As a result, substantive policy may 
be weaker than had the public interest been the primary consideration. The dissertation analyzes the 
implications for global health governance of legitimizing and institutionalizing actors with for-profit 
interests, such as baby food and soda companies and their business associations and front groups, in 
capacities that influence global health standards, norm-setting and policy-making. It also contributes 
an analysis of the extent to which the WHO is potentially setting itself up for greater dependence on 
for-profit entities, which can lead to further conflicts of interest and undermine the WHO’s role as 
lead global health body. 
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As a theoretical contribution, this dissertation builds on the public and global health 
literature’s notion of corporate (or commercial) determinants of health and classification of the 
corporate sector’s political activities into a playbook of strategies that is common across industries. 
It has drawn on the international political economy literature to contribute an analysis of the types 
of power that underpin the strategies in the playbook, and to analyze the ways in which these 
strategies and different types of power are iterative and mutually reinforcing. In doing so, my 
analysis brings to the existing literature: 
a) An understanding of how corporations increase their legitimacy and influence as governance 
actors by participating in multistakeholder initiatives, public private partnerships, and self-
regulatory platforms. This analysis shows the multistakeholder approach and self-regulation 
to be an extension of corporate actors’ efforts to influence policy and shape paradigms to 
enhance their legitimacy as partners in global health policy-making and governance 
b) An application of the concept of the corporate playbook to the strategies and tactics 
undertaken by corporations and their associations to influence the WHO as the global lead 
body on health. This focus is especially interesting because although the WHO lacks 
enforcement mechanisms, it remains a significant site for political activity by corporations to 
influence both policy recommendations and paradigms relating to health, industry products, 
and corporations and their associations as governance actors.  
A more nuanced understanding the strategies in the corporate playbook as they are deployed 
to influence global health policy-making and governance at the WHO and how the strategies are 
accessible to the corporate sector. The analysis demonstrates how, in pursuing these strategies and 
tactics, the corporate sector is able to draw upon different types of power – notably instrumental, 
structural and discursive power. Moreover, the exercise of one type of power often increases or 
reinforces access to another type of power. In this way, the analysis shows that the strategies and 
tactics and the different dimensions of power underpinning them are iterative and mutually 
reinforcing. For example, by using discursive power to represent itself  as a “partner” and legitimate 
governance actor, the private sector increases its instrumental and structural power by shaping 
paradigms that determine which policies are pursued and what role private actors are able to play in 
developing them. 
Together, these empirical and theoretical contributions inform the development of policy-
making processes and mechanisms that safeguard the public interest. My analysis presents a critical 
evaluation of private sector influence on global health policy and governance, demonstrating that 
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corporate activities and influences have both governance and public health implications. Such a 
critical analysis is particularly necessary at a time when the agency is increasingly seeking partnerships 
with the private sector and philanthropies to bridge its budgetary shortfalls an evolving global health 
architecture. This shift is taking place against a backdrop of a similar trend toward multistakeholder 
initiatives and public private partnership and an emphasis and entrenchment of the role of private 
sector in efforts across the UN system and the development sector more broadly (see, for example 
the Sustainable Development Goals (UNGA, 2015)). 
 
8.2 Direction for future research 
As discussed in Chapter 1, it can be difficult to access firsthand information about companies and 
industries associations. However, after the research for this dissertation was completed a new 
resource has become available for exploring food and beverage industry activities to influence global 
health governance. The Food Industry Documents Archive was launched by the University of 
California, San Francisco Industry Documents Library on November 15, 2018 (UCSF, 2018). The 
Industry Documents Library is already home to archives about the tobacco, drug, and chemical 
industries that have made it possible to investigate corporate tactics for influencing public health 
policy. Future research delving into this new industry documents archive can shed additional light on 
the tactics that the food industry uses. 
FENSA itself also warrants further research. While this dissertation has focused on the 
Framework in relation to the growing political influence of corporate actors, FENSA addresses the 
WHO’s engagement with NGOs, philanthropic foundations, and academic institutions. Each of 
these types of actors warrants detailed consideration of its political influence on the WHO and 
global health governance more generally. Research into the WHO’s engagement with NGOs is of 
particular interest. NGOs often draw their political legitimacy – and distinction from the corporate 
sector – from their claim that they represent the public interest. However, NGOs lack accountability 
to the public, and there is also growing corporate involvement in the civil society sector. These two 
factors may muddy the water for the WHO’s engagement with this type of NSA.  
Further examination is also necessary of the unfolding operationalization of FENSA, 
analysing its effectiveness with respect to conflicts of interest and undue influence by corporate 
actors and the implications of its institutionalization of the WHO’s multistakeholder activities. Of 
particular interest is the initial evaluation conducted in December 2019 for presentation at the 
Executive Board meeting in February 2020 (WHO, 2019h). Chapter 7 raised several significant 
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concerns about the operationalization and implementation of FENSA. For example, the department 
responsible for implementing FENSA is also tasked with entering into partnerships with NSAs. 
These two functions create potential risk of conflict of interest for the department. The 
effectiveness of FENSA’s ability to safeguard against conflicts of interest should also be assessed. 
The January 2017 admission of the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, a top financial contributor 
to the WHO, into Official Relations status with the WHO with no disclosure of its ties to the profit-
making sector suggests that safeguarding against conflicts of interest have been sidelined in favour 
of fundraising objectives.  
 
8.3 Conclusion 
Taking the baby food and soda industries as examples, this dissertation outlined why it is important 
for the WHO to take seriously the need for caution when engaging with the private sector in light of 
the track-record of these industries. This caution is especially important given the WHO’s embrace 
of a multistakeholder approach as it tries to address its financial challenges.  
In evaluating potential engagement with NSAs, besides the risk of potential conflicts of 
interest (which, again, would exist within the institution), the analysis in the dissertation why WHO 
must also consider conflicting interests, namely the extent to which each NSA’s interests align with 
public health interests, how much with profit-making interests, and how much with maintaining the 
independence, integrity and credibility of the WHO as a global health leader. Public health interests, 
and not profit-making interests, should determine global health policy, and also the legitimacy and 
influence of NSAs in the policy-making process. 
The analysis in this dissertation has shown that corporations will go to great lengths to 
protect and expand their ability to make a profit. Although they may provide an essential product or 
service to advance public health, and they may be happy to see this positive outcome, fundamentally 
their main interest is turning a profit. That is the corporation’s raison d’être. Corporations can be 
necessary and even important global health actors, but, based on the analysis in this dissertation, they 
should not be part of policy-making. They may contribute to the common good, but, as Marks 
(2019, p. 51) notes, “they cannot and should not be considered [its] guardians,” which is the 
responsibility of public officials, government bodies, and intergovernmental organizations. Based on 
the analysis in this dissertation, therefore, the WHO must take measures to protect global health 
policy and policy-making against profit-driven influence and safeguard its own independence, 
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integrity and credibility as a global health leader, including by responding appropriately to both 
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